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“This publication has been funded under the SEAMLESS integrated project, EU 6th 
Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration, 
Priority 1.1.6.3. Global Change and Ecosystems (European Commission, DG Research, 
contract no. 010036-2). Its content does not represent the official position of the European 
Commission and is entirely under the responsibility of the authors.” 
"The information in this document is provided as is and no guarantee or warranty is given 
that the information is fit for any particular purpose.  The user thereof uses the information at 
its sole risk and liability." 
Disclaimer 2: 
Within the SEAMLESS project many reports are published. Some of these reports are 
intended for public use, others are confidential and intended for use within the SEAMLESS 
consortium only. As a consequence references in the public reports may refer to internal 
project deliverables that cannot be made public outside the consortium. 
When citing this SEAMLESS report, please do so as: 
Schleyer. C., Theesfeld, I., Hagedorn, K., Aznar, O., Callois, J.M. et al., 2007. Approach 
towards an operational tool to apply institutional analysis for the assessment of policy 
feasibility within SEAMLESS-IF, SEAMLESS Report No.29, SEAMLESS integrated 
project, EU 6th Framework Programme, contract no. 010036-2, www.SEAMLESS-IP.org, 
169 pp, ISBN no. 90-8585-117-3 and 978-90-8585-117-2. 
 
 

SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 5 of 170 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents 5 
General Part 9 
Objective within the Project 9 
General Information 9 
Executive Summary 9 
Scientific and Societal Relevance 11 
Specific Part: Institutional Analysis for the Assessment of Policy Feasibility 13 
1 Introduction 13 
1.1 Institutions 14 
1.2 Institutional Change 16 
1.3 Institutions for Sustainability 18 
1.4 State of the Art of Institutional Indicators 20 
2 The Concept of Institutional Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 23 
2.1 Institutional Compatibility 23 
2.2 The Different Roles of Institutional Analysis within SEAMLESS-IF 24 
2.2.1 Institutional Pre-model Analysis 24 
2.2.2 Institutional Post-model Analysis 26 
3 The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) 27 
3.1 Step 1: Classification of Policy Options – Deriving Policy Types 28 
3.2 Step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 33 
3.3 Step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types with Institutional Indicators 
  38 
3.4 Step 4: Method to Aggregate Information on Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 
  61 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 6 of 170 
4 Integration of PICA in SEAMLESS-IF 63 
4.1 Integration of PICA in SEAMLESS-IF: Test Case 1 (Trade Liberalisation) 63 
4.1.1 Description of the Policy Option in Prototype 1 (Test Case 1) 63 
4.1.2 PICA step 1: Classification of the Policy Option 64 
4.1.3 PICA step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects related to the Policy Option 64 
4.1.4 PICA step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects of the Policy Option to Institutional 
Indicators 66 
4.1.5 PICA step 4: Aggregating Information on Crucial Institutional Aspects of the Policy 
Option  77 
4.2 Integration of PICA in SEAMLESS-IF: Test Case 2 (here: Nitrate Directive) 78 
4.2.1 Description of the Policy Option in Prototype 2 (Test Case 2) 78 
4.2.2 PICA step 1: Classification of the Policy Option 78 
4.2.3 PICA step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects related to the Policy Option 79 
4.2.4 PICA step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects of the Policy Option to Institutional 
Indicators 80 
4.2.5 PICA step 4: Aggregating Information on Crucial Institutional Aspects of the Policy 
Option  86 
5 Concluding Remarks 89 
References 91 
Glossary 95 
Appendices 97 
Appendix 1: Review on Research and the Literature on Institutional Indicators for Sustainability
 99 
1 Cluster of Institutional Indicators 99 
1.1 Good Governance Cluster 99 
1.1.1 Good Governance Indicators in Detail 100 
1.1.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Good Governance Cluster for Institutional 
Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 103 
1.2 Social Capital Cluster 104 
1.2.1 Social Capital Indicators in Detail 104 
1.2.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Social Capital Cluster for Institutional Analysis 
in SEAMLESS-IF 106 
1.3 Sustainability Cluster 107 
1.3.1 Sustainability – the Fourth Dimension’s Indicators in Detail 107 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 7 of 170 
1.3.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Fourth Dimension Cluster for Institutional 
Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 109 
1.4 Transaction Costs Cluster 109 
1.4.1 Transaction Costs Indicators in Detail 112 
1.4.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Transaction Cost Cluster for Institutional 
Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 113 
2 Gaps and Interlinkages of Institutional Indicators for Sustainability in SEAMLESS 113 
3 Developing a Classification System for Institutional Indicators 116 
4 Tables 119 
Table A1-1: Good Governance Institutional Indicators 119 
Table A1-2: Social Capital Institutional Indicators 123 
Table A1-3: Sustainability Institutional Indicators 125 
Table A1-4: Transaction Costs Institutional Indicators 128 
References 130 
Appendix 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types: PICA Step 2 137 
1 Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 137 
1.1 Subsidies for the Production of Environmental Services 138 
1.2 Rural Development Schemes Encouraging Self-organised Networks 138 
1.3 Agri-environmental Schemes in the New Member States 139 
1.4 The Endowment Effect of Property Rights 140 
1.5 Subsidising Collective Action of Landowners to Restore Wetlands 141 
1.6 Compulsory Restrictions in New Member States 142 
1.7 Implementation of Tradable Permits 142 
1.8 Fostering Endogenous Development Strategies through “Territorial Policies” 143 
1.9 Voluntary Co-operative Agreements between Farmers and (Private) Water Suppliers in 
Europe  144 
1.10 Pollution Licences 145 
1.11 Contracting between National and Regional Levels in Economic Development Actions 146 
1.12 Decentralisation of Rural Development Interventions 146 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 8 of 170 
1.13 Introduction of River Basin Management within the Water Framework Directive 147 
1.14 Privatisation of Public Services 148 
1.15 Implementing Agricultural Labels 148 
1.16 Agricultural Subsidies Subject to Compliance with Environmental Standards 150 
2 Crucial Institutional Aspects not Directly Related to Policy Options 150 
(Trade-related) Agricultural Protectionist Policies 150 
2.1 Deregulation of Agricultural Trade in Russia 150 
2.2 New (Potentially Legitimate and Welfare-enhancing) Arguments for Trade-related 
Protectionism 151 
2.3 Trade Policy Liberalisation in Poor Countries with Smallholder Agriculture 152 
2.4 Direct Versus Indirect Agricultural Support Schemes: Farmers’ Perceived Dependence on 
Support  153 
2.5 Political Costs of (Reducing) Agricultural Protection 153 
Environmental Policies 154 
2.6 Transaction Costs in Environmental Policies 154 
2.7 Constraints to Cost-efficient and Equitable Environmental Policy Design 155 
General Institutional Aspects 156 
2.8 Redundant and Contradictory Public Policies 156 
2.9 Acceptance of Policies by Citizens 156 
2.10 Social Capital Dimensions: Interpersonal Trust and Trust Towards Government 
Authorities 157 
References 157 
Appendix 3: Suggestions for Operationalisation of PICA and its Integration in the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) 163 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 9 of 170 
General Part 
Objective within the Project 
This Deliverable D2.4.2 comprises the work done by Task 2.4 (Activities 2.4.1-3) on the 
development of indicators characterising policy delivery systems and institutional 
environments. Task 2.4 addresses, in particular, the issue of the institutional conditions 
required to implement policies that acknowledge and promote sustainability and 
multifunctional aspects of agriculture. The final goal of Task 2.4 is to produce ex-ante an 
institutional assessment of agri-environmental policy options through their impact on the 
contribution of agriculture to sustainable development. This work will continue in WP 6, in 
particular in Task 6.4 where the “Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment 
(PICA)” introduced in this Deliverable will be tested, improved, and further integrated in 
SEAMLESS-IF. 
General Information 
Task(s) and Activity code(s): Task 2.4 Activity 2.4.1-3 
Input from (Task and Activity codes): Task 2.2; (Task 4.5)  
Output to (Task and Activity codes): Task 1.3; Task 2.2; Task 6.4 
Related milestones: M 2.4.1 
Executive Summary 
This Deliverable D2.4.2 comprises the work done by Task 2.4 (Activities 2.4.1-3) on the 
development of indicators characterising policy delivery systems and institutional 
environments. Task 2.4 addresses, in particular, the issue of the institutional conditions 
required to implement policies that acknowledge and promote sustainability and 
multifunctional aspects of agriculture. The final goal of Task 2.4 is to produce ex-ante an 
institutional assessment of agri-environmental policy options through their impact on the 
contribution of agriculture to sustainable development. For this purpose, the “Procedure for 
Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)” has been developed as a formalised 
methodology to assess the compatibility between policy options and various institutional 
contexts. 
In the introductory Section 1, the terms and concepts Institutions, Institutional Change, and 
Institutions for Sustainability are defined according to their utilisation in Task 2.4 and in the 
SEAMLESS-IF. Institutions are defined as the formal and informal rules of a society or of 
organisations that facilitate coordination among people by helping them form expectations. 
They also function as constraints that shape human interaction and the enforcement 
characteristics of these constraints. Institutions are not static, but dynamic, i.e. they evolve 
and change over time. Those processes of institutional change can be induced by a large 
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variety of triggers, such as new policies. Institutions for Sustainability are all institutional 
arrangements that help policies aiming at integrative sustainable development, i.e. integrating 
economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainability, to become effective. 
Further, a state-of-the-art review on institutional indicators (based on PD2.4.1) that was 
carried out at an early stage of Task 2.4 in order to assess the suitability of existing 
approaches and indicators for ex-ante institutional analysis of policy options is summarised. 
The institutional indicators found in the literature can be divided into four clusters that reflect 
their origin in the literature as well as their characteristics and purpose: good governance, 
social capital, institutions as the fourth dimension of sustainability, and transaction costs. 
The review revealed that only few indicators are focussing on the aspects and perspectives 
that are relevant in SEAMLESS. Above all, most indicators have been developed and used 
for ex-post assessments of policies, or other forms of ex-post analysis. Yet in some other 
crucial areas, indicators are simply missing. In essence, there are only a limited number of 
appropriate indicators (proxies and variables) that can be made operational for institutional 
analysis in SEAMLESS. More precisely, the indicators not always fulfil scientific qualitative 
criteria, such as being indicative, robust, and sensitive and the causal relations between 
different indicators are often not clearly defined. Appendix 1 contains an extensive 
description and discussion of these clusters. 
The subsequent Section 2 introduces the concept of institutional analysis in SEAMLESS-IF. 
In particular, the institutional compatibility approach is described. It refers to the 
compatibility between policy instruments and the respective institutional context to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of policymaking. Cost-efficiency and effectiveness of policies 
depend on the institutional arrangements (property rights and governance structures) in place. 
On the one hand, appropriate institutions increase the likelihood of actually achieving the 
policy objectives. On the other hand, appropriate institutions ensure that these policy 
objectives are achieved at reasonable costs.  
Further, the contributions of institutional analysis to the pre-modelling as well as to the post-
modelling phase of SEAMLESS-IF are highlighted. In the pre-modelling phase, first, 
components of PICA will be used to select and modify policy scenarios in the pre-modelling 
phase (see PD6.2.1.2). In particular, it will assist in developing an institutional typology of 
countries and regions for the definition of policy scenarios. Second, PICA will provide hints 
on whether institutional constraints in some or many countries and/or regions are likely to be 
prohibitive and the policy option will hardly become effective there. In the post-modelling 
phase, PICA will put the mainly quantitative model results into (institutional) context. This 
contributes to the validation of the model results on policy effects.  
Section 3 focuses on the “Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)” that 
has been developed as a formalised methodology to assess the compatibility between policy 
options and various institutional contexts, thus, providing the conceptual basis for an 
institutional dimension in modelling. PICA comprises four distinct working steps: 1) 
clustering policy options according to the type of intervention, the area of intervention, 
possibly involved property rights changes, and the type of the natural resource(s) addressed 
by the policy options; 2) Linking each policy cluster to specific sets of crucial institutional 
aspects; 3) Using institutional indicators to evaluate the respective crucial institutional aspect, 
i.e. the degree of its potential to constrain or to foster implementation of the policy option; 4) 
Deriving statements - arranged in thematic categories of institutional compatibility - about the 
probable effectiveness of the policy options from an institutional perspective depending on 
the combination and degree of the identified relevant institutional aspects.  
In Section 4, PICA is applied to the SEAMLESS Test Case 1 (Trade Liberalisation) and Test 
Case 2 (here: Nitrate Directive) to illustrate in a detailed way the concrete steps of 
institutional compatibility analysis within SEAMLESS.  
SEAMLESS 
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Finally, the concluding Section highlights the necessary steps for making PICA operational 
within SEAMLESS-IF. This is complemented by a detailed visual depiction of the sequence 
and the form of interactions between the User(s), the PICA expert team, other SEAMLESS 
Working Groups and - if applicable - external experts and stakeholders in Appendix 3. The 
depiction also provides suggestions on the representation of the different PICA components 
in the Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
Scientific and Societal Relevance 
While the relevance of institutional analysis for assessing the effectiveness and cost-
efficiency of (agri-environmental) policy implementation is largely accepted among 
scientists, the state-of-the-art in institutional economics offers hardly any standardised 
procedure for institutional analysis that can easily be combined with environmental and 
agricultural models widely used for ex-ante policy impact assessment. This Deliverable aims 
at filling this gap by introducing - at a conceptual level – a formalised methodology to assess 
the compatibility between policy options and various institutional contexts: the “Procedure 
for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)”. It will also present in detail information 
on missing data and other scientific information, thus, indicating knowledge gaps and 
assisting in clarifying future research needs. 
PICA allows for the systematic institutional ex-ante assessment of (agri-environmental) 
policies. This enables policy makers to identify at an early stage (potential) institutional 
incompatibilities between policy options and the various institutional contexts in different 
countries and regions. In addition, PICA can provide hints for a better policy design in terms 
of effectiveness and cost-efficiency.  
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Specific Part: Institutional Analysis for the 
Assessment of Policy Feasibility 
1 Introduction 
Sustainable resource use often fails, among other reasons, due to missing or inadequate 
institutional arrangements, policy makers often assume to be in place. This reasoning draws 
on political science and institutional economics literature and is substantiated with ample 
empirical cases given, for instance, in the common-pool resource debate (Dovers, 2001; Esty 
et al., 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Pellegrini, 1999; Pistor, 2002; 
Theesfeld, 2004). Often the effective institutional arrangements are ignored and policies that 
are not compatible with the existing formal and informal rules of society are implemented. 
Thus, the policy turns out to be ineffective although it aims at integrative sustainable 
development. In turn, policies aiming at integrative sustainable development, i.e. integrating 
economic, social, and environmental dimension of sustainability, often require special 
institutional arrangements to reach their aims.  
This Deliverable D2.4.2 comprises the work done by Task 2.4 (Activities 2.4.1-3) on the 
development of indicators characterising policy delivery systems and institutional 
environments. Task 2.4 addresses, in particular, the issue of the institutional conditions 
required to implement policies that acknowledge and promote sustainability and 
multifunctional aspects of agriculture. The final goal of Task 2.4 is to produce ex-ante an 
institutional assessment of agri-environmental policy options through their impact on the 
contribution of agriculture to sustainable development.  
Institutions are defined as the formal and informal rules of a society or of organisations that 
facilitate coordination among people by helping them form expectations. They also function 
as constraints that shape human interaction and the enforcement characteristics of these 
constraints.  
The Deliverable is structured as follows:  
First, in this introductory Section 1, the terms and concepts Institutions, Institutional Change, 
and Institutions for Sustainability1 are defined according to their utilisation in Task 2.4 and in 
the SEAMLESS-IF. Further, the main results of an extensive review on research and 
literature on institutional indicators are summarised (based on PD2.4.1). This state-of-the-art 
review on institutional indicators was carried out at an early stage of Task 2.4 in order to 
assess the suitability of existing approaches and indicators for ex-ante institutional analysis of 
policy options. Four clusters of institutional indicators that reflect their origin in the 
literature as well as their characteristics and purpose can be distinguished: good governance, 
social capital, institutions as the fourth dimension of sustainability, and transaction costs. 
Appendix 1 contains an extensive description and discussion of these clusters. 
The subsequent Section 2 introduces the concept of institutional analysis in SEAMLESS-IF. 
In particular, the idea of Institutional Compatibility - the compatibility between a policy and 
                                                     
1 The terms sustainability and sustainable development are used synonymously. The latter term was 
coined by the Brundtland Report in 1987 (WCED, 1987). 
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the respective institutional context – is elaborated on. Further, the different roles of 
institutional analysis within SEAMLESS-IF is described. Institutional analysis is contributing 
to the pre-modelling as well as to the post-modelling analysis. 
In the pre-modelling phase, first, components of PICA will be used to select and modify 
policy scenarios in the pre-modelling phase (see PD6.2.1.2). In particular, it will assist in 
developing an institutional typology of countries and regions for the definition of policy 
scenarios. Second, PICA will provide hints on whether institutional constraints in some or 
many countries and/or regions are likely to be prohibitive and the policy option will hardly 
become effective there. As a result, it could be recommended - and discussed with the User(s) 
- to modify the policy option or to carry out additional in-depth institutional pre-studies 
before running the other models. In the post-modelling phase, PICA will put the mainly 
quantitative model results into (institutional) context. This contributes to the validation of the 
model results on policy effects. 
Section 3 focuses on the “Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)” that 
has been developed as a formalised methodology to assess the compatibility between policy 
options and various institutional contexts, thus, providing the conceptual basis for an 
institutional dimension in modelling. PICA comprises four distinct working steps that are 
subsequently described in more detail: 1) clustering policy options according to the type of 
intervention, the area of intervention, possibly involved property rights changes, and the type 
of the natural resource(s) addressed by the policy options; 2) Linking each policy cluster to 
specific sets of crucial institutional aspects; 3) Using institutional indicators to evaluate the 
respective crucial institutional aspect, i.e. the degree of its potential to constrain or to foster 
implementation of the policy option; 4) Deriving statements - arranged in thematic categories 
of institutional compatibility - about the probable effectiveness of the policy options from an 
institutional perspective depending on the combination and degree of the identified relevant 
institutional aspects.  
In Section 4, PICA will be applied to the SEAMLESS Test Case 1 (Trade Liberalisation) and 
Test Case 2 (here: Nitrate Directive2) to illustrate in a detailed way the concrete steps of 
institutional compatibility analysis within SEAMLESS.  
Finally, the concluding Section will highlight the necessary steps for making PICA 
operational within SEAMLESS-IF. The description of the steps is complemented by a 
detailed visual depiction of the sequence and the form of interactions between the User(s), the 
PICA expert team, other SEAMLESS Working Groups and - if applicable - external experts 
and stakeholders in Appendix 3. The depiction also provides suggestions on the 
representation of the different PICA components in the Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
1.1 Institutions 
The basic functions of institutions are defined in accordance with the understanding of 
institutions prevailing in institutional economics and most areas of social sciences. 
Institutions are the rules of a society or of organisations that facilitate coordination among 
people by helping them form expectations, which each person can reasonably hold in dealing 
with others (Blaas, 1982). They reflect the conventions that have evolved in different 
                                                     
2 While Test Case 2 in SEAMLESS will address environmental policies and agro-ecological 
technologies to preserve water resources and biodiversity, there is no final decision on the concrete 
policy option, yet. For illustrating the basic functions of PICA, the Nitrate Directive as an important 
water-related environmental policy will be focussed on. 
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societies regarding the behaviour of individuals and groups relative to their own behaviour 
and the behaviour of others.3 Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They are made 
up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, and constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms 
of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic (North, 1990: 3; North, 1994: 359). 
In particular, “an institution can be defined as the set of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what 
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals 
dependent on their actions” (Ostrom, 1990: 51). It is useful to distinguish three levels of rules 
that affect the actions taken and outcomes obtained in using a resource. These levels of rules 
may appear on each geographical scale. 
1) Operational rules directly affect the day-to-day decisions made by appropriators 
concerning when, where and how to withdraw resource units, what information must 
be exchanged or withheld, and what rewards or sanctions will be assigned. 
2) Collective-choice rules indirectly affect operational choices. These are the rules that 
are used by appropriators, their officials, or external authorities in making policies.  
3) Constitutional-choice rules affect operational activities and result through their 
effects in determining who is eligible and determining the specific rules to be used in 
crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the set of operational 
rules.  
Here, Ostrom (1999: 52ff.) stresses that those rules are “nested”. This means that the presence 
of some rules governs the choice of other rules (at other levels). For instance, an operational 
rule is that farmers are not allowed to take specific actions in farming their land. In some 
protected areas, they are not allowed to apply fertilisers and pesticides on their land (to ensure 
the quality of drinking water). Thus, farmers would adapt their production techniques in their 
day-to-day decisions accordingly, and would apply neither fertilisers nor pesticides. Of 
course, farmers could also opt for disregarding the rule, e.g., because there is no (effective) 
monitoring of compliance with the rule. 
The collective choice rule defines how the above-mentioned regulation, i.e. the operational 
rule is established. This would include the definition of who (which actor or group of actors) 
is eligible to decide (establish, modify, and eliminate) on the operational rule and how the 
process of decision-making has to be structured. There might be actors at all administrative 
and political levels involved in defining the operational rules. For example, considering the 
designation of protected areas in Germany, the legislative framework is set at the national 
level, whereas detailed restrictions and requirements are defined in Federal State (Laender) 
acts. For instance, protected areas, such as nature reserves, are subject to stronger protection 
and the specific restrictions are determined, monitored, and enforced by the (local) 
administration of the nature reserves. Thus, in Germany, authorities at the Laender level can 
initiate the process of designation of a protected area but they have to follow the 
corresponding collective choice rules (determined in the respective national and Laender 
                                                     
3 In the area of economic relations, they play a crucial role in establishing expectations about the rights 
to use resources in economic activities and about the partitioning of the income streams resulting from 
economic activity (Ruttan, 1984: 2f.). 
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acts) including rules on the process of setting up this area, such as compulsory stakeholder 
participation. 
Collective choice situations (here, Laender designating protected areas and defining the 
corresponding land use restrictions using specific procedures) are structured by rules 
determined at a constitutional choice level. A constitutional choice rule is Germany’s 
constitution, determining the federal character of the political and administrative structures, 
i.e. the distribution of competencies between the national level and Germany’s 16 Laender. In 
that system, environmental protection including the designation of protected areas is in the 
responsibility of the Laender. 
Finally, there is an important distinction between institutions and organisations. State 
agencies or other collective actors are organisations, yet, they obtain their meaning from 
institutions. In other words, organisations only exist because there is a set of working rules 
that defines them (Bromley, 1989: 43). Governance is often referred to as what governments 
do. However, when resource users govern themselves under customary institutions, e.g., 
managing natural resources locally, this often does not involve the state (directly). Yet, 
indirectly, the state is often involved even in the establishment of local resource management 
systems (e.g., providing the legal framework or financial support).  
From these definitions, the functions of institutions can be summarised as giving structure, 
building expectations, and setting constraints to human interactions.  
1.2 Institutional Change 
Institutions are not static, but dynamic, i.e. they evolve and change over time. This is called 
institutional change. The large amount of theoretical literature on institutional change will not 
be explored here. However, it is emphasised that processes of institutional change can be 
induced by a large variety of triggers; not only by politicians implementing a new policy. 
More precisely, those triggers can start institutional change, but they can also aggravate, 
divert, and hamper ongoing processes of institutional change. Some examples are: 
• Implementation of a new policy: The implementation of the EU Nitrate Directive, for 
instance, induces a change in the property rights of farmers on their land (see Section 
4.2). Among other things, they are no longer allowed to use as much fertilisers on their 
land as they want. In order to make enforcement of this policy effective new controlling 
and monitoring systems will have to be introduced or existing ones changed, thus, the 
governance structures4 will change. Here, new actors might become involved (e.g., some 
state authority responsible for monitoring farmers’ behaviour and/or sanctioning 
misconduct). It is important to note, that the introduction of such a policy is - at the same 
time - a starting point for processes of institutional change and the outcome of a previous 
process of institutional change. In this example, the EU Nitrate Directive can be seen as a 
new (formal) rule governing the activities of farmers as a response to an increasing 
pollution of (ground) water due to the use of fertilisers on agricultural land. Policies can 
also be designed to change informal rules, such as understanding and perceptions of 
farmers related to fertiliser use. In such cases, policies aim at implementing good 
management practices, well-equipped and educated advisory systems, and arenas for 
communication and learning.  
                                                     
4 Governance structures are the organisational solutions for making rules (institutions) effective, i.e. 
they are necessary for guaranteeing the rights and duties and their use in coordinating transactions. 
(e.g., Ostrom, 1990) 
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• New transactions5 may occur that cause conflicts between actors and other problems: For 
example, due to technological innovations and their introduction in agriculture, new 
transactions can evolve, such as seeds from genetically modified organisms (GMO) 
blown to a neighbouring field planted with organic crops. For the organic farmer, this 
constitutes an unwanted problem - causing transaction costs6 since he or she might not be 
able to market his or her crops as “organic”. Outcomes of an institutional change induced 
by the wind-born transport of GMO seeds or pollen to a non-GMO-field (organic or 
conventional) might include new or adapted governance structures (or, at least, the need 
for it), e.g., fencing mechanisms, forming of GMO-free zones by farmers, and the 
introduction of a new EU Directive or national (liability) law on GMO. 
• New technologies may also induce changes of the properties of an already existing 
transaction (economic exchange): For example, fishing in the Baltic Sea is an activity 
that leads - due to the characteristics of the resource, the involved actors, and the 
institutional arrangements (property rights and governance structures) in place - to the 
problem of over-fishing. The result is the depletion of the fish resource. Now, if it would 
be possible to operate a beam from a satellite that is able to register every single fishing 
boat this would allow the actors operating the beam to control the access to the Baltic 
Sea, and, perhaps, to sanction illegal access. This would change the character of the Sea 
from a common-pool resource – with low excludability and high rivalry in consumption - 
towards a resource with the character of a private good with high rivalry but also the 
possibility to exclude resource users from the resource system. This could lead to 
institutional change within the governance structures and the property rights and duties 
connected with fishing in the Baltic Sea. Since monitoring access to the Sea is easy now, 
establishing a private property regime over the resource Baltic Sea would be feasible and 
enforceable (given the ability of owner(s) to prosecute illegal access). In other words, a 
new technology – here, reducing the costs for monitoring resource use - might enable 
new modes of governance, i.e., provide new options to govern a resource-depleting 
activity or transaction. Another example is the introduction of Global Positioning System 
(GPS)-based Precision Farming that is effectively mitigating the problem of overuse of 
fertilisers and, thus, pollution of groundwater with nitrates.  
• Other triggers for institutional change might include changed price relations at product 
markets that are caused, for example, by changed consumer preferences for organically 
produced food. Here, state or private organisations might evolve establishing (new) 
governance systems to monitor and sanction the production of organic produce or to co-
ordinate marketing activities.  
• External shocks, such as floods and other natural catastrophes, but also rapid political 
and social system transformations, e.g., in the Eastern European Countries (EEC), can 
trigger institutional change. 
                                                     
5 Transactions (economic exchanges) are the basic unit of analysis in New Institutional Economics 
(NIE). That is distinct from other units of analysis widely used in environmental and resource 
economics, such as externalities, public goods, resource utilisation, and common pool resources. 
Following Williamson (1985: 1), “a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a 
technological separable interface”. See Section 1.4 in Appendix 1 for a more differentiated discussion 
of transaction characteristics in the field of agri-environment. 
6 Transaction costs comprise ex-ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement but 
also the ex-post costs for maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract execution is 
misaligned because of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances: the costs of running the 
economic system (Williamson, 1996). 
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The discussion of the variety of possible triggers for institutional change leads to another 
important question: What actually determines the outcomes of a specific process of 
institutional change? What are relevant driving forces? For example, why does the 
introduction of GMOs in agriculture (for commercial usage) in Germany lead farmers in 
some regions to act co-operatively by forming GMO-free zones, but not in other regions? 
Why does privatisation of agricultural land, more precisely, the introduction of private 
property rights on land in some EEC countries lead to cost-efficient and competitive forms of 
agricultural land use, but not in others? Prominent theories trying to explain outcomes of 
institutional change include a) the Efficiency Theories of Institutional Change focusing on 
efficiency aspects and on competitive pressure as selection mechanisms for cost-efficient 
institutions (Eggertsson, 1990: 53; Allio et al., 1997), b) the Distributional Theory of 
Institutional Change explaining institutional change “as a by-product of strategic conflict over 
substantive social outcomes” (Knight, 1992: 126), and c) the Public Choice Theory of 
Institutional Change concentrating on the activities of political actors to govern and to control 
changes in institutions (Meyer, 1996; Weimer, 1997).  
Moreover, institutions are not only modified intentionally, but institutional change does also 
happen spontaneously (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). Furthermore, institutional change can 
have both, intended and unintended outcomes. 
1.3 Institutions for Sustainability 
In the course of evaluating the progress in implementing Agenda 21, the Commission on 
Sustainable Development of the United Nations (UNCSD) defined sustainability as having 
four dimensions (Spangenberg and Bonniot, 1998; Spangenberg et al., 2002). Besides the 
economic, social, and environmental dimension, institutions are defined as the fourth 
dimension of sustainability. The same reasoning is applied in the MATISSE project (Methods 
and Tools for Integrated Sustainability Assessment) funded within the 6th Framework 
Program of the European Union. MATISSE starts from the assumption that no single tool or 
instrument can capture all stages and dimensions of sustainability. It calls for “new and 
improved tools and methods that integrate the social, economic, environmental, and 
institutional dimension of sustainability” (Weaver, 2005: 50). MATISSE follows a dual track 
approach, combining a pragmatic need to improve and inter-link existing tools and 
simultaneously develop a new generation of specifically designed Integrated Sustainability 
Assessment Tools. The process of methodological development highlights, in particular, 
institutional aspects as one dimension of sustainability. Likewise, in SEAMLESS, the fourth 
dimension represents an important challenge to fully integrate economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability objectives within the necessary institutional structures. Patterns 
of unsustainable behaviour have emerged over long periods of time and are highly resistant to 
change. They are largely determined by institutional arrangements. “Without institutional 
change we will not move purposefully toward sustainability” (Dovers, 2001).  
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Figure 1: Institutions for Sustainability – The Fourth Dimension 
Institutions include mechanisms that facilitate or hamper decision-making aiming at 
sustainability by political actors. Further, institutional arrangements affect (positively or 
negatively) the implementation of rules by the authorities and the behaviour in following 
these rules by farmers and other actors. Depending on the (natural) resource characteristics, 
those institutions that allow for sustainable development are often accompanied by specific 
governance structures, such as horizontal non-market coordination. This includes, for 
example, various forms of cooperation and collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 
1994), formal and informal networks as knowledge and information systems, and methods 
and infrastructure for measuring, monitoring, and evaluating environmental damages and 
benefits, but also conflict resolution mechanisms and incentives and opportunities to promote 
innovation and learning (Hagedorn et al., 2002). These governance structures range from 
informal to formal, and their scales vary from local to international. Paavola and Adger 
(2005) coin this “environmental governance” and refer to the creation of new organisations, 
such as the establishment of environmental agencies or the delegation of authority to existing 
agencies to undertake governance activities.  
In the SEAMLESS project, the ex-ante assessment of the impacts of policy options on 
sustainable development is at the core. Here, policies aiming at sustainable resource use 
might call for new, existing, or adapted forms of environmental governance in order to 
become cost-efficient and effective7; thus, policy makers might want to encourage or 
implement those forms of environmental governance in complementary policies, or modify 
the original policy accordingly. In this context, Dovers (2001: 4) stresses that institutions for 
sustainability must be persistent over time, be obedient to core principles, be informed and 
informing, be inclusive of a variety of interests, and be sufficiently flexible to learn and 
improve. 
                                                     
7 Effectiveness refers to the accuracy and completeness with which the specified goals/policy 
objectives can be achieved. Cost-efficiency (or, cost-effectiveness) is determined by relating the 
resources (costs) expended to the accuracy and completeness of goals/policy objectives achieved. 
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1.4 State of the Art of Institutional Indicators 
In order to assess the suitability of existing approaches and indicators for ex-ante institutional 
analysis of policy options an extensive research and literature review capturing the state-of-
the-art of institutional indicators8 was carried out at an early stage of Task 2.4 (PD2.4.1). 
Institutional analysis, in particular with respect to indicator development and methodological 
issues, is a comparatively young, yet growing area of research. For example, the United 
Nations Commission for Sustainable Development (UN, 2001) concluded from the testing 
period of their core set of indicators for sustainable development, that the institutional area 
need further development and refinement in comparison to the other three dimensions. 
Further, Guinomet (1999) carried out a comparative study on indicators for sustainable 
development in 26 initiatives by international organisations, research institutes, and 
governments. He found that both, institutional aspects and institutional indicators play a 
rather minor role. Only five of 26 projects mention institutional aspects at all, only two name 
institutional indicators, and in none of the projects institutional aspects are treated as of 
primary importance.  
Underlining the above observations, the state-of-the-art review carried out by Task 2.4 
revealed that only few indicators are focussing on the aspects and perspectives that are 
relevant in SEAMLESS. Above all, most indicators have been developed and used for ex-
post assessments of policies, or other forms of ex-post analysis. Yet in some other crucial 
areas, indicators are simply missing. For example, the indicators scrutinized in this Section 
and in the Appendix 1 miss institutional aspects that are crucial when analysing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation, such as effective property rights (i.e., 
rules-in-use) on nature components and proxies for effective governance structures at a 
certain geographical scale.  
In essence, there are only a limited number of appropriate indicators that can be used directly 
for institutional analysis in SEAMLESS. More precisely, the indicators not always fulfil 
scientific qualitative criteria, such as being indicative, i.e. truly representing the phenomenon 
intended to characterised, robust, i.e. directionally safe with not significant changes in case of 
minor changes in the methodology or improvements in the data base, and sensitive, i.e. 
reacting early and sensibly to changes in what they are monitoring. Additionally, the causal 
relations between different indicators are often not clearly defined.  
However, the mere existence of some indicators that are already operational, i.e. which have 
an accessible data set, and are indicative, robust, and sensitive does not mean that they are 
appropriate for the objectives of institutional analysis in SEAMLESS. In SEAMLESS it is 
aimed at measuring the impact of policies on sustainability and to assess the institutional 
context with respect to its impact on the effectiveness of policy implementation. Thus, the 
measurement of institutions within SEAMLESS has to be closely connected to the policy 
option to be implemented. This adds a particular difficulty, which is not yet addressed in the 
institutional indicators literature that does not aim at institutional compatibility of policy 
options. Further, the methodologies for ex-ante policy assessment from an institutional 
perspective are rare, and none of them can be directly used in a formalised way. Because of 
                                                     
8 For convenience, in this Deliverable, the term “institutional indicator” is used capturing all variables 
and proxies that can be used for the analysis of institutions and governance systems. This might also 
encompass indicators that are usually referred to as economic, ecological, or social indicators. For 
example, farming structures or forms of land use that can be found in a Member State of region do 
have an impact on the institutional compatibility of proposed policy options since they are important 
signals “describing” the institutional context the policy is (supposed to be) implemented in. The level 
of social capitel would be another crucial indicator for institutional analysis. 
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this, the “Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment” (PICA) that will be 
introduced in Section 3 was developed as an alternative/new approach to overcome the 
aforementioned deficits, or to limit their effects. Thus, quite a few of the reviewed proxies 
and variables can be made operational for institutional analysis in SEAMLESS. 
The literature and research on institutional indicators that was reviewed can be divided into 
four clusters that reflect their origin in the literature as well as their characteristics and 
purpose: good governance, social capital, institutions as the fourth dimension of 
sustainability, and transaction costs (see also Theesfeld and Beckmann, forthcoming):  
1. The good governance cluster provides indicators to assess primarily under which 
institutional conditions governance promotes rather than retards economic development. 
These well-developed indicators are based on statistical data at a national scale to suit 
international comparison. The developed indices are suitable for econometric analysis 
and the underlying data sets are well tended and accessible.  
2. Social capital is widely seen as a prerequisite for collective action. This cluster deals with 
indicators that try to measure social cohesion, values, and communication capacities. The 
used indicators are either subjective - based on local case studies - or objective rough 
proxies from local or regional data. Case study data are scattered and not comprised in 
any data set and the proxies used are very indirect.  
3. The third cluster - institutions as the fourth dimension of sustainability -, is conceived as 
being the closest to the SEAMLESS objective, in particular considering its objective to 
measure institutional performance with the help of indicators. This approach is rooted in 
the sustainability debate of the United Nations. Similar to the perspective on the role of 
institutions in SEAMLESS they are regarded as providing the necessary structures 
capable of delivering the other three dimensions of sustainability: social, environmental, 
and economic sustainability. The Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat) has produced a set of indicators adapted to the situation in the EU, based on the 
indicator core set proposed by the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development. However, the review of these indicator sets revealed that especially the 
institutional indicators are rudimentary. While there is indeed a limited number of 
scientific works focusing on their further development, it only takes place on a 
conceptual or theoretical level, i.e., these indicators are not operationalised.  
4. The transaction costs cluster provides a number of case studies from various disciplines 
to measure transaction costs, in particular, limited to policy implementation costs on a 
case-to-case basis. These studies give some hints on the efficiency of a policy, e.g., a 
favourable institutional context may lead to higher effectiveness of a policy, yet, this 
might come along with higher transaction costs. In order to generalise from the case study 
results relevant attributes of a transaction have to be determined. This can lead to 
normative statements about governance structures that would mitigate the problem 
addressed by the policy option in a cost minimising way. Importantly, transactions related 
to nature often possess additional distinct and complex attributes that have to be 
considered, such as the excludability of actors from access to the resource, rivalry among 
the users of the resource, and separability of the provision of distinct environmental 
goods. Thus, the range of suitable, in particular horizontal non-market coordination 
mechanisms is arguably much broader in the field of agri-environment.  
There are two important conceptual and methodological reasons for the limited feasibility 
of measuring transaction costs empirically within the institutional analysis in 
SEAMLESS. First, and most important, direct measurement of transaction costs is only 
possible if a concrete organisational or contract arrangement is in place actually 
governing a relevant transaction. That is, (real) transaction costs cannot be observed and 
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quantified before a policy is implemented and is actually inducing or causing these costs. 
In general, calculating hypothetical transaction costs or initiating „simulation 
experiments“ would be options to overcome this problem. However, to gain useful results 
from these approaches a very precise description of the administrative procedures and 
requirements linked to the policy option for all relevant actors (groups), such as farmers, 
regional administrations, etc., would be needed. Further, these requirements - but also the 
related transaction costs - may differ even among the same actor groups. For example, 
large enterprises might face different regulations and application procedures than small 
subsistence farmers. Here, not only the level of transaction costs will differ, but also the 
relevant transaction cost categories. Second, given the SEAMLESS objective aiming at 
being able to assess every agricultural and environmental policy a policy maker can think 
of, identifying all relevant transaction costs categories and measuring all related 
transation costs would be an extremly time-consuming and costly undertaking.  
Appendix 1 contains an extensive description and discussion of these clusters as well as 
detailed tables (A1-1 to A1-4) summarising the characteristics of the indicator found in the 
literature. 
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2 The Concept of Institutional Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 
Policy assessment in SEAMLESS from an institutional perspective follows the concept of 
institutions for sustainability, which is defined as the necessary institutional structure capable 
of delivering concrete economic, social, and environmental sustainability objectives that are 
set by the User(s) when choosing a policy option. Here, the effectiveness of a policy and the 
cost-effectiveness of its implementation depend largely on the degree of compatibility 
between this policy option and the respective institutional context. However, not least 
because institutions usually relate to a great diversity of situations, the state of the art in 
institutional economics offers hardly any standardised procedure for institutional analysis that 
can easily be combined with environmental and agricultural models widely used for policy 
impact assessment. To assess the compatibility between policy options and various 
institutional contexts9 a formalised methodology has been developed that provides the 
conceptual basis for an institutional dimension in modelling: the “Procedure for Institutional 
Compatibility Assessment (PICA)”. Before presenting the respective components of PICA in 
detail in Section 3, this Section 2 will, first, render more precisely the concept of institutional 
compatibility as well as elaborate on the basic role of institutional analysis as pre- and post-
model analysis in SEAMLESS-IF.  
2.1 Institutional Compatibility 
Institutional compatibility refers to the compatibility between policy instruments and the 
respective institutional context to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of policymaking. A 
policy is cost-efficient and effective only if certain institutional arrangements (property rights 
and governance structures) are in place. Thus, on the one hand, appropriate institutions 
increase the likelihood of actually achieving the policy objectives, i.e. they increase the 
degree of actors’ compliance and (intended) change of behaviour. On the other hand, 
appropriate institutions ensure that these policy objectives are achieved at reasonable costs. 
Policy instruments that have proven to be very cost-efficient in a specific institutional context 
might perform rather poorly in another institutional context, i.e. they might be not effective at 
all, or they might induce higher costs to become effective. For example, a regulatory or 
command-and-control policy that puts a ceiling on the allowed amount of pesticides to be 
used per hectare and year might be ineffective if there is no authority in place to monitor and 
sanction farmers’ compliance. Here, effectiveness could be increased to establish such an 
authority; yet, the costs for establishing it might be substantial, thus, reducing the cost 
efficiency. The justifiable costs to be borne by society to make the policy effective cannot be 
defined by scientists; it depends upon public opinion and political will, both very dynamic 
factors. However, the role of scientists can be to identify and to specify those transaction 
costs in an objective manner, if possible. This information would enable policy makers to 
design better policies and to make their choices on a more solid basis. 
In particular when agricultural and environmental policies are concerned, suitable governance 
structures have to address the prevailing interdependencies of the actors, i.e. the fact that the 
                                                     
9 Please note that this policy-oriented approach is distinct from the problem-oriented approach widely 
used for institutional analysis, which would evaluate different institutional arrangements potentially 
able to deal with a concrete resource use problem, and that would - based on this evaluation - derive 
recommendations for suitable institutional solutions. 
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choice of one actor may influence that of another, a situation often overlooked in 
conventional economics, which assumes that agents are independent (Paavola and Adger, 
2005). For example, political jurisdictions targeted by a policy have to match, in an 
appropriate manner, with the range of physical, economic, social, and, in particular, 
institutional linkages found in the rural areas and in the agricultural sector. If carefully 
designed, governance structures can facilitate communication and coordination among 
diverse networks of stakeholders in EU agricultural and environmental policy, thus, making 
effective policy implementation more likely. 
SEAMLESS-IF is supposed to be able to assess a policy option and provide a knowledgeable 
basis for decision makers to judge not only its likely effects on the environmental, economic, 
and social systems. It has also to provide indications on whether the policy can be expected to 
become effective. In principle, a positive research approach would give indications on the 
feasibility of policies and would refer to all phases of the policy cycle: issues entering the 
agenda, gathering information, discussion of concepts, policy formation, policy 
implementation, policy evaluation, feed back to decision makers, and policy adjustment or 
termination. In SEAMLESS, however, institutional analysis is conceptualised and 
operationalised to reveal where a policy option in the implementation phase would be 
compatible with the existing institutional structures, and where an institutional misfit likely to 
hamper policy implementation can be expected.  
2.2 The Different Roles of Institutional Analysis within 
SEAMLESS-IF 
The economic and environmental models used in SEAMLESS-IF do often assume that 
appropriate and required institutions are in place for resource governance towards 
sustainability. The PICA tool developed in Task 2.4 allows questioning these underlying 
assumptions by testing the institutional compatibility between a policy option and the 
respective institutional context. Thereby, the institutional analysis will strengthen the 
modelling approach of SEAMLESS in the pre- and post-modelling phase:  
In the pre-modelling phase, first, components of PICA will be used to select and modify 
policy scenarios in the pre-modelling phase (see PD6.2.1.2). In particular, it will assist in 
developing an institutional typology of countries and regions for the definition of policy 
scenarios. Second, PICA will provide hints on whether institutional constraints in some or 
many countries and/or regions are likely to be prohibitive and the policy option will hardly 
become effective there. As a result, it could be recommended - and discussed with the User(s) 
- to modify the policy option or to carry out additional in-depth institutional pre-studies 
before running the other models. In the post-modelling phase, PICA will put the mainly 
quantitative model results into (institutional) context. This contributes to the validation of the 
model results on policy effects. 
2.2.1 Institutional Pre-model Analysis 
The pre-model analysis refers to the conceptualisation phase of the ex-ante impact assessment 
of policy options within SEAMLESS. The division between pre-model analysis and 
modelling phase is to some extent artificial, as pre-model analysis can also be understood as 
the first step of a model run. There are two distinct functions of institutional analysis in the 
pre-modelling phase:  
First, components of PICA will be used to select and modify policy scenarios in the pre-
modelling phase (see PD6.2.1.2). In particular, it will assist in developing an institutional 
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typology of countries or regions for the definition of policy scenarios. More precisely, for 
testing and improving the SEAMLESS-IF tools to assess the sustainability of agricultural 
systems at EU, national, and regional levels, the general testing procedure will begin to 
develop concrete broad “soft” and “hard” main scenarios for the policy option under scrutiny. 
This will be done in close interaction with the DG-Environment and in User Forums. Parts of 
the PICA tool will be used to identify institutional aspects related to the policy option that are 
likely to affect negatively the effective implementation of the policy. Thereafter, indicators 
that are particularly meaningful and able to assess the extent of the identified constraints are 
used to categorise countries or regions with respect to the relevant crucial institutional 
aspects. Taking the policy option “Nitrate Directive” as an example, “running” PICA might 
point to specific critical features of the institutional context, namely high levels of 
opportunism among actors as well as high levels of corruption in a country or region may 
have a constraining effect on the effectiveness and/or cost-efficiency of implementing the 
policy option. Thus, “real” information/data on the (average) level of opportunism and/or 
corruption in a country or region will be helpful for the development of more detailed 
scenarios according to different (institutional) zones (countries/regions) in the EU. In the 
example, in zones with high (average) levels of opportunism and/or corruption scenarios 
might include complementary measures, such as voluntary, incentive based measures (e.g., 
Agri-Environmental Measures) or cheap/costless advisory services for farmers as well as the 
establishment of an anti-corruption initiative. At this point, the institutional typology of 
countries or regions can also provide information on which complementary measure might be 
best in which country or region. For example, institutional analysis points to the fact that 
effective implementation of Agri-Environmental Measures depends on the experiences the 
targeted actor(s) have with this kind of measures. Here, farmers in the New Member States 
are likely to have less experiences with those incentive measures since AEM endorsed by the 
EU by the Rural Development Regulation (apart from SAPARD) have not been available 
there for such a long time as in the other Member States.  
Changes in the policy scenarios might induce changes in the selection, sequence, or form of 
the other models. For example, institutional analysis might reveal that only certain changes in 
resource use due to policy implementation need to be taken into account by biophysical 
models. More precisely, some policy, which is supposed to be implemented for regulating 
water use, might affect (increase) the price for extracting groundwater, but might have no 
effect on the price for taking water from surface waters, such as rivers. Yet in other cases, 
some models might even be excluded due to their very strong assumptions that differ greatly 
and decisively from the respective real situations. Alternatively, if possible, these 
assumptions could be modified or “relaxed”.  
Second, the PICA tool will assist the User(s) of SEAMLESS-IF in assessing the possibilities 
to implement the chosen policy option in the different institutional contexts of the targeted 
countries and regions. PICA will assess, hence, whether it will be possible to implement a 
certain policy or whether institutional constraints will cause prohibitively high transaction 
costs resulting in the fact that the policy hardly will reach its objective(s). As a result, 
modifications of the policy option (e.g., adding complementary policy features to mitigate the 
likely institutional constraints) might be discussed with the User(s) before running the other 
models. Other suggestions may include more extensive in-depth institutional pre-studies at 
various geographical scales (from country to farm level) - and, perhaps, with a resource- or 
problem-specific focus - in those countries and regions where PICA indicates severe 
institutional incompatibilities.  
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2.2.2 Institutional Post-model Analysis 
Institutional analysis has important functions in the post-modelling phase by relating the 
quantitative model outputs to the concrete institutional contexts identified in the countries and 
regions. Institutional analysis can guide the interpretation of the results and can contribute to 
the validation of the model outputs. For example, a decrease in employment in the 
agricultural sector predicted by the models might have a different meaning in a region where 
a large part of the population is employed in the agricultural sector if compared with a 
decrease in a region where only few people are employed in this sector. Further, if specific 
institutional aspects are prevalent in a region, such as strong farmers’ associations with high 
lobbying capacities, the decrease in employment might be lower than predicted by the 
models. Taking another example, model results predicting extensive changes in land use from 
grassland to arable farming - due to changes in input prices - might prove to be invalid in 
regions where such a change in land use is forbidden (e.g., in nature protection areas). For 
institutional post-model analysis, participatory methods involving stakeholders and/or experts 
but also surveys may be particularly helpful. 
 
This Section 2 has highlighted the various contributions institutional analysis, and in 
particular PICA, can make to strengthen the modelling approach of SEAMLESS in the pre- 
and post-modelling phase. However, it is important to note that PICA - introduced in the next 
Section - was designed as a coherent analytical tool that can function largely independent of 
its position within the SEAMLESS-IF modelling sequence. Appendix 3 contains a visual 
depiction of the suggested way of integrating PICA in the overall process of policy 
assessment within SEAMLESS-IF. 
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3 The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility 
Assessment (PICA) 
As highlighted above, not least because institutions usually relate to a great diversity of 
situations, the state of the art in institutional economics offers hardly any standardised 
procedure for institutional analysis that can easily be combined with environmental and 
agricultural models widely used for policy impact assessment. To assess the compatibility 
between policy options and various institutional contexts a formalised methodology has been 
developed that provides for an institutional dimension in modelling: the “Procedure for 
Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)”.  
PICA comprises four distinct working steps:  
• Step 1:  The policy options are clustered according to 1) type of intervention 
(regulatory, economic, and/or advisory), 2) area of intervention 
(hierarchy/bureaucracy, market, and/or self-organised network), 3) possibly 
involved property rights changes, and 4) the nature of the problem addressed 
(attributes of the resources)10. This classification allows identifying the generic 
structure of a policy option.  
• Step 2: Each policy type is characterised by specific sets of crucial institutional aspects.  
• Step 3: The respective crucial institutional is characterised by institutional indicators11. 
More precisely, the library of crucial institutional aspects developed in Step 2 
for various policy types is linked with institutional indicators that help to 
evaluate the potential of the respective crucial institutional aspect to constrain or 
to foster the implementation of a policy option. The institutional indicators are 
selected from existing indicator lists, perhaps modified, or new proxies 
elaborated. Further, concrete assumptions on links and relationship between a 
crucial institutional aspect and the respective set of indicators will be made.  
• Step 4: Combination and potential of the identified relevant institutional aspects lead to 
statements about the probable effectiveness of the policy options from an 
institutional perspective. PICA outputs - which are mainly qualitative in 
character - are grouped in thematic categories of institutional compatibility and, 
thus, allow for drawing conclusions about an institutional fit or misfit between 
policy options and institutional contexts. Results will be presented as text, 
tables, and maps (see Appendix 3). 
In Figure 3.1, the basic concept of PICA is visualised, using the LEADER program as an 
example. 
                                                     
10 Relevant attributes of the resources can include their “type” (e.g., water, soil, or biodiversity), their 
geographical dimension (local, national, global), their complexity, and many more. 
11 To avoid misunderstandings it should be kept in mind that in this Deliverable institutional indicators 
are defined as variables and proxies that are used as input to the institutional analysis within PICA. 
Unlike the common understanding of indicators within Work Package 2 and in the overall SEAMLESS 
project institutional indicators, such as members in farmers’ associations, or government effectiveness 
do not represent the information/results of the institutional analysis given to the end users. 
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Use existing institutional indicators
or elaborate new proxies that indicate
the extent of the crucial institutional aspect 
Society
Step 4: Conclude on e.g., Governance structure Compatibility
Property 
Rights Change
Natural 
Resource
Area of 
Intervention
Type of 
Intervention
Step1: Identify Policy Type
(e.g., economic/self-organised networks)
Step 3: Select Indicators
(e.g., for bonding social capital) 
Information access
Number of phone lines per
1,000 inhabitants 
Number of newspapers
circulating
Density of
sociability places
Step 2: Extract Crucial Institutional Aspects
(e.g., lack of social capital)
Policy Option
e.g., LEADER
 
Figure 3.1: Scheme on the Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment 
3.1 Step 1: Classification of Policy Options – Deriving Policy Types 
In this Section, a general classification system to identify the generic structure of policy 
options is presented. Policy types are introduced to offer a systematic way to classify every 
policy option that SEAMLESS-IF will ever have to assess. The particular type of intervention 
together with the area of intervention provides the basic information to describe a certain 
policy type. Additional dimensions used to classify policy options include possibly involved 
property rights changes and the nature of the problem addressed (attributes of the resources 
(see Table 3.1). The objective of this specification of policy types is to provide a suitable 
formalized structure to identify crucial institutional aspects (CIA) that are of particular 
importance for the policy option under scrutiny. It is assumed that the policy type 
(represented by distinct fields of the matrix) is decisive for the range and kind of crucial 
institutional aspects that can expected to be conducive or detrimental to implementation of 
this policy option.  
Practically, this typology does allow limiting the number of CIAs that have to be reviewed 
when evaluating the policy to be implemented. In the absence of this classification, all 
identified CIA relevant for agricultural and environmental policies would have to be 
"computed" every time a policy option is to be assessed. In the following, the dimensions of 
the classification system will be explained in more detail. 
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The type of intervention, the rows of the matrix in Table 3.1, describes how and by which 
means the impact of a policy shall be reached, such as:  
• Regulatory or command-and-control policies (compulsory): E.g., EU Directives, 
National, regional, and local laws, regulations, and provisions 
• Economic instruments often using financial (dis)incentives: E.g., taxes, subsidies, grants 
and loans, tradable pollutions permits, Agri-Environmental Schemes 
• Advisory/Voluntary12 policies: E.g., codes of good practice, extension systems, 
environmental audits 
A similar distinction is made by Moskowitz (1978: 65ff.) who analyses a wide range of 
alternative policy options that have the common objective to redirect financial investments 
from the private sector to ensure neighbourhood preservation. Here, Moskowitz distinguishes 
between three types of interventions: a) regulatory policies for mandatory investments, b) 
direct subsidies, such as tax benefits to change the final profit estimation, and c) persuasion 
by providing facts, figures, and experience to demonstrate that the private sector could 
realistically expect profits from these investments.  
The area of intervention points to the governance structures a policy is supposed to have an 
impact on.13 The differentiation used in PICA follows to a large extent the widely known 
categories of governance structures (hierarchy, market, and hybrids) suggested by Williamson 
(2004) for developing his alignment hypotheses (see Section 1.4 in Appendix 1). However, 
first, it can be assumed that almost every governance structure in the real world can indeed be 
seen as some hybrid form between the polar cases market and hierarchy14. Thus, in the 
respective columns those areas of intervention that are closer to either market or hierarchy are 
subsumed. Second, with specifying the third column self-organised network, the attention is 
directed to a specific (hybrid) form of governance structure that is of particular interest if 
pursuing agricultural, environmental, and rural development policy objectives.  
The column property rights change is the third dimension to describe a policy type. It 
accounts for changes in private and collective property rights, in particular, on natural 
resources and covers the institutional specificities of environmental regulations. 
An example shall illustrate the value added of the last dimension. In 2002, the European 
Commission established the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as a bureaucracy 
dedicated to provide independent scientific advice on food safety15. In the PICA typology, 
this can be categorised as a regulatory policy that is adding an element to the bureaucratic 
                                                     
12 Of course, some economic polices, such as Agri-Environmental Schemes, are also voluntary in 
character since farmers can choose to participate in those schemes, or not. In contrast, in this category, 
the term “voluntary” refers to policies that motivate voluntary actions or behavioural changes of actors 
without direct financial incentives, i.e., for example, by convincing actors. 
13 More precisely, a policy aims at influencing (encourage/discourage) real-world transactions (e.g., 
use of pesticides, protection of species) by changing existing and/or creating new governance 
structures that coordinate these transactions in such a way that, e.g., their results are internalised by the 
actors. 
14 While in markets (repeated) economic exchange is based on voluntary bilateral agreements between 
individuals (e.g., auctions, stock markets, etc.), an authority on a higher level compulsorily selects 
economic action in hierarchies (e.g., state agencies, but also within private firms). 
15 In close collaboration with non-authorities and in open consultation with stakeholders EFSA shall 
provide independent scientific advice on all matters with direct or indirect impact of food safety and 
clear communication on existing and emerging risks. 
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structure in the EU. This category (Regulatory on Hierarchy/Bureaucracy) would also be 
appropriate for a policy that prescribes the demarcation of nature reserves including the 
establishment of some formal authorities to manage the reserves. However, the crucial 
difference for the purpose of ex-ante institutional analysis of policy options is that - 
additionally - the establishment of the latter bureaucracy (the nature reserve authority) has 
presumably a higher and more direct impact on the (private) property rights of the actors 
concerned, the farmers in the reserves. This fact is very likely to bring additional institutional 
aspects to the forefront that could hamper the effective implementation of this policy. For 
example, a high level of opportunism on part of the farmers in these reserves might be 
detrimental to a smooth implementation, as could be ambiguous property rights on land. 
Undoubtedly, most policy options will imply some changes in property rights. However, here 
it is defined in a more narrow sense pointing to changes in the property rights of farmers on 
their natural production resources. For example, most of the environmental regulations, such 
as the Flora-Fauna-Habitat Directive or the Nitrate Directive reduce directly farmers’ 
property rights. Restrictions on land use, such as the prohibition to spread manure on the field 
during winter months, have direct impacts on the individual production decisions of farmers. 
Thus, these environmental regulations, according to the matrix, would not only address the 
governance structure market (area of intervention) since the restriction in manure spreading is 
directly affecting the production function of the farmer resulting in higher productions costs 
and, hence, less profit. Clearly, these regulations are also linked to severe changes and 
constraints on (private) property rights of farmers that are not governed by market 
mechanisms.  
According to Schlager and Ostrom (1992), bundles of property rights can be disaggregated 
into a) the operational level property rights, including access and withdrawal rights, and b) 
the collective-choice property rights, including management, exclusion, and alienation rights. 
Politically induced impact can be found on any of these dimensions of property rights. 
Further, although the effective property rights – unlike the formal property rights - are much 
harder to grasp empirically on any level above the case study level, they are regarded as 
crucial in giving indications about the institutional compatibility of policy options. For 
example, information about a (non-marginal) gap between formal and effective property 
rights on land use in a country or region could point to a limited effectiveness of future 
policies invoking changes in property rights on land use. 
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Table 3.1 Matrix of Policy Types 
Area of Intervention (Governance Structures)  
Hierarchy/Bureaucracy Market Self-organised network 
Property Rights Change 
Regulatory 
Policies that  
intervene at hierarchies/bureaucracies 
using regulatory (command-and-
control) instruments;  
Example: Establishing the European 
Food Safety Authority and Nature 
Reserves 
Policies that  
intervene at markets  
using regulatory (command-and-
control) instruments;  
Example: Implementing certification 
rules for organic products 
Policies that  
intervene at self-organised networks 
using regulatory (command-and-
control) instruments;  
Example: Implementing new 
European Statutes for cooperatives 
Policies that  
induce substantial changes in 
property rights for farmers 
regarding their natural production 
resources 
using regulatory instruments  
Economic 
Policies that  
intervene at hierarchies/bureaucracies 
using economic instruments;  
Example: Budget cuts for (regional) 
administrative bodies 
Policies that  
intervene at markets  
using economic instruments;  
Example: Subsidising organic milk 
and non-till farming practices 
Policies that  
intervene at self-organised networks 
using economic instruments;  
Example: Providing funds for 
LEADER-groups 
Policies that  
induce substantial changes in 
property rights for farmers 
regarding their natural production 
resources  
using economic instruments 
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Advisory/ 
Voluntary 
Policies that  
intervene at hierarchies/bureaucracies 
using advisory/voluntary instruments  
Example: Providing training material 
on efficient management structures 
and administrative procedures (Best-
practice) 
Policies that  
intervene at markets  
using advisory/voluntary instruments;  
Example: Providing information 
brochures on health and organic food 
to consumers; providing training on 
environmental friendly farming 
Policies that  
intervene at self-organised networks 
using advisory/voluntary instruments 
Example: Providing information 
brochures with best-practice-
examples; facilitating knowledge 
transfer between networks 
Policies that  
induce substantial changes in 
property rights for farmers 
regarding their natural production 
resources  
using advisory/voluntary 
instruments 
 
Natural Resource Addressed Water Land/Soil Biodiversity Forestry Complex Resources 
Example: Agri-Environmental Schemes focussing on reducing diffuse pollution of nitrates from agriculture would be allocated to the boxes “Economic on 
Market” and “Water”(grey boxes). 
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An additional dimension, which needs to be added to this matrix, considers the natural 
resource addressed by the policy option, i.e. water, land/soil, biodiversity, forestry, or 
complex resources16. Some crucial institutional aspects stem from the fact that the 
characteristics of a natural resource addressed or the attributes of a transaction related to 
nature might call for certain institutional arrangements to make a policy option effective 
(Hagedorn et al., 2002). For instance, addressing water quality often has to deal with non-
point pollution from agriculture that constitutes challenges for adequate forms of monitoring 
and sanctioning. Further, policies for the protection of biodiversity or specific rare species 
face particular incentive problems, not the least because the future value of these rare species 
is uncertain and the benefits of protection cannot only be reaped by the one protecting it. In 
addition, the geographical dimensions (local, national, global) of resources can also be 
important. Thus, distinct institutional aspects for each of the resources addressed can be 
expected. 
To sum up, the four dimensions necessary to describe a policy type comprehensively are 
illustrated as a four-dimensional graphic in Figure 3.2. The x-axis describes the area of 
intervention, the y-axis the type of intervention, and the z-axis the natural resource addressed. 
The colour of the cuboids reflects the forth dimension; dark grey, if a property rights change 
is involved, and light grey, if not. Each cuboid in the space represents a certain policy type. 
For illustration, Agri-Environmental Schemes focussing on reducing diffuse pollution of 
nitrates from agriculture can be assigned to the policy type of the light grey cuboid. 
Regulatory
Economic
Advisory/
Voluntary
Regulatory
Regulatory
Area of Intervention
Type of 
Intervention
Property Rights
Change involved
Natural Resources
Soil
Water
Biodiversity
Forestry
Hierarchy/
Bureaucracy
Market Self-organised Network
Economic
Market
Wa
ter
No Property 
Rights Change 
involved
Property Rights Change 
Hierarchy
So
il
 
Figure 3.2: Four Dimensions of a Policy Type 
                                                     
16 The category complex resource system refers to resource systems with many externalities involved 
(e.g., wetlands). 
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3.2 Step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 
In this section, the main findings of the comprehensive literature review on crucial 
institutional aspects (CIA) are presented. While some crucial institutional aspects found in the 
literature are directly linked to a concrete policy, there is also a substantial body of literature 
that is not directly related to a concrete policy. Rather, the CIA discussed there are associated 
with broad policy fields, such as trade related policies and environmental policies, or address 
general institutional issues. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarise the CIAs that are directly linked to 
concrete policies by structuring them as policy types according to the matrix presented in 
Section 3.1 (PICA step 1). In Table 3.4, those CIAs not directly linked to policy types are 
presented.17 In Appendix 2, the review of the literature is documented in a detailed manner. 
To a large extent, the CIA found in the policy assessment literature are derived from ex-post 
analysis of the implementation of agricultural, environmental, and rural development policies. 
CIA are discussed which proved to have a positive or (mostly) negative effect on policy 
implementation. Further, institutional aspects that stem from theoretical or conceptual 
scientific studies were included. In many cases, the empirical and the theoretical literature 
point to the same CIA.  
As illustrated by the empty boxes in Table 3.2, not all policy types could be linked with 
CIAs. This is mainly due to the fact that the literature review focussed on policy types that 
are related to the various Test Cases in SEAMLESS and on other very prominent policies, 
such as Rural Development Programs, etc. For the operational phase of SEAMLESS-IF this 
would imply that - once a policy type is identified that has not been linked with any (or only 
few) CIA yet - the literature review would have to be extended encompassing studies 
addressing this policy type. This library of CIA (Tables 3.2 – 3.4) will be revised and 
extended with every new policy option that is assessed by PICA. 
Not all CIAs are exclusively linked to only one single policy type, or to only one type of 
intervention, e.g., economic or regulatory. This is in line with the results of the literature 
review suggesting that some CIAs can be (and have proved to be) conducive or detrimental to 
many (at least more than one) policy types. For example, the occurrence of the CIA 
"contradictory policy instruments/rules" in a specific region can hamper both, the 
implementation of 1) a regulatory policy and of 2) an economic policy:  
1) An agricultural policy might allow, e.g., fertiliser use up to 100 kg/ha/year; an 
environmental policy introduced in the same region might reduce this limit to 50 
kg/ha/year. Such contradictions are often due to different policy objectives. However, 
both rules might be valid legally. Thus, in case there is no given priority among these 
(regulatory) policies, there might be a conflict.  
2) The same is true for economic policies. In the same region, there might be a policy in 
place that provides financial incentives encouraging a specific activity, and another 
policy paying actors not to carry out this very activity. Further, economic policies can 
also be in contradiction to regulatory policies active in the same region. For example, 
financial payments to turn grass land into arable land, which, at the same time, is 
forbidden in some regions.  
The relevance of a specific CIA for a concrete policy type depends on the features of the 
policy to be implemented (or the requirements demanded by this policy for successful 
implementation). However, the relative importance of a specific CIA can vary among the 
                                                     
17 In all three Tables, 3.2 - 3.4, the numbers in brackets refer to the number of this respective CIA in 
Table 3.5 where it is linked with institutional indicators (PICA step 3). 
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policy types it is related to. In addition, while most of the CIA derived from the literature 
seem to be linked to a specific type of intervention more closely than to the area of 
intervention this relationship and its implications still needs to be validated.  
In some cases, an institutional aspect might only become conducive or detrimental (or 
becomes stronger in its effect) in combination with another institutional aspect. For example, 
strong consumer preferences might not be a constraint per se. However, if this institutional 
aspect is coupled with high levels of social capital it will become important since this might 
indicate that consumers are also able or likely to voice these preferences in an organised way. 
In turn, if social capital is low they might "only" be able to articulate their preferences 
individually (e.g., by not buying GMO-containing food). Similarly, farmers may face low 
private opportunity costs for changing land use (e.g., induced by a policy). Yet, this 
conducive aspect might be “neutralised” by farmers’ limited access to information on the 
policy or on alternative forms of land use. 
It is important to note that CIAs often only make sense when they are related to a concrete 
policy. Therefore, the expert (team) running PICA in the operational phase of SEAMLESS-IF 
will have to decide which CIAs are indeed relevant for the policy option under scrutiny, 
which might this time be skipped for further analysis, and which "new" or adapted CIAs 
should be added. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Crucial Institutional Aspects Encountered for Different Policy Types  
Please note the numbers in brackets refer to the number of this respective CIA in Table 3.5 where it is linked with institutional indicators (PICA step 3). 
Area of Intervention  
Hierarchy/ 
Bureaucracy (Hi) 
Market 
(Ma) 
Self-organised Network 
(SON) 
Property Rights Change 
(PR) 
Regulatory 
(Reg) 
• Political and administrative inertia (1) 
• Administrative public Transaction Costs (2) 
• Bargaining power state vs. farmers’ organisations 
(32) 
• Unclear distribution of responsibilities between 
administrative levels (Problems of interplay) (3) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint 
production) (17) 
• Redundant policy instruments & rules (17) 
• Not matching financial means and capacities for 
administrative restructuring (6) 
• Adverse, but historically deep rooted institutions 
(11) 
• Heterogeneity of actors’ interests (12) 
• Problems of (institutional) fit (16) 
• Ambiguous property rights (more pronounced for New 
Member States) (28) 
• Information asymmetry state vs. firm (23) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint 
production) (17) 
• Redundant policy instruments & rules (17) 
• High level of opportunism (22) 
• Monopoly power (25) 
• Lack of trust between economic actors (31) 
• High administrative public and/or private Transaction 
Costs (2) (7) 
• Weak consumer preferences (34) 
• Strong consumer preferences together with high level 
of social capital (29) (34) (35) 
• High level of corruption (21) 
 • Endowment effect (26) 
• Ambiguous property rights (more 
pronounced for New Member 
States) (28) 
• Information asymmetry state vs. 
firms (23) 
• High level of opportunism (22) 
 
Economic 
(Eco) 
• Undifferentiated distribution of financial means for 
restructuring among regions (20) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint 
production) (17) 
• Redundant policy instruments & rules (17) 
• High level of opportunism (22) 
• More pronounced in New Member States:  
• No experiences with measures (10) 
• Insufficient information on policy (25) 
• Not matching farmers’ competencies & capabilities 
(9) 
• Target group not (fully) eligible (14) 
• Strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations (32) 
• Lack of social capital (among local actors, state vs. local, between 
levels) (29) 
• High public and private (administrative) Transaction Costs (2) (7) 
• High level of redistribution of decision making power (4) 
• Resistance to pluralisation of decision making (5) 
• Endowment effect (26) 
• More pronounced in New Member 
States:  
• No experiences with measures (10) 
• Insufficient information on policy 
(25) 
• Not matching farmers’ 
competencies and capabilities (9) 
• Target group not (fully) eligible 
(14) 
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Advisory/ 
Voluntary 
(Adv) 
  • Very large water resource system (37) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) (17) 
• Low incentives to resolve a problem (36) 
• High private opportunity costs (8) 
• High private Transaction Costs (7) 
• Dispersion/fragmentation of property rights (27) 
• High number of actors (13) 
• Environmental problem is not easy to identify in space and time 
(38) 
• Dispersion/fragmentation of 
property rights (27) 
• High number of actors (13) 
• Environmental problem is not easy 
to identify in space and time (38) 
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Table 3.3: Summary of Crucial Institutional Aspects Related to Natural Resources  
Addressed by Some of the Policies 
Natural Resources Addressed Crucial Institutional Aspects 
Complex resource systems with many 
externalities involved (e.g., wetlands) 
(ComRes) 
• Lack of social capital (here, trust among local actors) (29)
Water resource systems with long-term and 
diffuse impacts stemming from farming 
activities (Water) 
• Very large water resource system (37) 
• Not matching legal restrictions (17) 
• Low incentives to resolve a problem (36) 
• High opportunity costs for farmers (8) 
• High private Transaction Costs (7) 
Land/Soil (Land) • High heterogeneity of actors’ interests (12) • High level of opportunism (22) 
Please note the numbers in brackets refer to the number of this respective CIA in Table 3.5 where it is  
linked with institutional indicators (PICA step 3). 
Table 3.4 Summary of Crucial Institutional Aspects – Not Linked to Concrete Policy Options 
 Crucial Institutional Aspects 
(Trade-related) Agricultural 
Protectionist Policies (Prot) 
• Very large water resource system (37) 
• High political costs for reducing protectionist policies (39) 
• Political and administrative inertia (1) 
• Strong consumer preferences for health and quality products (35) 
• Strong environmental groups and environmental legislation (31) 
• High environmental awareness and strong environmental preferences of 
consumers (34) 
• Corruption (21) 
• Poor country with smallholder agriculture (41) 
• Inefficient credit markets for smallholders (42) 
• High perceived dependence on support/protection (40) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) (17) 
• Redundant policy instruments & rules (17) 
Environmental Policies 
(EnvP) 
• Information asymmetry state vs. firm (producer) (23) 
• Opportunism (22) 
• Heterogeneous environment-related social values (33) 
• Lack of (environmental) political continuity (15) 
• Undifferentiated policy measures (19) 
• Legal restrictions to differentiation (18) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) (17) 
General Institutional Aspects 
(Gen) 
• Low levels of interpersonal trust (in particular, if policies rely on 
spontaneous / endogenous collective action) (30) 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) (17) 
• Redundant policy instruments & rules (17) 
• Problems of interplay (3) 
Please note the numbers in brackets refer to the number of this respective CIA in Table 3.5 where it is  
linked with institutional indicators (PICA step 3)
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3.3 Step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 
with Institutional Indicators 
In this Section, the library on crucial institutional aspects (CIA) - developed in PICA step 2 
for various policy types – is linked with institutional indicators that help to evaluate the 
respective CIA leading to statements about the effectiveness of policy implementation (PICA 
step 4). In Table 3.5, for all CIA identified so far several institutional indicators, possible data 
sources, and assumptions on links and relationships between CIAs and the respective 
indicators are suggested.  
More precisely, the second column contains all CIA identified in PICA step 2 (see Tables 3.2 
- 3.4 in Section 3.2). They are preliminarily grouped according to their “thematically 
closeness/proximity”. In the third column one can find codes for the policy type(s) the 
respective CIA is related to (e.g., Reg-Hi: Regulatory on Hierarchy, or EnvP: Environmental 
Policies). The fourth and fifth columns contain one or more institutional indicator(s) and the 
respective descriptions and calculations. Here, not all suggested indicators need to be kept for 
future consolidated versions of PICA. In practice, some indicators might turn out to be rather 
redundant; some might prove to have less explanatory power for describing the respective 
CIA. Similarly, also other indicators that seem to be (more) meaningful can be added. 
Furthermore, for quite a few of these indicators the literature and related documents do not 
tell much about how they are measured. The fifth column presents (potential or likely) data 
sources/data bases one might make use of in order to “calculate” the institutional indicators.  
In general, it can be differentiated between five types of data sources: 
• A) Qualitative evaluation procedures, e.g., expert/stakeholder groups, screening of 
documents, etc. 
• B) Existing data bases and proxies not yet integrated in SEAMLESS-IF, e.g., national 
statistical databases, indexes on social capital, environmental awareness, corruption, etc. 
• C) Existing data bases already integrated in SEAMLESS-IF, e.g., current land use 
• D) Outputs (variables) calculated by models integrated in SEAMLESS-IF, e.g., changes 
in land use and agricultural production 
• E) (Non-institutional) Indicators calculated by SEAMLESS-IF, e.g., policy impact on 
budgetary expenditure and total welfare 
In Table 3.5, the suggested institutional indicators draw on quite a few different sources, 
mainly existing data bases not yet integrated in SEAMLESS-IF. While conceptually useful 
for describing the CIA, they represent – at the moment – an indicator wish list since data 
availability cannot be guaranteed. However, for those (restricted list of) indicators relevant 
for assessing the policy options in Test Case 2 (see Section 4.2) - and, later, Test Case 3 – 
concrete data related issues will be addressed drawing on the expertise of Work Package 4. 
For Prototype 3 of SEAMLESS-IF it is also intended to integrate (“upload”) the relevant data 
bases into SEAMLESS-IF.  
While it is not very likely that all suggested data bases can be made available this does not 
create a problem for institutional analysis within SEAMLESS-IF. First, for most CIA a broad 
range of alternative institutional indicators each describing the extent of a CIA was 
suggested; varying in explanatory power of course. Second, if no “hard” data from data bases 
is available qualitative assessment procedures carried out by the PICA-expert team can be 
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regarded as similarly effective and robust for evaluating the likely effect of identified CIA for 
policy implementation. 
Finally, the last column presents plausible relationships between the CIA and the suggested 
indicator. It describes the effect of changes in the indicator values (e.g., a percentage or index 
figure) on the level of the institutional constraint or potential under scrutiny. Given the 
extensive list of more than 40 CIA (and many more indicators) Task 2.4 was, arguably, not 
able to construct more precise relationships or even thresholds that are universally valid. Such 
as “If more than 20% of the basic (administrative) services are fully available online (full 
electronic case handling)” then public transaction costs are considered as “low” or “If less 
than 20% of the basic (administrative) services are fully available online” then public 
transaction costs are considered as “high”. Also, instead of absolute (automatic and 
universally valid) statements about the level of constraints or potentials in a specific country 
the relative levels of the respective constraint or potential in the different Member States 
and/or regions are often more relevant and meaningful. In the operational phase of 
SEAMLESS-IF, the team of PICA-trained institutional analysts will evaluate the various 
indicators and the values they “produce” (PICA step 4; see Section 3.4). By focussing on a 
concrete policy to assess, these experts will be able to determine or assume relationships that 
are more precise and to define - in some cases - thresholds that are meaningful and valid for 
the policy option under scrutiny. This process can also be thought of as some kind of “model 
calibration” which is done for other SEAMLESS models, too.  
In general, an automatic or formalised interpretation of indicators and their parameter values 
does not make sense and will not produce useful results. What is more, data might not be 
available, or might be available only at Member State level. Yet, for certain institutional 
policy assessment, regional data will provide more useful and meaningful results.  
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Table 3.5: Crucial Institutional Aspects, Institutional Indicators, and Expert Assumptions on Links between them 
No. Crucial 
Institutional 
Aspects (CIA) 
Related to  
Policy Type(s) 
Institutional Indicator Description / Data Data Sources / 
Databases 
Expert assumptions on 
links between indicator 
and CIA 
Transposition of European 
Community law (by policy 
area) 
Percentage of implemented EU Directives in a Member State: 
Directives for which measures or implementation have been 
notified by Member States divided by Directives applicable 
on the reference date by Member States 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
high political and 
administrative inertia 
Government effectiveness  Composite indicator measuring the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies 
Values: -3 (low) to +3 (high) 
World Bank Negative values indicate 
high political and 
administrative inertia 
Bureaucratic quality Measure for institutional strength and quality of the civil 
service; assesses how much strength and expertise bureaucrats 
have and how able they are to manage political alternations 
without drastic interruptions in government services, or policy 
changes (also part of World Bank composite indicator 
“Government effectiveness”) 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) – 
Political Risk 
Services (see also 
World Bank) 
Low values indicate high 
administrative inertia 
1 Political and 
administrative inertia 
Reg-Hi;  
Prot 
Adaptation rate of 
economic policies 
Non-representative measure for “Government economic 
policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy” 
(also part of World Bank composite indicator “Government 
effectiveness”) 
Institute for 
Management 
Development ( 
WCY) (see also 
World Bank) 
Low adaptation rates 
indicate high political 
inertia 
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E-government on-line 
availability 
Percentage of the 20 basic services which are fully available 
online (full electronic case handling) 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
high public transaction costs 
E-government usage by 
individuals 
Percentage of individuals (16-74 years old) who have used the 
Internet in the last 3 months for interaction with public 
authorities (obtaining information, downloading forms, 
sending filled in forms) 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
high public transaction costs 
Importance of the public 
sector 
Ratio = Number of civil servants / Number of total population National Statistical 
Databases 
Assumed “U-shaped” 
relationship with public 
transaction costs: few or 
many civil servants (high or 
low ratios) indicate high 
public transaction costs 
2 High administrative 
public transaction 
costs18 
Reg-Hi;  
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-SON 
Bureaucracy Measure of the quality of a country’s bureaucracy (also part 
of World Bank composite indicator “Government 
effectiveness”) 
World Markets 
Online (see also 
World Bank) 
Low values indicate high 
administrative public 
transaction costs 
3 Unclear distribution of 
responsibilities 
between 
administrative levels 
(Problems of 
interplay) 
Reg-Hi; 
Gen 
Degree of federalism / 
Allocation of financial 
means at regional 
administrative levels 
Ratio = Regional (Sub-Central) budget / Central budget National Statistical 
Databases 
Assumed “Bell-shaped” 
relationship: Very low ratios 
(highly centralised) and 
very high ratios (highly 
decentralised) indicate a low 
potential of contradictions 
and redundancies between 
central and regional 
administrative levels 
                                                     
18 Political inertia and public transaction costs can be very close. However, “inertia” refers to a general inability and/or unwillingness to do something (work) and also to 
a (negative or sceptical) attitude towards change, e.g., of the policy set or policy design. Yet, high administrative public transaction cost might also be found/occur in 
bureaucracies that are very keen to be active and/or are open to change. 
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Bureaucratic quality Measure for institutional strength and quality of the civil 
service; assesses how much strength and expertise bureaucrats 
have and how able they are to manage political alternations 
without drastic interruptions in government services, or policy 
changes (also part of World Bank composite indicator 
“Government effectiveness”) 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) – 
Political Risk 
Services (see also 
World Bank) 
Low values indicate an 
unclear distribution of 
responsibilities between 
administrative levels 
Quality of decentralised 
government systems 
(does only apply for post-
communist countries) 
Qualitative assessment of government decentralization, 
independence and responsibilities of local and regional 
governments, and legislative and executive transparency (also 
part of World Bank composite indicator “Government 
effectiveness”) 
Freedom House – 
Nations in Transit 
(see also World 
Bank) 
Negative assessments 
indicate an unclear 
distribution of 
responsibilities between 
administrative levels 
Redistribution of decision 
making power 
Degree of redistribution of decision making power likely to be 
caused by implementing policy option 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High degrees indicate a 
raised likelihood that policy 
implementation is 
constrained 
4 High level of 
redistribution of 
decision making 
power 
Eco-SON  
Administrative Levels Number of administrative levels in a Member State National Statistical 
Databases 
A high number of 
administrative levels 
indicates that it is more 
difficult to redistribute 
decision making power 
because each public actor at 
every level is likely to 
defend his influence and 
power 
5 Resistance to 
pluralisation of 
decision making 
Eco-SON Administrative levels Number of administrative levels in a Member State National Statistical 
Databases 
Number = 1 indicates the 
existence of a singular 
decision making structure 
which is assumed to signal a 
high resistance to a 
pluralisation of decision 
making 
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Quality of decentralised 
government systems 
(does only apply for post-
communist countries) 
Qualitative assessment of government decentralization, 
independence and responsibilities of local and regional 
governments, and legislative and executive transparency (also 
part of World Bank composite indicator “Government 
effectiveness”) 
Freedom House – 
Nations in Transit 
(see also World 
Bank) 
Negative assessments 
indicate a high resistance to 
a pluralisation of decision 
making 
6 Not matching financial 
means and capacities 
for administrative 
restructuring 
Reg-Hi  Financial potential of 
public administrations 
Ratio = Public budget / Gross National Product (GNP) National Statistical 
Databases 
Low ratios indicate a low 
importance of public 
administration, thus, having 
a poor potential to carry out 
administrative restructuring 
E-government on-line 
availability 
Percentage of the 20 basic services which are fully available 
online (full electronic case handling) 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
high private transaction 
costs 
E-government usage by 
individuals 
Percentage of individuals (16-74 years old) who have used the 
internet in the last 3 months for interaction with public 
authorities (obtaining information, downloading forms, 
sending filled in forms) 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
high private transaction 
costs 
Educational level of 
farmers 
Percentage of farmers with an education level below X SEAMLESS social 
indicators 
Illiteracy of farmers Percentage of illiterate farmers SEAMLESS social 
indicators 
High percentages indicate 
high private transaction 
costs 
Educational level of 
population 
Pupils and students (ISCED 1-6) aged 5-29 as percentage of 
total population aged 5-29 years 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
high private transaction 
costs 
7 High private 
transaction costs 
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-SON; 
Adv-SON;  
Water 
Land owner – tenant 
relationship 
Average number of land owners per tenant National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate high 
private transaction costs 
since farmers have to 
negotiate with many 
owner(s) for some changes 
in land use 
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Land farmed under 
leasehold contracts 
Percentage of agricultural land farmed under leasehold 
contracts 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High percentages indicate 
high private transaction 
costs since farmers have to 
negotiate with owner(s) for 
some changes in land use 
Opportunity costs related 
to land use 
Soil quality index SEAMLESS 
databases 
High quality of soils 
indicates a high productivity 
of land use and, thus, high 
(marginal) opportunity costs 
for farmers for changes in 
land use away from the 
optimum 
8 High private 
opportunity costs 
Adv-SON;  
Water 
Opportunity costs related 
to farming practices 
Average revenue per hectare SEAMLESS 
databases; 
SEAMLESS 
economic 
indicators 
High average revenues per 
hectare indicate a high 
productivity of land use and, 
thus, high (marginal) 
opportunity costs for 
farmers for changes in 
farming practices away 
from the optimum 
Small farms Percentage of farms with less than 5 ha SEAMLESS 
Databases; 
EUROSTAT 
Small farm(er)s are assumed 
to have a lower capabilities 
and competencies. Thus, 
high percentages of small 
farms indicate high 
constraints.  
Educational level of 
farmers 
Percentage of farmers with an education level below X SEAMLESS social 
indicators 
9 Not matching farmers’ 
competencies and 
capabilities 
Eco-Ma;  
Eco-PR 
Illiteracy of farmers Percentage of illiterate farmers SEAMLESS social 
indicators 
High percentages indicate 
an increased likelihood of 
mismatch between policy 
and farmers’ competencies 
and capabilities 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 45 of 170 
Educational level of 
population 
Pupils and students (ISCED 1-6) aged 5-29 as percentage of 
total population aged 5-29 years 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate an 
increased likelihood of 
mismatch between policy 
and farmers’ competencies 
and capabilities 
Experiences with Agri-
Environmental Measures 
or similar measures 
Time with implemented Agri-Environmental Schemes or 
similar measures (Years) or Date of implementation of Rural 
Development Regulation (RDR) 
National 
Integrated 
Administration 
and Control 
System (IACS); 
Assessment by 
expert group 
Few (no) years with 
implemented AES or a 
recent date of RDR 
implementation indicate a 
low level of experiences 
with AES 
10 No experiences with 
measures 
Eco-Ma  
Experiences with other 
measures or policies  
Time with implemented measures or policies similar to the 
measures or policies under scrutiny (Years) 
Assessment by 
expert group 
Few (no) years with 
implemented AES indicate a 
low level of experiences 
with respective measures 
11 Adverse, but 
historically deep rooted 
institutions  
(in administrative and 
political structures) 
Reg-Hi  Existence of adverse, but 
historically deep rooted 
institutions  
(in administrative and 
political structures) 
Adverse, but historically deep rooted institutions (in 
administrative and political structures) exist 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
The existence of adverse, 
but historically deep rooted 
institutions (in administrat. 
and political structures) 
indicates high constraints 
12 High heterogeneity of 
actors’ interests 
Reg-Hi;  
Land 
Heterogeneity of actors’ 
interests 
Degree of heterogeneity of actors’ interests Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High degrees of 
heterogeneity indicate high 
constraints (e.g., more 
difficult & costly mediation) 
Farmer density Average number of farms per 100 ha SEAMLESS 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
high number of actors 
13 High number of actors Adv-SON;  
Adv-PR 
Land Owner density Average number of land owners per 100 ha National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
high number of actors 
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Structure of farming 
system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of people employed in the 
farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A high ratio indicates a 
farming system not 
dominated by large farms 
(latifundium system) and, 
thus, high numbers of actors 
Very small farms Percentage of farms with less than X ha SEAMLESS 
Databases 
Very small farms are often 
not eligible to participate in 
specific schemes, thus, a 
high percentage of very 
small farms indicates a high 
number of farms that might 
not be eligible 
14 Target group not 
(fully) eligible 
Eco-Ma;  
Eco-PR 
Eligibility of target group Degree of eligibility of target group Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees of eligibility of 
target group indicate high 
constraints 
Political instability and 
violence 
Composite indicator measuring the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
political violence and terrorism  
Values: -3 (low) to +3 (high)  
World Bank Positive values imply a lack 
of political continuity  
Government stability Measure for the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and ist ability to stay in office (also part of World 
Bank composite indicator “Political instability and violence”)
ICRG – Political 
Risk Services (see 
also World Bank) 
Low measures indicate a 
lack of political continuity 
15 Lack of 
(environmental) 
political continuity 
EnvP  
Policy consistency and 
forward planning 
Measure of how confident businesses can be of the continuity 
of economic policy stance: whether a change of government 
will entail major policy disruption, and whether the current 
government has pursued a coherent strategy (also part of 
World Bank composite indicator “Government effectiveness”)
World Markets 
Online (see also 
World Bank) 
Low measures indicate a 
high probability of a lack of 
political continuity 
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Transposition of European 
Community law 
Percentage of implemented EU Directives in a Member State: 
Directives for which measures or implementation have been 
notified by Member States divided by Directives applicable 
on the reference date by Member States 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate a 
lack of political continuity 
Participation in 
international 
environmental agreements 
Measure for the participation of a country in international 
environmental agreements (combines ratifications of treaties 
and conventions with the level of active participation in, 
contribution to, and compliance with the treaties' obligations) 
(also part of ESI) 
Values: 0 (no participation) to 1 (full participation) 
Different sources 
(see also Environ-
mental 
Sustainability 
Index - ESI) 
Values below 0.5 indicate 
low degrees of active 
participation in international 
environmental agreements 
and, thus, a lack of 
(environmental) political 
continuity 
Environmental political 
continuity 
Degree of environmental political continuity Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate high 
constraints 
16 Problems of 
(institutional) fit 
Reg-Hi  Administrative Levels Number of administrative levels in a Member State National Statistical 
Databases 
Low numbers of 
administrative levels 
indicate that it would be 
more difficult to find an 
administrative unit able to 
manage a resource or a 
problem appropriately (i.e., 
spatial externalities are 
reduced) 
17 Contradictory policy 
instruments and rules 
(joint production) 
Reg-Hi;  
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-Ma;  
EnvP;  
Prot;  
Gen 
Contradictory policies 
(incl. joint production) 
Methodology to identify contradictory policies that are, e.g., 
due to joint production: 1) Compile a short list of relevant 
policies that are applied in the area and that could be 
contradictory to the policy option; 2) Identify more precisely 
and evaluate contradictions between policy option under 
scrutiny and policies in this short list 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
The existence of 
contradictory policies and 
rules indicates high 
constraints 
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Redundant policy 
instruments and rules 
Reg-Hi;  
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-Ma;  
Prot;  
Gen 
Redundant policies Methodology to identify redundant policies: 1) Compile a 
short list of relevant policies that are applied in the area and 
that could be redundant to the policy option; 2) Identify more 
precisely and evaluate redundancies between policy option 
under scrutiny and policies in this short list 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
The existence of redundant 
policies and rules indicates 
high constraints 
18 Legal restrictions to 
differentiation 
EnvP Legal system Member State with case-based common law or statute law  Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Common law is usually 
more differentiated and 
more open-minded to case-
specific restriction, thus, 
statute law indicates a high 
constraint 
19 Undifferentiated 
policy measures 
EnvP  Differentiation potential Degree of differentiation potential / possible for policy 
measure 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate a low 
level of differentiation of 
the policy measures 
20 Undifferentiated 
distribution of 
financial means for 
restructuring among 
regions 
Eco-Hi Distribution of financial 
means among regional 
administrations 
Variance of regional (Sub-Central) budgets per inhabitant in a 
country 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
Assessment by 
expert group 
Low variances indicate an 
undifferentiated distribution 
(other than the number of 
inhabitants) of financial 
means for regional 
administrations 
Corruption Perception 
Index 
Combination of various sources measuring overall extent of 
corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) as determined by 
expert assessments and opinion surveys 
Transparency 
International 
21 High level of 
corruption 
Reg-Ma;  
Prot 
Control of Corruption Composite indicator of the extent public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption as 
well as and state “capture” by elites and private interests 
World Bank 
High levels of the various 
measures and indexes of 
corruption in the political 
system and in the 
bureaucracy contributes to 
lax enforcement of 
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Corruption within the 
political system 
Measure of corruption within the political system, which 
distorts the economic and financial environment, reduces the 
efficiency of government and business by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political 
system. (also part of the World Bank composite indicator 
“control of corruption”) 
ICRG - Political 
Risk Services (see 
also World Bank) 
Intrusiveness of 
bureaucracy 
Measure of the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy: 
amount of red tape likely to encounter is assessed, as is the 
likelihood of encountering corrupt officials and other groups. 
(also part of the World Bank composite indicator “control of 
corruption”) 
World Markets 
Online (see also 
World Bank) 
Infringement cases Number of infringement cases in a country brought before the 
Court of Justice  
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers of 
infringement cases indicate 
high levels of opportunism 
Rule of Law Composite indicator of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
World Bank Low “rule-of-law-
measures” indicate high 
levels of opportunism 
22 High level of 
opportunism 
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-Ma;  
Reg-PR;  
Land;  
EnvP 
Order Assessment of popular observance of the law (Part of 
composite indicator „Rule of Law“) 
World Bank Low measures indicate high 
levels of opportunism 
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Information asymmetry Methodology to identify information asymmetry: 1.) Identify 
potential sources of information asymmetry related to the 
policy under scrutiny; 2.) Evaluate the impact of this 
information asymmetry on the efficiency of this policy; 3.) 
Assess the additional controlling and monitoring costs 
necessary to reduce the level of information asymmetry to an 
“acceptable” level 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High additional controlling 
and monitoring costs 
necessary to reach an 
“acceptable” level of 
information asymmetry 
indicate a high constraint 
Affinity of governments 
towards devolution 
Degree of affinity of the government of a country towards 
devolution 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate high 
information asymmetries 
since centralised control and 
monitoring is more costly 
Farmer density Average number of farms per 100 ha SEAMLESS 
Databases 
High numbers indicate 
higher controlling and 
monitoring cost, thus, likely 
higher information 
asymmetries 
23 Information 
asymmetry state vs. 
firm (Controlling and 
monitoring problems)19 
Reg-Ma;  
Reg-PR;  
EnvP 
Rule of Law Composite indicator of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
World Bank Low measures indicate an 
ineffective/inefficient 
existing controlling and 
monitoring system causing 
information asymmetries 
                                                     
19 Please note: 1) Information asymmetries are conceived as the result of problems on part of the state to control and monitor the activities of firms. These problems 
depend, among other things, on the ability (technical/knowledge/human resources) or even willingness of the administration in charge to control and monitor actors’ 
behaviour, but also on the characteristics of the resources (and the related activities to be monitored) concerned. Thus, information asymmetries might exist (or persist) 
because costs for monitoring and controlling are high or even prohibitive. In other words, if controlling and monitoring are possible and available at zero costs, there 
would be no information asymmetries. 2) There is a strong link between the level of opportunism (see CIA 22) and controlling and monitoring costs. High levels of 
opportunism in a country might indicate high costs for controlling necessary to deter actors from cheating. 
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24 Monopoly power Reg-Ma  Oligopolistic structure Number of firms in a sector (e.g., food processing industry, 
water supply firms, etc.) 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
 
EUROSTAT 
Low numbers indicate a 
tendency towards an 
oligopolistic structure in a 
sector (or a monopoly = 1) 
Agricultural specialised 
press 
Number of agriculture related journals, newspapers, 
newsletters, etc. 
National Statistical 
Databases 
Low numbers indicate a low 
variety of specialised press 
and, thus, a high likelihood 
of insufficient information 
25 Insufficient 
information on policy 
Eco-Ma;  
Eco-PR 
Dissemination of 
specialised press among 
farmers 
Ratio = total circulation (or printed copies) of specialised 
press / number of farms 
National Statistical 
Databases;  
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
Low ratios indicate a low 
dissemination level of 
specialised press and, thus, 
a high likelihood of 
insufficient information 
26 Endowment effect Reg-PR;  
Eco-PR  
Change of property rights Degree of (substantial) cut back on relevant property rights 
endowments of actors addressed by the policy and of other 
actors (including the state) 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High degrees of cut back on 
relevant property rights of 
actors indicates a stronger 
resistance of actors 
27 Dispersion/ 
fragmentation of 
property rights20 
Adv-SON;  
Adv-PR 
Land owner - tenant 
relationship 
Average number of land owners per tenant National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate that 
property rights on the land 
farmed by one tenant are 
dispersed 
                                                     
20 Here, term “fragmentation” refers to “land fragmentation”, i.e., owners per hectare. However, “dispersion” refers to the distribution of specific components of property 
rights on a concrete piece of land (access, alienation, withdrawal, etc.). 
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Land farmed under 
leasehold contracts 
Percentage of agricultural land farmed under leasehold 
contracts 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High percentages indicate 
that property rights on a 
high proportion of land (of a 
country) are dispersed 
Land ownership  
(land fragmentation) 
Average size of land per land owner National Statistical 
Databases 
Low numbers indicate a 
high degree of land 
fragmentation 
Dispersion of farm size For each country a farm size distribution curve (farms with 
size < 5 ha, between 5-20 ha, between 20-50 ha, and > 50 ha) 
will be calculated for each year. Difference between years will 
serve as a measure of farm size dispersion.  
EUROSTAT; 
Own calculations 
n.a. 
Land ownership disputes Number of infringement cases in a country brought before the 
Court of Justice that are related to disputes on land ownership 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
high level of ambiguity of 
property rights on land 
Confiscation/Expropriation
 
Private property protection 
Measure on the likelihood of confiscation / expropriation or 
Measure on private property protection (also part of the 
World Bank composite indicator “rule of law) 
 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
(see also World 
Bank) 
High likelihoods of 
confiscation / expropriation 
or low measures of private 
property protection indicate 
a high ambiguity of 
(private) property rights 
28 Ambiguous property 
rights 
Reg-Ma;  
Reg-PR 
Transition Country /  
New Member State 
Binary indicator:  
New Member State (joined EU 1. May 2004 or after) = 1 
Old Member State (joined EU before 1. May 2004) = 0 
EUROSTAT It is assumed that property 
rights are more ambiguous 
in the New Member States 
Membership in relevant 
associations and NGOs 
Percentage of farmers that are members in relevant 
associations and NGOs 
Assessment by 
expert group;  
Statistics of 
relevant associ-
ations and NGOs 
Low percentages indicate a 
low level of bonding social 
capital among farmers 
29 Social capital (among 
local actors = bonding 
social capital) 
(Reg-Ma);  
Eco-SON; 
ComRes 
Associations and NGOs Number of relevant associations and NGOs Assessment by 
expert group 
Low numbers indicate a low 
level of bonding social 
capital 
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Telecommunication Number of mobile phones per 1.000 inhabitants EUROSTAT Low numbers indicate a low 
level of bonding social 
capital 
Intensity of Email-
exchange and 
telecommunication 
Number of E-mail or phone exchange inside and outside a 
region 
EUROSTAT Low numbers indicate a low 
level of bonding social 
capital 
Remoteness Average distance of farms to public transport n.a. High average distances 
indicate a low level of 
bonding social capital (in 
countries with limited availa-
bility of private transport 
Social Capital Social Capital Measure (ex-ante policy implementation) 
Measure will be specified by WP2 – social indicator group 
SEAMLESS social 
indicators 
A low measure indicates a 
low level of bonding social 
capital 
Level of Internet access – 
households 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
Voter turnout in national 
parliamentary elections 
Percentage of the (accredited) population who cast a vote or 
turn out at a national parliamentary election 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
E-government usage by 
individuals 
Percentage of individuals (16-74 years old) who have used the 
internet in the last 3 months for interaction with public 
authorities (obtaining information, downloading forms, 
sending filled in forms) 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
Trust between actors Percentage of respondents who answer “Most people can be 
trusted” 
EVSS (World 
Values surveys) 
Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
Social capital 
(between local actors 
and actors at other 
levels, e.g., state = 
bridging social capital) 
(Reg-Ma);  
Eco-SON; 
ComRes 
Level of citizen’s 
confidence in EU 
institutions 
Share of positive opinions expressed (people who declare that 
they “tend to trust”) towards the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, and the Council of Ministers of the 
EU, respectively. 
EUROSTAT Low shares indicate low 
bridging social capital 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 54 of 170 
Relative trust European 
citizens have for citizens of 
other countries 
Average response to the question ”I would like to ask you a 
question about how much trust you have in people from 
various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a 
lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all” 
(1 = no trust at all; 2 = not very much trust; 3 = some trust; 4 
=a lot of trust). 
Eurobarometer Average values between 1 
and 2 indicate low trust 
between actors 
30 Trust between actors 
(interpersonal trust) 
Reg-Ma;  
Gen 
Trust between actors Percentage of respondents who answer “Most people can be 
trusted” 
EVSS (World 
Values surveys) 
Low percentages indicate 
low trust between actors 
Memberships in 
environmental 
intergovernmental 
organisations 
Number of memberships (of a country) in environmental 
intergovernmental organizations 
Different sources 
(see Environ-
mental 
Sustainability 
Index - ESI) 
High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Participation in 
international 
environmental agreements 
Measure for the participation of a country in international 
environmental agreements (combines ratifications of treaties 
and conventions with the level of active participation in,  
contribution to, and compliance with the treaties' obligations) 
(also part of ESI) 
Values: 0 (no participation) to 1 (full participation) 
Different sources 
(see also Environ-
mental 
Sustainability 
Index - ESI) 
Values above 0.5 indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Environmental 
Governance 
Measure on the severity of environmental policy of a country 
(also part of ESI) 
World Economic 
Forum (see also 
ESI and Damania 
et al. 2004) 
High measures indicate 
strong environmental 
groups 
Environmental Subsidies Level of environmental motivated subsidy; Also: (Ratio = 
Environmental motivated subsidy / Gross National Product) 
OECD High ratios indicate strong 
environmental groups 
and/or legislation 
31 Strong environmental 
groups and / or 
environmental 
legislation 
Prot  
Eco-label awards Number of (Community) Eco-label awarded to products and 
services with reduced environmental impacts 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
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Ethical Financing Number of organisations that have implemented and Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) or an ISO 14001 
certification 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Protected Areas for 
Biodiversity: Habitats 
Directive 
Percentage of Area proposed under the Habitats Directive 
relative to total agricultural area in a country 
EUROSTAT High percentages indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Environmental 
associations and NGOs 
Number of environmental associations and NGOs Assessment by 
expert group; 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Memberships in 
environmental associations 
and NGOs 
Ratio = Number of memberships in environmental 
associations and NGOs / total population of the country 
Assessment by 
expert group; 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High ratios indicate strong 
environmental groups 
and/or legislation 
Memberships in farmers 
associations 
Total number of members in farmers associations National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers organisations 
Fragmentation of farmers 
associations 
Number of farmers associations National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
relatively weak (total) 
bargaining power of farmers 
organisations 
32 Strong bargaining 
power of farmers’ 
organisations 
Reg-Hi;  
Eco-SON 
Lobbying power of 
farmers unions 
Percentage of farmers in a country that are members of farmer 
unions 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
Assessment by 
expert group 
High percentages indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers unions. 
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Proximity between farmers 
associations and EU 
authorities 
(Number of) farmers associations (of a country) with official 
representatives in Brussels 
Data assembled by 
expert group 
A high number indicates a 
high influence on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and 
strong bargaining power 
Structure of farming 
system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of people employed in the 
farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A low ratio indicates a 
farming system dominated 
by large farms (latifundium 
system) and, thus, a high 
influence on the political 
decision making process at 
national level 
Producer Support Estimate Monetary budget of producer support (e.g., market price 
support, payments based on overall farming income, etc.) in a 
country 
OECD High estimates indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers organisation 
Eco-label awards Number of different Eco-labels awarded to products and 
services with reduced environmental impacts 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate 
heterogeneous environment-
related social values 
Protected Areas for 
Biodiversity: Habitats 
Directive 
Percentage of Area proposed under the Habitats Directive 
relative to total agricultural area in a country 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
strong local opposition 
against the demarcation of 
protected areas, thus, 
heterogeneous environment-
related social values 
33 Heterogeneous 
environment-related 
social values) 
EnvP 
Transposition of 
environment-related 
European Community law 
Percentage of implemented environment-related EU 
Directives in a Member State: Environment Directives for 
which measures or implementation have been notified by 
Member States divided by Environmental Directives 
applicable on the reference date by Member States 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
strong opposition of actor 
groups against 
implementation of these 
directives, thus, 
heterogeneous environment-
related social values 
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Environmental conflicts Number of infringement cases concerning environmental 
issues brought before the Court of Justice in country as a 
percentage of total infringement cases 
National statistical 
databases 
High percentages indicate a 
high heterogeneity of 
environment-related social 
values 
Environmental 
associations and NGOs 
Number of environmental associations and NGOs Assessment by 
expert group; 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
high number of different 
environmental goals and, 
thus, a high heterogeneity of 
environment-related social 
values 
Policitical influence of 
Green Party 
Percentage of votes cast for a green party at parliamentary 
elections at national level 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High percentages indicate a 
high environmental 
awareness 
Environmental awareness Positive answers to the question “I would give part of my 
income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution” 
Inter-university 
Consortium for 
Political and 
Social Research 
(European Values 
Surveys Series - 
EVSS) 
High numbers of positive 
answers indicate a high 
environmental awareness 
Environmental expenditure Percentage of environmental public expenditure of Gross 
Domestic Product 
EUROSTAT High percentages indicate 
strong environmental 
preferences 
Enterprises with an 
environmental 
management system 
Number of organisations that have implemented and Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) or an ISO 14001 
certification 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
preferences 
34 High environmental 
awareness and strong 
environmental 
preferences of 
consumers 
Prot 
Eco-label awards Number of (Community) Eco-labels awarded to products and 
services with reduced environmental impacts 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
consumer preferences 
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Health and quality label 
awards 
Number of health- or quality-labels awarded to (agricultural 
products) 
Assessment by 
expert group 
Low/High numbers indicate 
weak/strong consumer 
preferences for health or 
quality products 
Opposition to GMO-
products 
Percentage of population opposed to GMO products Eurobarometer Low/High numbers indicate 
weak/strong consumer 
preferences for health or 
quality products 
35 Weak / Strong 
consumer preferences 
for health or quality 
products 
Reg-Ma;  
Prot 
Composite Consumer’s 
environmental awareness 
and health concerns 
Principal component analysis (PCA) on different items related 
to environmental concerns (decompose Environmental 
Awareness Index?) and health concerns (number of health- 
labels awarded to products) 
EVSS;  
Assessment by 
expert group 
Low/High numbers indicate 
weak/strong consumer 
preferences for health or 
quality products 
36 Low incentives to 
resolve a problem 
Adv-SON;  
Water 
Incentives for resolving 
problems  
Degree of incentives to resolve the problem SEAMLESS 
environmental 
indicators; 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate low 
incentives to resolve a 
problem 
37 Very large water 
resource system 
Adv-SON;  
Water 
Size of water resource 
system 
Binary indicator:  
Very large water resource systems addressed by policy = 1;  
Or not = 0 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Value = 1 indicates the 
existence of the constraint 
38 Environmental 
problem is not easy to 
identify in space and 
time 
Adv-SON;  
Adv-PR 
Identifiability in space and 
time 
Degree of identifiability of environmental problem in space 
and time 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate high 
constraints 
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Proximity between 
farmers/consumers 
associations and EU 
authorities 
(Number of) farmers associations / consumers associations (of 
a country) with official representatives in Brussels 
Datasets High numbers indicate a 
high influence of 
farmers/consumers on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and, 
thus, high political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies for farmers/ 
consumers 
Lobbying power of 
farmers associations 
Percentage of farmers of a country that are members of a 
farmers association 
National Statistical 
Databases;  
Assessment by 
expert group 
High percentages indicate 
high influence of farmers on 
the political decision 
making process, thus, high 
political costs for reducing 
protectionist policies. 
Voters employed in the 
farming sector 
Percentage of voters (population eligible to vote) that are 
employed in the farming sector 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
High percentages indicate 
high political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies for farmers 
39 High political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies 
Prot 
Structure of farming 
system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of people employed in the 
farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A low ratio indicates a 
farming system dominated 
by large farms having larger 
potentials for lobbying and, 
thus, high political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies for farmers 
40 High perceived 
dependence on 
support/protection 
Prot Perceived dependence on 
support/protection 
Degree of perceived dependence on support/protection Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High degrees indicate high 
constraints 
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41 Poor country with 
smallholder 
agriculture 
Prot Small farms in poor 
countries 
Percentage of farms with less than 5 ha in countries with a 
Gross Domestic Product per person below X 
EUROSTAT High percentages indicate a 
dominance of smallholder 
agriculture in poor country, 
thus, higher constraints 
42 Inefficient credit 
markets for 
smallholders 
Prot Very small farms Percentage of farms with less than X ha EUROSTAT; 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High percentages indicate 
higher constraints since very 
small farms usually have 
problems to get credits 
Legend: Reg-Hi: Regulatory on Hierarchy/Bureaucracy; Reg-Ma: Regulatory on Market; Eco-Hi: Economic on Hierarchy/Bureaucracy; Eco-Ma: 
Economic on Market; Reg-SON: Regulatory on Self-organised network; Eco-SON: Economic on Self-organised networks; Adv-SON: 
Advisory/Voluntary on Self-organised network; Reg-PR: Regulatory on Property Rights Change; Eco-PR: Economic on Property Rights Change; Adv-
PR: Advisory/Voluntary on Property Rights Change; ComRes: Complex resource systems with many externalities involved; Water: Water resource 
systems with long-term and diffuse impacts stemming from farming activities; Land: Land/Soil; Prot: (Trade-related) Agricultural Protectionist Policies; 
EnvP: Environmental Policies; Gen: General Institutional Aspects 
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3.4 Step 4: Method to Aggregate Information on Crucial 
Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 
In this Section, the method to aggregate the information on crucial institutional aspects of 
policy types will be introduced. The application examples of PICA described in Sections 4.1 
and 4.2 will illustrate the operationalisation of this step. 
It is important to note that there is no automatic calculation process producing quantitative 
values for the extent of the identified CIAs by evaluating the outcomes of the various 
institutional indicators employed. Rather, the expert team that runs PICA - with the help of 
external experts and/or users and/or stakeholders - will use the information provided by the 
indicators for a qualitative assessment of the relevant CIA. Subsequently, the expert team will 
combine the information on the respective constraints or potentials to an overall assessment 
on institutional compatibility of the policy option (with respect to a country or region). 
During this process, they will elaborate on qualitative composite output indicators, such as:  
• institutional diversity,  
• property rights compatibility,  
• communication capacity,  
• governance structures compatibility, and  
• embeddedness compatibility.  
Crucial institutional aspects relevant for the policy option under scrutiny will be subsumed 
under these categories of institutional compatibility. Depending on the policy, other or 
additional categories might be introduced. Finally, those categorised region- or country wise 
qualitative statements on the compatibility of the policy option will be communicated - 
explained by the PICA expert team - to the User(s) of SEAMLESS-IF. 

SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 63 of 170 
4 Integration of PICA in SEAMLESS-IF 
In this Section, PICA will be applied to the SEAMLESS Test Case 1 (Trade Liberalisation) 
and Test Case 2 (here: Nitrate Directive) to illustrate the concrete steps of institutional 
compatibility analysis within SEAMLESS.21 It is assumed that a small team of experts trained 
in institutional economics supervises the entire procedure. This expert team runs PICA with 
the help of - and in close interaction with - the respective User(s), other relevant SEAMLESS 
scientists (e.g., modellers, data base group, etc.), relevant national and/or regional 
stakeholders, and other experts. 
While the overall procedure of institutional compatibility analysis has been formalised and 
structured to enable a focussed and time efficient ex-ante institutional policy assessment there 
is no automatic quantitative calculation process covering all steps of PICA. Qualitative forms 
of assessment are important elements within PICA. Yet, this qualitative assessment is based - 
to varying degrees - on quantitative data (e.g., the values/results of institutional indicators 
describing the extent of a respective Crucial Institutional Aspect). Furthermore, in the context 
of integrating PICA in Prototype 3, a more detailed protocol will be developed that will guide 
any future PICA team through the process of institutional analysis within SEAMLESS (see 
also Appendix 3). 
4.1 Integration of PICA in SEAMLESS-IF: Test Case 1 (Trade 
Liberalisation) 
4.1.1 Description of the Policy Option in Prototype 1 (Test Case 1) 
In Test Case 1, the policy option “Trade Liberalisation” is to be adopted. The policy option is 
aiming at eliminating trade-distorting instruments, relates to the market level of the 
agricultural sector, and affects all commodities through the price mechanism which can (and 
will) be modelled using CAPRI, GTAP, and other modelling systems. More precisely, the 
“Trade Liberalisation” policy scenario is encompassing four main elements: 1) Reductions in 
import tariffs (based on the details of the so-called Harbinson 1½ proposal); 2) Elimination of 
export subsidies (assuming the complete elimination of all export subsidy practices, such as 
direct export subsidies, producer financed subsidies, and cost reduction measures); 3) 
Expansion of tariff rate quotas (assuming the same reduction commitments as by Harbinson 
for import tariffs); 4) Specific bilateral trade agreements signed and implemented. Here, the 
year 2012 is taken as simulation year since at this time the reform of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 2003 is considered to be fully implemented.22  
                                                     
21 Please not that redundancies between the two Test Cases concerning the description of the procedure 
are intended. This is supposed to ensure that the reader can focus on one example only. 
22 The CAP reform of 2003, as it would be implemented in 2012 in the EU-25 is part of the reference 
scenario assumptions. It thus includes the currently most plausible implementation of decoupling and 
payment scheme options (single farm payments, regional uniform payments, or hybrid forms) for the 
different EU Member States, modulation of direct payments, capping of export subsidies and EU 
preferential trade agreements with least developed and other countries. It also comprises specific and 
ad-valorem tariffs, and tariff rate quotas as currently being regulated by the different WTO members.  
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4.1.2 PICA step 1: Classification of the Policy Option 
Using all available information on the concrete form and content of the policy option 
provided by the User(s) the PICA expert team is categorising the policy option according to 
the matrix of policy types (see Table 4.1). “Trade Liberalisation” is identified as a policy type 
aiming to intervene at markets (here, for 12 raw commodities and 8 intermediates) using 
economic instruments (here, tariff cuts and reduction in subsidies) as type of intervention. 
Further, Crucial Institutional Aspects (CIA) related to trade-related agricultural protectionist 
policies have to be considered. This categorisation allows focusing the subsequent review of 
relevant policy assessment literature (and other literature) that is screened for CIAs. 
4.1.3 PICA step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects related to the Policy Option 
The literature review that is carried out by the PICA expert team reveales a number of Crucial 
Institutional Aspects potentially hampering the effective implementation of the policy option 
“Trade Liberalisation”, in particular, the implementation of tariff cuts and reductions in 
subsidies.23 Those CIAs are summarised in Table 3.2 (Box: Economic – Market) and in Table 
3.4 (Trade-related agricultural protectionist policies) in Section 3. The complete set of 
potentially relevant CIA encompasses:24  
1. Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) 
2. Redundant policy instruments & rules 
3. High level of opportunism 
4. No experiences with measures 
5. Insufficient information on policy 
6. Not matching farmers’ competencies & capabilities 
7. Target group not (fully) eligible 
8. Strong consumer preferences together with high level of social capital 
9. High level of corruption 
10. Very large water resource system 
11. High political costs for reducing protectionist policies 
12. Political and administrative inertia 
13. Strong consumer preferences for health and quality products 
14. Strong environmental groups and environmental legislation 
15. High environmental awareness and strong environmental preferences of consumers 
16. Poor country with smallholder agriculture 
17. Inefficient credit markets for smallholders 
18. High perceived dependence on support/protection 
Together with the User(s), relevant national and/or regional stakeholders, and other experts, 
the PICA expert team is discussing the relevance of every identified CIA for the policy option 
under scrutiny. Here, some of these CIAs might be regarded as relevant for the policy type 
(economic on market) in general, but not be considered as crucial for the concrete policy 
option to be assessed. Thus, the expert team can decide to skip some CIAs at this stage, e.g., 
the CIA very large water resource system. In turn, additional CIAs that have not been 
covered by the literature reviewed - or not in relation to the policy type under scrutiny - might 
                                                     
23 Depending on the policy option under scrutiny, the (then) PICA expert team can make - largely - use 
of the already existing library of CIAs that was compiled during former applications of PICA. 
Effectively, there will be an evergrowing library of CIAs that only has to be updated and 
complemented if a “new” policy option is to be assessed. 
24 The order of the CIAs in the list does not imply a ranking according to their relative importance. 
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be added. For example, strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations is found to be an 
important additional CIA. 
The detailed description and explanation of every CIA identified can be found in the 
respective Sections in Appendix 2. However, for illustrative purposes the relevance of some 
identified CIA will be highlighted and linked to the policy option. These CIAs are considered 
of primary importance for the implementation of the policy option “Trade Liberalisation”. 
1) Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) 
An important strand of institutional aspects found in the literature stems from the fact that 
agricultural production is usually marked by joint production of commodities (e.g., meat or 
milk) and non-commodities (e.g., landscapes attractive for tourists). For example, lifting 
import tariffs for milk (meat) might cause a decrease in domestic prices for milk (meat) 
which can lead to a decrease in domestic milk (meat) production. Thus, less grassland is 
needed; farmers in some (marginal) regions might stop farming at all and / or using their land 
for other purposes (e.g., as fallow land or for housing). However, there are special support 
programs in place in some countries and regions that encourage farmers to use their land in a 
particular way (e.g., using grassland as pastures) because it ‘produces’ a landscape attractive 
for tourists, thus, preventing the predicted change in land use. Such financial support might 
come from the state but also from the regional tourist council; eventually ‘buying’ a 
particular landscape from the farmer. There might also be formal laws (regional, national, 
and/or international) preventing the use of land other than ‘the traditional way’ in some 
regions.  
The existence of those contradictory financial incentives as well as formal laws might be the 
result of the presence of strong environmental groups and environmental legislation in a 
country or region, a high environmental awareness and strong environmental preferences of 
consumers, or a strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations. Therefore, a particular 
country might have signed international agreements having institutional constraining effects. 
For example, a country might have agreed to reduce their emission of climate gases by 
creating appropriate ‘sinks’. Here, certain types of land cover (e.g., grasslands) might serve 
this purpose better than others do (e.g., arable or housing). Thus, there might be financial 
incentive programs in place - or even formal restrictions - for changing land use, again, 
preventing the predicted decrease in e.g., milk (meat) production.  
2) High environmental awareness and strong environmental preferences of consumers 
Consumers in a particular country or region might have a strong preference for buying 
products that are produced in an environmentally friendly fashion (e.g., dolphin friendly 
tuna) or that are not produced using genetically modified organisms (e.g., maize) or growth 
hormones (e.g., BST beef). If this is the case, there might be no markets (or smaller ones than 
predicted) for those products bearing the risk of being produced in a way not preferred by the 
consumers in this country.  
3) Strong consumer preferences for health and quality products 
Similar to the CIA above, consumers in a particular country or region might have a strong 
preference for health and quality products, thus, (foreign) produce not meeting these 
preferences will face lower consumer demands. Linking up to the CIA presented first 
(contradictory policy instruments & rules), those preferences might have been 
manifested/formalised in countrywide health and quality standards. Here, a high level of 
social capital is facilitating the expression of preferences in the political arena, thus, the CIA 
strong consumer preferences together with high level of social capital is of importance here, 
too. For example, for milk there might be very high state-sanctioned hygienic standards in 
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place (in a particular region or country). Assuming a positive relation between quality and 
marginal production costs, fulfilling this particular standard might not be possible for every 
potential foreign milk producer (alternatively, his/her marginal production costs increase and 
he/she can not (longer) offer the milk at a (comparatively) low price).  
4) High political costs for reducing protectionist policies 
Implementation of policies reducing agricultural protection might be constrained in a specific 
country or region due to high political costs. These costs can be expected to be high a) if the 
relative income position of farmers is decreasing, b) if the commodities concerned represent a 
high share in consumer expenditures, c) if policies are defined at EU level, d) if capital 
intensive agricultural production branches are concerned, and e) in the presence of low 
income rates and high real food prices (Swinnen et al., 2000). The level of political costs 
might also be influenced by the degree of the perceived dependence on support/protection. 
Since direct aid schemes for farmers were found to convey a stronger subjective impression 
of dependence (Daugbjerg et al., 2003) it can be expected that policies that aim to reduce 
those direct aid schemes will face stronger opposition from farmers (‘lobbies), thus, 
increasing political costs, than indirect support schemes. Furthermore, the level of political 
costs that a government has to face when reducing agricultural protection will be higher if 
farmers’ organisations have strong bargaining power. 
5) High level of corruption 
The existence of (powerful) domestic actors who profit from trade regulations in place might 
hinder a successful implementation of reducing protectionist policies. This might be because 
they help them to extract corruption rents that can be used partly to keep them in power. 
Extraction of corruption rents may either be through opportunities for bribery or the exercise 
of an import monopoly (Kerr, 2004). 
4.1.4 PICA step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects of the Policy Option 
to Institutional Indicators 
In PICA step 2, the expert team suggests a restricted/short list of CIAs that are considered to 
be of particular importance for assessing the effectiveness of implementing the policy option 
“Trade Liberalisation” (the numbers in brackets indicate the position of the respective CIAs 
in Table 4.1):  
1. Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) (1) 
2. High environmental awareness and strong environmental preferences of consumers (2) 
3. Strong environmental groups and environmental legislation (3) 
4. Strong consumer preferences for health and quality products (4) 
5. Strong consumer preferences together with high level of social capital (2) (4) (5) 
6. High political costs for reducing protectionist policies (6) 
7. High perceived dependence on support/protection (7) 
8. Strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations (8) 
9. High level of corruption (9) 
In Table 4.1, the selected CIAs are linked with at least one institutional indicator that can help 
to evaluate the respective CIA; eventually leading to statements about the effectiveness of 
policy implementation in PICA step 4. For further “processing” only those indicators are 
selected from the available portfolio that are considered to have some explanatory power with 
respect to the concrete policy option under scrutiny, here, “Trade Liberalisation”. At this 
stage, the expert team that has compiled the list of institutional indicators is interacting 
closely with other SEAMLESS scientists, in particular with the modelling and data bases 
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groups. In particular, the availability, quality, and (geographical/regional) scope of 
quantitative data are discussed in order to select the most appropriate indicators.25 Further, the 
precise forms (e.g., focus groups, interviews, document analysis, etc.) and scopes 
(stakeholder and/or experts at regional and/or national and/or EU-level, etc.) of suggested 
qualitative assessments are discussed and decided on. 
For illustration, some indicators drawing on different data sources or processes of generating 
data are discussed in more detail.  
A) In order to identify contradictory policies that are, e.g., due to joint production, the 
following methodology is suggested: 1) Compile a short list of relevant policies that are 
applied in the area and that could be contradictory to the policy option; 2) Identify more 
precisely and evaluate contradictions between policy option under scrutiny and policies in 
this short list. This qualitative assessment is carried out by the PICA expert team together 
with other experts 
B) In order to describe the extent of the CIA high level of corruption it is suggested, among 
other things, to make use of the Corruption Perception Index compiled by Transparency 
International. It contains a combination of various sources measuring the overall extent 
of corruption as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. Additionally, the 
Control of Corruption Indicator provided by the World Bank can be used to describe the 
extent of the CIA. This is a composite indicator of the extent public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both, petty and grand corruption as well as state “capture” by 
elites and private interests. Both data sets include national data for various years. For both 
indicators, it is assumed that high levels of the various measures and indexes of 
corruption in the political system and in the bureaucracy contributes to lax enforcement 
of regulations and an ability on the part of producers and consumers to evade 
responsibility for the harms they cause, thus, indicate high constraints. 
C) For describing the social capital element of the CIA strong consumer preferences 
together with high level of social capital it is suggested to assess the membership [of 
consumers] in relevant associations and NGOs (percentage) by reviewing national 
statistics of relevant associations and NGOs and employing national expert groups. Here, 
low percentages indicate a low level of bonding social capital among consumers. The 
Social Capital Measure that is constructed and further specified by the social indicator 
group of SEAMLESS Work Package 2 provides further insight on social capital in the 
various countries. Here, it is assumed that a low measure indicates a low level of bonding 
social capital.  
D) For assessing the political costs for reducing protectionist policies, among other things, 
the indicator structure of farming system is introduced. It is construed as the ratio 
between the number of farms (in a country or region) and the number of people employed 
                                                     
25 Future Prototypes of SEAMLESS-IF are likely to include/have access to some of the data bases 
suggested in Table 3.5, e.g., some relevant and freely available data sets from the World Bank, 
EUROSTAT, or the like. However, other quantitative data bases will only be included on a case-to-
case basis, depending on both, the relative importance of the indicator described by this data set and 
the policy option under scrutiny.  
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in the farming sector. This information can be provided by data bases already integrated 
in SEAMLESS-IF. Here, a low ratio indicates a farming system dominated by large farms 
having larger potentials for lobbying and, thus, high political costs for reducing 
protectionist policies for farmers. 
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Table 4.1: Restricted List of Crucial Institutional Aspects and Institutional Indicators Relevant for the Policy Option “Trade Liberalisation” 
No. Crucial 
Institutional 
Aspects (CIA) 
Related to  
Policy Type(s) 
Institutional Indicator Description / Data Data Sources / 
Databases 
Expert assumptions on 
links between indicator 
and CIA26 
1 Contradictory policy 
instruments and rules 
(joint production) 
Reg-Hi;  
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-Ma;  
EnvP;  
Prot;  
Gen 
Contradictory policies 
(incl. joint production) 
Methodology to identify contradictory policies that are, e.g., 
due to joint production: 1) Compile a short list of relevant 
policies that are applied in the area and that could be 
contradictory to the policy option; 2) Identify more precisely 
and evaluate contradictions between policy option under 
scrutiny and policies in this short list 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
The existence of 
contradictory policies and 
rules indicates high 
constraints 
Policitical influence of 
Green Party 
Percentage of votes cast for a green party at parliamentary 
elections at national level 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High percentages indicate a 
high environmental 
awareness 
Environmental awareness Positive answers to the question “I would give part of my 
income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution” 
Inter-university 
Consortium for 
Political and 
Social Research 
(European Values 
Surveys Series - 
EVSS) 
High numbers of positive 
answers indicate a high 
environmental awareness 
2 High environmental 
awareness and strong 
environmental 
preferences of 
consumers 
Prot 
Environmental expenditure Percentage of environmental public expenditure of Gross 
Domestic Product 
EUROSTAT High percentages indicate 
strong environmental 
preferences 
                                                     
26 Please note that this column will contain “Specific assumptions on links between indicator, CIA, and policy option” when actually running PICA. It will be filled by the 
PICA team after discussing the relevance and sufficiency of available indicators for evaluating the identified CIA with respect to the concrete policy option. This process 
is also likely to produce a restricted (smaller) list of those institutional indicators related to a respective CIA that can be linked meaningfully with the policy option under 
scrutiny. See also Appendix 3. 
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Enterprises with an 
environmental 
management system 
Number of organisations that have implemented and Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) or an ISO 14001 
certification 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
preferences 
Eco-label awards Number of (Community) Eco-labels awarded to products and 
services with reduced environmental impacts 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
consumer preferences 
Memberships in 
environmental 
intergovernmental 
organisations 
Number of memberships (of a country) in environmental 
intergovernmental organizations 
Different sources 
(see Environ-
mental 
Sustainability 
Index - ESI) 
High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Participation in 
international 
environmental agreements 
Measure for the participation of a country in international 
environmental agreements (combines ratifications of treaties 
and conventions with the level of active participation in,  
contribution to, and compliance with the treaties' obligations) 
(also part of ESI) 
Values: 0 (no participation) to 1 (full participation) 
Different sources 
(see also Environ-
mental 
Sustainability 
Index - ESI) 
Values above 0.5 indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Environmental 
Governance 
Measure on the severity of environmental policy of a country 
(also part of ESI) 
World Economic 
Forum (see also 
ESI and Damania 
et al. 2004) 
High measures indicate 
strong environmental 
groups 
Environmental Subsidies Level of environmental motivated subsidy; Also: (Ratio = 
Environmental motivated subsidy / Gross National Product) 
OECD High ratios indicate strong 
environmental groups 
and/or legislation 
3 Strong environmental 
groups and / or 
environmental 
legislation 
Prot  
Eco-label awards Number of (Community) Eco-label awarded to products and 
services with reduced environmental impacts 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
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Ethical Financing Number of organisations that have implemented and Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) or an ISO 14001 
certification 
EUROSTAT High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Protected Areas for 
Biodiversity: Habitats 
Directive 
Percentage of Area proposed under the Habitats Directive 
relative to total agricultural area in a country 
EUROSTAT High percentages indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Environmental 
associations and NGOs 
Number of environmental associations and NGOs Assessment by 
expert group; 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate 
strong environmental 
groups and/or legislation 
Memberships in 
environmental associations 
and NGOs 
Ratio = Number of memberships in environmental 
associations and NGOs / total population of the country 
Assessment by 
expert group; 
National Statistical 
Databases 
High ratios indicate strong 
environmental groups 
and/or legislation 
Health and quality label 
awards 
Number of health- or quality-labels awarded to (agricultural 
products) 
Assessment by 
expert group 
Low/High numbers indicate 
weak/strong consumer 
preferences for health or 
quality products 
Opposition to GMO-
products 
Percentage of population opposed to GMO products Eurobarometer Low/High numbers indicate 
weak/strong consumer 
preferences for health or 
quality products 
4 Strong consumer 
preferences for health 
or quality products 
Reg-Ma;  
Prot 
Composite Consumer’s 
environmental awareness 
and health concerns 
Principal component analysis (PCA) on different items related 
to environmental concerns (decompose Environmental 
Awareness Index?) and health concerns (number of health- 
labels awarded to products) 
EVSS;  
Assessment by 
expert group 
Low/High numbers indicate 
weak/strong consumer 
preferences for health or 
quality products 
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Membership in relevant 
associations and NGOs 
Percentage of farmers that are members in relevant 
associations and NGOs 
Assessment by 
expert group;  
Statistics of 
relevant associ-
ations and NGOs 
Low percentages indicate a 
low level of bonding social 
capital among farmers 
Associations and NGOs Number of relevant associations and NGOs Assessment by 
expert group 
Low numbers indicate a low 
level of bonding social 
capital 
Telecommunication Number of mobile phones per 1.000 inhabitants EUROSTAT Low numbers indicate a low 
level of bonding social 
capital 
Intensity of Email-
exchange and 
telecommunication 
Number of E-mail or phone exchange inside and outside a 
region 
EUROSTAT Low numbers indicate a low 
level of bonding social 
capital 
Remoteness Average distance of farms to public transport n.a. High average distances 
indicate a low level of 
bonding social capital (in 
countries with limited availa-
bility of private transport 
Social capital (among 
local actors = bonding 
social capital) 
(Reg-Ma);  
Eco-SON; 
ComRes 
Social Capital Social Capital Measure (ex-ante policy implementation) 
Measure will be specified by WP2 – social indicator group 
SEAMLESS social 
indicators 
A low measure indicates a 
low level of bonding social 
capital 
Level of Internet access – 
households 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
5 
Social capital 
(between local actors 
and actors at other 
levels, e.g., state = 
bridging social capital) 
(Reg-Ma);  
Eco-SON; 
ComRes Voter turnout in national 
parliamentary elections 
Percentage of the (accredited) population who cast a vote or 
turn out at a national parliamentary election 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
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E-government usage by 
individuals 
Percentage of individuals (16-74 years old) who have used the 
internet in the last 3 months for interaction with public 
authorities (obtaining information, downloading forms, 
sending filled in forms) 
EUROSTAT Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
Trust between actors Percentage of respondents who answer “Most people can be 
trusted” 
EVSS (World 
Values surveys) 
Low percentages indicate 
low bridging social capital 
Level of citizen’s 
confidence in EU 
institutions 
Share of positive opinions expressed (people who declare that 
they “tend to trust”) towards the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, and the Council of Ministers of the 
EU, respectively. 
EUROSTAT Low shares indicate low 
bridging social capital 
Proximity between 
farmers/consumers 
associations and EU 
authorities 
(Number of) farmers associations / consumers associations (of 
a country) with official representatives in Brussels 
Datasets High numbers indicate a 
high influence of 
farmers/consumers on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and, 
thus, high political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies for farmers/ 
consumers 
Lobbying power of 
farmers associations 
Percentage of farmers of a country that are members of a 
farmers association 
National Statistical 
Databases;  
Assessment by 
expert group 
High percentages indicate 
high influence of farmers on 
the political decision 
making process, thus, high 
political costs for reducing 
protectionist policies. 
6 High political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies 
Prot 
Voters employed in the 
farming sector 
Percentage of voters (population eligible to vote) that are 
employed in the farming sector 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
High percentages indicate 
high political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies for farmers 
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Structure of farming 
system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of people employed in the 
farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A low ratio indicates a 
farming system dominated 
by large farms having larger 
potentials for lobbying and, 
thus, high political costs for 
reducing protectionist 
policies for farmers 
7 High perceived 
dependence on 
support/protection 
Prot Perceived dependence on 
support/protection 
Degree of perceived dependence on support/protection Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High degrees indicate high 
constraints 
Memberships in farmers 
associations 
Total number of members in farmers associations National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers organisations 
Fragmentation of farmers 
associations 
Number of farmers associations National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
relatively weak (total) 
bargaining power of farmers 
organisations 
Lobbying power of 
farmers unions 
Percentage of farmers in a country that are members of farmer 
unions 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
Assessment by 
expert group 
High percentages indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers unions. 
8 Strong bargaining 
power of farmers’ 
organisations 
Reg-Hi;  
Eco-SON 
Proximity between farmers 
associations and EU 
authorities 
(Number of) farmers associations (of a country) with official 
representatives in Brussels 
Data assembled by 
expert group 
A high number indicates a 
high influence on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and 
strong bargaining power 
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Structure of farming 
system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of people employed in the 
farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A low ratio indicates a 
farming system 
dominated by large farms 
(latifundium system) and, 
thus, a high influence on 
the political decision 
making process at 
national level 
Producer Support Estimate Monetary budget of producer support (e.g., market price 
support, payments based on overall farming income, etc.) in a 
country 
OECD High estimates indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers organisation 
Corruption Perception 
Index 
Combination of various sources measuring overall extent of 
corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) as determined by 
expert assessments and opinion surveys 
Transparency 
International 
Control of Corruption Composite indicator of the extent public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption as 
well as and state “capture” by elites and private interests 
World Bank 
Corruption within the 
political system 
Measure of corruption within the political system, which 
distorts the economic and financial environment, reduces the 
efficiency of government and business by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political 
system. (also part of the World Bank composite indicator 
“control of corruption”) 
ICRG - Political 
Risk Services (see 
also World Bank) 
9 High level of 
corruption 
Reg-Ma;  
Prot 
Intrusiveness of 
bureaucracy 
Measure of the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy: 
amount of red tape likely to encounter is assessed, as is the 
likelihood of encountering corrupt officials and other groups. 
(also part of the World Bank composite indicator “control of 
corruption”) 
World Markets 
Online (see also 
World Bank) 
High levels of the various 
measures and indexes of 
corruption in the political 
system and in the 
bureaucracy contributes to 
lax enforcement of 
regulations and an ability on 
the part of producers and 
consumers to evade 
responsibility for the harms 
they cause, thus, indicate 
high constraints 
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Legend: Reg-Hi: Regulatory on Hierarchy/Bureaucracy; Reg-Ma: Regulatory on Market; Eco-Ma: Economic on Market; Eco-SON: Economic on Self-
organised networks; Adv-SON: Advisory/Voluntary on Self-organised network; ComRes: Complex resource systems with many externalities involved; 
Prot: (Trade-related) Agricultural Protectionist Policies; EnvP: Environmental Policies; Gen: General Institutional Aspects 
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4.1.5 PICA step 4: Aggregating Information on Crucial Institutional Aspects of 
the Policy Option 
In this final step of PICA, the expert team that runs PICA with the help of external experts, 
the User(s), and stakeholders is using the information provided by the indicators for a 
qualitative assessment of the restricted list of CIAs. This includes, first, combining the 
various indicator information available for every single CIA of the restricted list to arrive at a 
qualitative (or, depending on the indicators, quantitative) statement about the relative extent 
of this CIA in all countries and/or regions. For example, the level of corruption can be 
determined for every country where the policy option is to be implemented, thus, providing 
insights in the relative - country-wise - likelihoods for a reduced effectiveness of policy 
implementation. This information can be compiled, for example, in tables and/or interactive 
maps where different colours signal different levels of corruption.27 
Second, the PICA expert team together with the User(s), stakeholders, and other experts is 
constructing qualitative composite output indicators.28 These output indicators draw on 
information from one or a group of Crucial Institutional Aspects. For the policy option 
“Trade Liberalisation” the expert team suggests to aggregate the information according to the 
following four thematic categories: 
The CIAs aresubsumed under the following four categories: 
1. Property rights compatibility 
• Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) 
• High political costs for reducing protectionist policies 
2. Communication capacity 
• High levels of social capital 
• Strong bargaining power of farmer’s organisations 
• Strong environmental groups 
3. Governance structures compatibility 
• High level of corruption 
4. Embeddedness compatibility 
• High environmental awareness 
• Strong environmental preferences of consumers 
• Strong consumer preferences for health and quality products 
• High perceived dependence on support/protection 
Alternatively, the CIAs might also be subsumed under the following five categories: 
1. Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) 
2. High environmental awareness, strong environmental preferences of consumers, and 
strong environmental groups (including high levels of social capital) 
                                                     
27 These tables and maps might also be made available to the User(s), or they can be integrated in the 
final qualitative statements on the institutional compatibility of the policy option. 
28 While it is certainly helpful to use „classic“ categories, such as property rights compatibility, 
embeddedness compatibility, etc., the User(s) might prefer other categories and/or the PICA expert 
team – depending on the policy option under scrutiny and on the CIAs identified – might suggest other 
and/or additional categories. 
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3. Strong consumer preferences for health and quality products (including high levels of 
social capital) 
4. High political costs for reducing protectionist policies (including high perceived 
dependence on support/protection and strong bargaining power of farmer’s organisations) 
5. High level of corruption 
Finally, these categorised region- or country-wise qualitative statements on the compatibility 
of the policy option will be presented to the User(s) of SEAMLESS-IF by the PICA expert 
team. Here, an interactive form of communication is preferred since this provides the 
opportunity to discuss the results and, perhaps, the introduction of complementary policy 
instruments in countries or regions with specific CIAs.  
4.2 Integration of PICA in SEAMLESS-IF: Test Case 2 (here: 
Nitrate Directive) 
4.2.1 Description of the Policy Option in Prototype 2 (Test Case 2) 
In Test Case 2, environmental policies and agro-ecological technologies are to be studied. 
Among other things, their ability to reduce the use of water, the water pollution by nitrate and 
pesticides, and to preserve biodiversity is to be assessed. The Nitrate Directive (Council 
Directive 91/676/EEC) (EC, 1991) that was adopted in 1991 will be taken as an example to 
illustrate PICA. This policy can be seen as a prominent and typical example for an EU 
environmental policy addressing water pollution.  
One of the core elements of the Nitrate Directive is that Member States have to draw up and 
implement action programmes in vulnerable zones designated before that shall consist, 
among other things, of mandatory rules. These rules determine, e.g., periods when the land 
application of certain types of fertiliser is prohibited, and limitations of the land application of 
fertilisers taking into account the characteristics of the zones concerned, in particular soil 
conditions, soil type and slope, land use, and agricultural practices (see annex III of the 
Directive). Furthermore, Member States have to establish suitable monitoring and 
enforcement systems to ensure actors’ compliance with the rules. 
4.2.2 PICA step 1: Classification of the Policy Option 
Using all available information on the concrete form and content of the policy option 
provided by the User(s) the PICA expert team categorises the policy option “Nitrate 
Directive” – according to the matrix of policy types (see Table 3.1) – as a regulatory type of 
policy having affects on markets. As described above, it demands from the Member States 
that action programmes are to be implemented that shall consist of, among other things, 
concrete mandatory measures determined in annex III. However, only the national regulations 
determine the precise limits of restrictions in time and space. Further, it is assumed that no 
compensations are paid for these restrictions.29 These uncompensated restrictions have an 
impact on the production costs of farmers (e.g., because yields decrease due to restrictions in 
fertiliser use) and, thus, on his/her position at the market. More precisely, the farmer might be 
                                                     
29 National laws to implement the Nitrate Directive might be complemented with various forms of 
compensation schemes that ease the burden for some stakeholders and/or which are active in selected 
areas.  
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forced to offer his produce at a higher price resulting in a decrease in demand for this 
produce, or he/she might keep the price and accept reduced profits. Furthermore, the “Nitrate 
Directive” is an example of an environmental policy, thus, CIAs relevant for this group of 
policies are also to be searched for in the relevant literature. This categorisation allows 
focusing the subsequent review of relevant policy assessment literature (and other literature) 
that is screened for CIAs. 
4.2.3 PICA step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects related to the Policy Option 
The literature review that is carried out by the PICA expert team reveals a number of Crucial 
Institutional Aspects potentially hampering the effective implementation of the policy option 
“Nitrate Directive”, in particular, the implementation of restrictions in fertiliser use.30 Those 
CIAs are summarised in Table 3.2 (Box: Regulatory – Market) and in Table 3.4 
(Environmental Policies) in Section 3. The complete set of potentially relevant CIA 
encompasses:31  
1. Ambiguous property rights 
2. Information asymmetry state vs. firm 
3. Contradictory policy instruments & rules (joint production) 
4. Redundant policy instruments & rules 
5. High level of opportunism 
6. Monopoly power 
7. Lack of trust between economic actors 
8. High administrative public and/or private Transaction Costs 
9. Weak consumer preferences 
10. Strong consumer preferences together with high level of social capital 
11. High level of corruption 
12. Heterogeneous environment-related social values 
13. Lack of (environmental) political continuity 
14. Undifferentiated policy measures 
15. Legal restrictions to differentiation 
Together with the User(s), relevant national and regional stakeholders, and other experts, the 
PICA expert team is discussing the relevance of every identified CIA for the policy option 
under scrutiny. Here, some of these CIA might be regarded as relevant for the policy type 
(regulatory on market) in general, but not be considered as crucial for the concrete policy 
option to be assessed. Thus, the expert team can decide to skip some CIAs at this stage, e.g., 
the CIA monopoly power. In turn, additional CIAs that have not been covered by the 
literature reviewed - or not in relation to the policy type under scrutiny - might be added. For 
example, strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations is found to be an important 
additional CIA.  
The detailed description and explanation of every CIA identified can be found in the 
respective Sections in Appendix 2. However, for illustrative purposes the relevance of some 
identified CIAs will be highlighted and linked to the policy option. These CIAs are 
                                                     
30 Depending on the policy option under scrutiny, the (then) PICA expert team can make - largely - use 
of the already existing library of CIAs that was compiled during former applications of PICA. 
Effectively, there will be an evergrowing library of CIAs that only has to be updated and 
complemented if a “new” policy option is to be assessed. 
31 The order of the CIAs in the list does not imply a ranking according to their relative importance. 
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considered of primary importance for the implementation of the policy option “Nitrate 
Directive”.  
1) Strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations  
Implementation of mandatory measures restricting the use of fertilisers and pesticides in 
designated vulnerable zone affects directly the production costs of farmers in these zones, 
often leading to income losses. Yet, the (degree of the) concrete restrictions is determined by 
the respective Member States or regions. Here, a strong agricultural lobby might be able to 
soften these mandatory restrictions, or to sue out/obtain exception clauses. Thus, strong 
farmers’ organisations might hamper the effective implementation of the Directive.  
2) Information asymmetry state vs. firm and high level of opportunism 
Information asymmetries between public administrations (state) and agricultural producers 
can be conceived as the result of problems on part of the state to control and monitor the 
activities of firms. These problems depend, among other things, on the ability 
(technical/knowledge/human resources) or even willingness of the administration in charge to 
control and monitor actors’ behaviour, but also on the characteristics of the resources (and the 
related activities to be monitored) concerned. Mandatory measures to reduce water pollution 
by nitrates and/or pesticides are difficult – or very costly – to observe and to measure, e.g., 
the exact amount of nitrates applied per hectare. Thus, farmers’ non-compliance with 
prescribed restrictions is not easy to detect and/or non-compliance (or the degree of it) cannot 
be associated clearly to single actors/farmers since nitrates diffuse slowly into often huge 
groundwater bassins. Furthermore, high levels of opportunism on part of the farmers 
concerned are likely to exacerbate the problem leading to high costs for controlling necessary 
to deter actors from cheating. 
4.2.4 PICA step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects of the Policy Option 
to Institutional Indicators 
In PICA step 2, the expert team suggests a restricted/short list of CIAs that are considered to 
be of particular importance for assessing the effectiveness of implementing the policy option 
“Nitrate Directive” (the numbers in brackets indicate the position of the respective CIAs in 
Table 4.2):  
1. Strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations (1) 
2. Information asymmetry state vs. firm (2) 
3. High level of opportunism (3) 
In Table 4.2, the selected CIAs are linked with at least one institutional indicator that can help 
to evaluate the respective CIA; eventually leading to statements about the effectiveness of 
policy implementation in PICA step 4. For further “processing” only those indicators are 
selected from the available portfolio that are considered to have some explanatory power with 
respect to the concrete policy option under scrutiny, here, “Nitrate Directive”. At this stage, 
the expert team that has compiled the list of institutional indicators is interacting closely with 
other SEAMLESS scientists, in particular with the modelling and data bases groups. In 
particular, the availability, quality, and (geographical/regional) scope of quantitative data are 
discussed in order to select the most appropriate indicators.32 Further, the precise forms (e.g., 
                                                     
32 Future Prototypes of SEAMLESS-IF are likely to include/have access to some of the data bases 
suggested in Table 4.5, e.g., some relevant and freely available data sets from the World Bank, 
EUROSTAT, or the like. However, other quantitative data bases will only be included on a case-to-
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 81 of 170 
focus groups, interviews, document analysis, etc.) and scopes (stakeholder and/or experts at 
regional and/or national and/or EU-level, etc.) of suggested qualitative assessments are 
discussed and decided on. 
For illustration, some indicators drawing on different data sources or processes of generating 
data are discussed in more detail.  
A) For assessing the bargaining power of farmers’ organisations, among other things, the 
indicator structure of farming system is introduced. It is construed as the ratio between 
the number of farms (in a country or region) and the number of people employed in the 
farming sector. This information can be provided by data bases already integrated in 
SEAMLESS-IF. Here, a low ratio indicates a farming system dominated by large farms 
having larger potentials for lobbying. 
B) Another indicator for assessing the bargaining power of farmers’ organisations 
suggested by the PICA expert team is the Producer Support Estimate provided by the 
OECD. This indicator is reflecting the monetary budget of producer support (e.g., market 
price support, payments based on overall farming income, etc.) in a country. Here, high 
estimates indicate a strong bargaining power of farmers organisation. 
C) Among other indicators, the PICA expert team suggests a concrete methodology to 
identify information asymmetries: 1) Identify potential sources of information asymmetry 
related to the policy under scrutiny; 2.) Evaluate the impact of this information 
asymmetry on the efficiency of this policy; 3.) Assess the additional controlling and 
monitoring costs necessary to reduce the level of information asymmetry to an 
“acceptable” level. This qualitative assessment is carried out by the PICA expert team 
together with other experts. Here, high additional controlling and monitoring costs 
necessary to reach an “acceptable” level of information asymmetry indicate a high 
constraint. 
                                                                                                                                                       
case basis, depending on both, the relative importance of the indicator described by this data set and 
the policy option under scrutiny.  
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Table 4.2: Restricted List of Crucial Institutional Aspects and Institutional Indicators Relevant for the Policy Option “Nitrate Directive” 
No. Crucial 
Institutional 
Aspects (CIA) 
Related to  
Policy Type(s) 
Institutional Indicator Description / Data Data Sources / 
Databases 
Expert assumptions on 
links between indicator 
and CIA33 
Memberships in farmers 
associations 
Total number of members in farmers associations National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers organisations 
Fragmentation of farmers 
associations 
Number of farmers associations National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
relatively weak (total) 
bargaining power of farmers 
organisations 
Lobbying power of 
farmers unions 
Percentage of farmers in a country that are members of farmer 
unions 
National Statistical 
Databases; 
Assessment by 
expert group 
High percentages indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers unions. 
1 Strong bargaining 
power of farmers’ 
organisations 
Reg-Hi;  
Eco-SON 
Proximity between farmers 
associations and EU 
authorities 
(Number of) farmers associations (of a country) with official 
representatives in Brussels 
Data assembled by 
expert group 
A high number indicates a 
high influence on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and 
strong bargaining power 
                                                     
33 Please note that this column will contain “Specific assumptions on links between indicator, CIA, and policy option” when actually running PICA. It will be filled by the 
PICA team after discussing the relevance and sufficiency of available indicators for evaluating the identified CIA with respect to the concrete policy option. This process 
is also likely to produce a restricted (smaller) list of those institutional indicators related to a respective CIA that can be linked meaningfully with the policy option under 
scrutiny. See also Appendix 3. 
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Structure of farming 
system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of people employed in the 
farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A low ratio indicates a 
farming system dominated 
by large farms (latifundium 
system) and, thus, a high 
influence on the political 
decision making process at 
national level 
Producer Support Estimate Monetary budget of producer support (e.g., market price 
support, payments based on overall farming income, etc.) in a 
country 
OECD High estimates indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers organisation 
Information asymmetry Methodology to identify information asymmetry: 1.) Identify 
potential sources of information asymmetry related to the 
policy under scrutiny; 2.) Evaluate the impact of this 
information asymmetry on the efficiency of this policy; 3.) 
Assess the additional controlling and monitoring costs 
necessary to reduce the level of information asymmetry to an 
“acceptable” level 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High additional controlling 
and monitoring costs 
necessary to reach an 
“acceptable” level of 
information asymmetry 
indicate a high constraint 
Affinity of governments 
towards devolution 
Degree of affinity of the government of a country towards 
devolution 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate high 
information asymmetries 
since centralised control and 
monitoring is more costly 
Farmer density Average number of farms per 100 ha SEAMLESS 
Databases 
High numbers indicate 
higher controlling and 
monitoring cost, thus, likely 
higher information 
asymmetries 
2 Information 
asymmetry state vs. 
firm  
Reg-Ma;  
Reg-PR;  
EnvP 
Rule of Law Composite indicator of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
World Bank Low measures indicate an 
ineffective/inefficient 
existing controlling and 
monitoring system causing 
information asymmetries 
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Infringement cases Number of infringement cases in a country brought before the 
Court of Justice  
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers of 
infringement cases indicate 
high levels of opportunism 
Rule of Law Composite indicator of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
World Bank Low “rule-of-law-
measures” indicate high 
levels of opportunism 
3 High level of 
opportunism 
Reg-Ma;  
Eco-Ma;  
Reg-PR;  
Land;  
EnvP 
Order Assessment of popular observance of the law (Part of 
composite indicator „Rule of Law“) 
World Bank Low measures indicate high 
levels of opportunism 
Legend: Reg-Hi: Regulatory on Hierarchy/Bureaucracy; Reg-Ma: Regulatory on Market; Eco-Ma: Economic on Market; Eco-SON: Economic on Self-
organised network; Reg-PR: Regulatory on Property Rights Change; Land: Land/Soil; EnvP: Environmental Policies 
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4.2.5 PICA step 4: Aggregating Information on Crucial Institutional Aspects of 
the Policy Option 
In this final step of PICA, the expert team that runs PICA with the help of external experts the 
User(s), stakeholders is using the information provided by the indicators for a qualitative 
assessment of the restricted list of CIAs. This includes, first, combining the various indicator 
information available for every single CIA of the restricted list to arrive at a qualitative (or, 
depending on the indicators, quantitative) statement about the relative extent of this CIA in all 
countries and/or regions. For example, the level of corruption can be determined for every 
country where the policy option is to be implemented, thus, providing insights in the relative - 
country-wise - likelihoods for ineffective policy implementation. This information, for 
example, can be compiled in tables and/or interactive maps where different colours signal 
different levels of opportunism.34 
Second, the PICA expert team together with the User(s), stakeholders, other experts is 
constructing qualitative composite output indicators.35 These output indicators draw on 
information from one or a group of Crucial Institutional Aspects. For the policy option 
“Nitrate Directive” the expert team suggests to aggregate/group the information according to 
the following two thematic categories: 
1) Communication capacity 
• Bargaining power of farmers’ organisations 
2) Governance structures compatibility 
• Information asymmetries between state & firm (including high levels of 
opportunism) 
                                                     
34 These tables and maps might also be made available to the User(s), or they can be integrated in the 
final qualitative statements on the institutional compatibility of the policy option. 
35 While it is certainly helpful to use „classic“ categories, such as property rights compatibility, 
embeddedness compatibility, etc., the User(s) might prefer other categories and/or the PICA expert 
team – depending on the policy option under scrutiny and on the CIAs identified – might suggest other 
and/or additional categories. 
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Finally, these categorised region- or country-wise qualitative statements on the compatibility 
of the policy option will be presented to the User(s) of SEAMLESS-IF by the PICA expert 
team. Here, an interactive form of communication is preferred since this provides the 
opportunity to discuss the results and, perhaps, the introduction of complementary policy 
instruments in countries or regions with specific CIAs.  
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5 Concluding Remarks 
The “Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)” introduced in this 
Deliverable provides - at a conceptual level - a formalised methodology to assess the 
compatibility between policy options and various institutional contexts, thus, allowing for the 
systematic institutional ex-ante assessment of (agri-environmental) policies. Next working 
steps to be carried out in WP 2 (Task 2.4) and WP 6 (Task 6.4 and 6.5) will encompass the 
operationalisation of the approach and the practical integration (as far as possible) in 
SEAMLESS-IF. The first sketch of the detailed visual depiction of the sequence and the form 
of interactions of between the User(s), the PICA expert team, and other actors as well as the 
suggestions made on the representation of the different PICA components in the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) in Appendix 3 will serve as a starting point for further discussions with 
the respective SEAMLESS work packages. This includes, in particular, a close collaboration 
with WP 4 regarding the availability and integration of (or, access to) selected databases (e.g., 
EUROSTAT, World Bank, etc.) for a restricted list of institutional indicators. Further, an 
intensive interaction is necessary with WP 5 to ensure – at least - the representation of the 
permanent elements (tables, graphs, maps, and texts) of PICA in the GUI. The major share of 
this work will be done in Task 6.4 where PICA will be tested in the region Auvergne 
(France), improved, and further integrated in SEAMLESS-IF.  
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Glossary 
Cost-efficiency  Cost-efficiency (also, cost-effectiveness) is determined by 
relating the resources expended to the accuracy and 
completeness of goals achieved. 
Crucial institutional aspects Crucial institutional aspects are those institutional factors 
that foster or hamper the effective and cost-efficient 
implementation of policies. 
Effectiveness  Effectiveness refers to the accuracy and completeness with 
which specified goals can be achieved.  
Governance structures Governance structures are the organisational solutions for 
making rules (institutions) effective, i.e. they are necessary 
for guaranteeing the rights and duties and their use in 
coordinating transactions. 
Institutions Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints 
(e.g., rules, laws, and constitutions), informal constraints 
(e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. 
Institutional compatibility Institutional compatibility refers to the compatibility 
between policy instruments and the respective institutional 
context to assess the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of 
policymaking. 
Institutional indicators  Institutional indicators are defined as variables and proxies 
that are used as input to the institutional analysis within 
PICA. Unlike the common understanding of indicators 
within Work Package 2 and in the overall SEAMLESS 
project institutional indicators, such as members in farmers’ 
associations, or government effectiveness do not represent 
the information/results of the institutional analysis given to 
the User(s). Further, institutional indicators often also 
encompass indicators that are usually referred to as 
economic, ecological, or social indicators. 
Institutions for sustainability Institutions for sustainability represent the institutional 
structures necessary to fully integrate economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability objectives. 
Policy cycle The policy cycle encompasses the whole “life” process of a 
policy; from the creation to ending the policy. It includes the 
following stages: Agenda setting, policy formation, decision-
making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation 
(resulting in the decision to continue, modify, or terminate 
the policy). 
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Transaction Transactions (economic exchange) are the basic unit of 
analysis in New Institutional Economics (NIE). That is 
distinct from other units of analysis widely used in 
environmental and resource economics, such as externalities, 
public goods, resource utilisation, and common pool 
resources. Following Williamson (1985: 1), “a transaction 
occurs when a good or service is transferred across a 
technological separable interface”. 
Transaction costs Transaction costs comprise ex-ante costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement but also the ex-
post costs for maladaptation and adjustment that arise when 
contract execution is misaligned because of gaps, errors, 
omissions, and unanticipated disturbances: the costs of 
running the economic system. 
Organisations State agencies or other collective actors are organisations; 
yet, they obtain their meaning from institutions. 
Organisations only exist because there is a set of working 
rules that defines them. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 Review on Research and the Literature on Institutional Indicators for  
Sustainability 
Appendix 2 Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types: PICA Step 2 
Appendix 3  Suggestions for Operationalisation of PICA and its Integration in the 
Graphical User Interface (GUI 
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Appendix 1: Review on Research and the Literature on 
Institutional Indicators for Sustainability 
In order to assess the suitability of existing approaches and indicators for ex-ante institutional 
analysis of policy options an extensive research and literature review capturing the state-of-
the-art of institutional indicators was carried out at an early stage of Task 2.4 (PD2.4.1). The 
literature and research on institutional indicators that was reviewed can be divided into four 
clusters that reflect their origin in the literature as well as their characteristics and purpose: 
1) Good Governance, 2) Social Capital, 3) Institutions as the fourth dimension of 
Sustainability, and 4) Transaction Costs (see also Theesfeld and Beckmann, forthcoming). 
Section 1 contains short descriptions of the main characteristics of the four clusters as well as 
concrete available indicators found in the literature and general reflections on their 
applicability for institutional analysis in SEAMLESS. In Section 2, gaps and interlinkages of 
institutional indicators found in the literature are discussed. In the subsequent Section 3, a 
system to classify the various indicators (variables and proxies) in a more differentiated way 
is suggested. Relevant criteria address, for example, the type of the indicator (nominal, 
ordinal, and cardinal), the geographical coverage, and the data availability. This classification 
system is used in Section 4 to structure the detailed tables of indicators provided for each 
cluster separately.  
1 Cluster of Institutional Indicators 
1.1 Good Governance Cluster 
The first cluster of institutional indicator research is closely related to institutions and growth. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the term good governance emerged among individuals and 
organisations who were concerned with the influences of governance on economic 
performance. Here, governance means the delivery of political goods36 to citizens by nation-
states. According to Besancon (2003), good governance is achieved when a high order of 
certain political goods is provided and when nation-states perform effectively and well on 
behalf of their inhabitants. The judgement of crucial political goods is based on societal 
norms and beliefs, often beginning with the supply of security.37 Management, supply, and 
delivery of most of the public goods constitutes governance and the extent to which nation-
states do perform can, in theory, be measured (Besancon, 2003). This cluster analyses under 
which institutional conditions different forms of governance promote rather than retard 
economic development. Social scientists are aware that institutions underpin economic 
                                                     
36 Besancon (2003: 1) gives a useful definition of political goods: “Good governance” is defined as 
providing political goods, such as “rule of law, political and civil freedom, medical and health care, 
schools and educational instructions, roads, railways, the arteries of commerce, communications 
networks, a money and banking system, a fiscal and institutional context within which citizens can 
prosper, support to civil society, and a method of regulating the sharing of the environmental 
commons”. 
37 Kaufmann et al. (2000) gives another broad definition of governance. 
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development, but this particular strand of research specifically asks which political 
institutions are most conducive to development and reform. However, this research field 
seems to be a rather contested area (Angy, 2005). 
By and large, this cluster originates from the need of the World Bank and other international 
agencies 1) to allocate scarce resources to governments so that they will use them most 
effectively, and 2) to help countries in diagnosing governance failures and in finding 
solutions. Thus, a new interest in measuring the performance of governments using indicators 
of governance and institutional quality has emerged (World Bank, 2001). This approach is 
based on the assumption that weak governance and slow economic development go hand in 
hand, while improved governance fosters development success (Kaufmann et al., 2000). 
However, this area of research is developing rapidly since “[m]ore specific measures of 
government performance, coupled with more specific measures of governmental process or 
institutional arrangements are needed to permit tests that provide more indication of which 
reforms are likely to be effective” (Knack and Keefer, 2003). Measurements of governance 
should set standards for improvement and achievement as well as indicate where funds could 
best be used and where a policy might prove most effective. From the viewpoint of 
development aid, its aim is to show which nation states have improved and which ones are in 
need of improvement. A reasonable amount of literature in this cluster is devoted to the 
relation between corruption and prosperity. 
Another use of the approach underlying this cluster comes from the need to rank countries for 
credit markets and for international investors. This is done mainly with subjective expert 
evaluation on ordinal mathematical scales. Different integration techniques are used to 
compose indices.  
1.1.1 Good Governance Indicators in Detail 
1) In this cluster, a good starting point is the compendium of institutional indicators 
“Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality” provided by the World Bank (2001). 
This compendium analyses several data sets and studies mainly dealing with performance 
indicators of governance but also some data sets with process indicators (see Table A1-
1):  
a) The Freedom House Index of political freedoms and civil liberties is based on 
analytical reports and numerical ratings by country experts and a central panel of 
experts. It is an additive point methodology for categorising political rights and civil 
liberties. The index is widely used in published studies referring to the relationship 
between civil liberties and per capita income as well as income growth.  
a) The International Country Risk Guide includes variables of corruption in 
government, law and order tradition, and bureaucratic quality. Knack and Keefer 
(1995) construct from these data sets an index reflecting the security of private 
property and the enforceability of contracts.  
b) The Business Environmental Risk Intelligence Index is produced for sale to 
subscribers who are primarily investors interested in information on political risks 
associated with overseas investments. In general, higher values of the index are 
associated with income growth.  
c) One part of the World Development Report 1997 (World Bank, 1997) represents a 
survey with actual investors that was conducted in 67 countries about the perceptions 
of the quality of governance.  
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d) The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International gives an indication 
on the perception of corruption. It is a performance indicator based on ratings of 
‘elite’ experts. It shall give a signal to donors where to invest in order to fight 
corruption (Transparency International, 2006).  
e) Another worldwide governance research indicator data set is the one from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (Kaufmann et al., 1999a, b) (KKZ-indeces). 
This is a composition of indeces from numerous indicators collected from other 
sources including the data sets listed above. The KKZ indices currently represent the 
most extensive study on governance indicators. There are regular updates and good 
access to data. 
f) Motivated by scepticism regarding subjective governance indicators, Clague et al. 
(1999), introduce an objective measure, the Contract-Intensive Money. This measure 
is equal to the proportion of M2 that is not comprised of currency outside banks. The 
logic behind is that money lent to financial organisations is less safe where one 
cannot rely on contracts. Similar to the other data sets, the intention is to show the 
relation to growth rates and, here in particular, to investment’s share of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  
2) Besides these data sets that are mainly based on performance indicators, the World Bank 
(2001) also refers to some references of process indicators: 
a) The Civil Service Employment and Pay is a data set compiled by Schiavo-Campo et 
al. (1997 a, b) giving ratios on government employment and wages.  
b) The Weberian Comparative State Data Project is a data set based on qualitative 
expert rankings in 35 developing countries. Evans and Rauch (1999) construct 
indicators, such as a meritocratic hiring index, an internal promotion and career 
stability index, a civil service compensation index, and an overarching “Weberian 
State Scale”.  
c) The Polity98 Project on Regime Characteristics provides descriptive measures of 
political structures and regime change for the period 1800-1986. Some variables, 
such as measures providing information on political participation, on centralisation 
and scope of government authority, and on the institutionalisation of autocracy and 
democracy could be of interest for constructing institutional indicators of ex-ante 
policy assessment within SEAMLESS. 
d) The Political Constraint Index incorporates information on the number of 
independent branches of government with veto power and the distribution of 
preferences across and within those branches. 
e) There is a large new cross-country data set on political institutions: the Database of 
Political Institutions, which might include interesting variables referring to the 
SEAMLESS objectives. For this, it is described in more detail in the following. 
3) The Database on Political Institutions (DPI) has been compiled by the Development 
Research Group of the World Bank and contains 113 variables for 117 countries over the 
years 1975-1995 (Beck et al., 2000). The DPI seeks to add to existing knowledge on 
political institutions, and to gather into one source information that had previously been 
scattered.38 The variables provide details about elections, electoral rules, type of political 
                                                     
38 The DPI can be compared with other political databases: the “Polity III” compiled by Gurr et al. 
(1998) and the “objective assessments of government checks and balances” created by Henisz (1997). 
Polity III includes numerous subjective indicators of the political and institutional environment 
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system, party composition of the opposition and government coalitions, and the extent of 
military influence on government. The database also contains a number of new variables, 
compiled from raw data, such as measures of checks and balances and political stability. 
The DPI variables are almost all quantitative and their construction is entirely 
transparent.39 The data set is accessible free of charge.  
These variables can be linked and applied to several problems and hypotheses in political 
economy. For instance, variables describing electoral competitiveness in the database 
(e.g., indices of electoral competitiveness, vote shares of parties, and directly elected 
executives) allow for cross-country investigation into the following questions: Whether 
greater competition in contests for political office increases or reduces the willingness to 
reform. “Faced with the prospect of more competitive elections, politicians might be 
more sensitive to redistributive concerns and less likely to reform. However, politicians 
who feel few competitive pressures to reform may be more likely to engage in policies 
that benefit them and their core supporters at the expense of the rest of society” (Beck et 
al., 2000: 6). 
4) Among others, Besancon (2003) provides another comprehensive compendium on 47 
projects on measuring governance or its various subsets. It includes sources and 
descriptions of each particular data project, the empirical scope of those efforts, and 
describes what types of indicators (subjective or objective) are employed. 
5) What is known under the notion “second-generation governance indicators” (Knack et 
al., 2003) is the progress made by the World Bank to shift from qualitative and broad 
indicators of corruption - or the rule-of-law - towards quantitative indicators of 
governance. These indicators are supposed to measure the progress towards reaching the 
major UN conference goals and to be more useful for practical reforms.  
6) A conceptual contribution is presented by Bovaird and Löffler (2003). The authors call 
for measuring not only the quality of services but also the improvements in quality of life 
and in governance processes. They draw from the fact that a public organization cannot 
be judged only on the excellence of its services; it also has to be excellent in the way it 
exercises its political, environmental, and social responsibilities. The notion of good 
governance is split into the components a) improvements in public policy outcomes and 
b) implementation by all stakeholders of a set of principles and processes. What is new in 
the concept of Bovaird and Löffler is that they aim to measure the success of public 
interventions in terms of the quality of life changes which they bring about for those 
affected by them (i.e. the perceived outcomes), rather than the quality of the activities 
themselves. For instance, “the level of community safety perceived by citizens”, rather 
than “the quality of police and crime prevention services”, or “the quality of the 
environment which people experience” rather than “the quality of environmental 
protection or improvement services” needs to be assessed. This proposed change in 
orientation of good governance assessment implies the challenge to find ways how 
quality of live improvements can be measured. It is partly based on a new survey mainly 
done at local scale. Some proxies at a higher geographical scale might be found in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
(evaluating both, formal and informal conditions) but tend to be highly aggregated. Thus, qualities of 
the political system are captured in very few variables.  
39 The variables are also disaggregated, allowing researchers to get away from such useful but broad 
indicators of countries as whether they allow elections or not, whether elections are “free”, or whether 
the executive is “constrained”. Instead, the DPI allows researchers to use precise and concrete 
institutional features of countries (Beck et al., 2000: 3). 
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Human Development Index of the United Nations that ranks nations. Yet, given the 
differences between local areas, quality of life indicators are difficult to compare. 
Regarding the geographical scales, research and literature subsumed in the good governance 
cluster mainly tries to develop indicators at the national scale to allow for cross-country 
studies.  
1.1.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Good Governance Cluster for 
Institutional Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 
The intention to measure the impact of institutions on economic growth and economic 
development refers only to one dimension of sustainability, the economic one.  
Data sets of the DPI are closely linked to the political economy of policymaking. Those 
questions mainly appear in the beginning of a policy cycle (see Glossary). In the SEAMLESS 
project, with respect to the implementation and enforcement of a policy, it is assumed that the 
politicians are willing to introduce the reform and the policy option, ignoring the political 
economy in place in the pre-implementation phases of the policy cycle. However, the pre-
implementation phases of the policy cycle – including, e.g., choosing issues, gathering 
information, and discussing of and deciding on options for the design of the policy – certainly 
have important ramifications for the overall performance, but also for the institutional 
compatibility of a policy option. For example, extensive and transparent forms of stakeholder 
participation integrating different and possibly contrary interests in the design process may 
increase the acceptance of a policy, its actual uptake (in the case of voluntary schemes), and 
the likelihood of compliance (in the case of command-and-control or regulatory policies). 
With regard to the latter type of policies, requirements for appropriate governance structures, 
e.g., for monitoring and enforcement might be different. Here, the results of the institutional 
analysis carried out within SEAMLESS-IF can be seen as an important input into the political 
discussions in the pre-implementation phases of the policymaking process by informing the 
User(s) about critical aspects related to the political economy, such as corruption or political 
predictability of governments in Member States. 
Other variables within the DPI, such as the one capturing the extent of federalism in a 
country’s political structure could turn out to be valuable for constructing institutional 
indicators, such as a measure of institutional diversity; for instance, the number of contiguous 
autonomous regions in a country. A region, area, or district that has some degrees of 
autonomy or that is self-governing requires certain kind of policy measures if nationwide 
reforms shall be implemented. If this is not the case, the effectiveness of the policy is at stake. 
Likewise, the indication whether multiple levels of sub-national governments are in place, or 
not, can be important to construct indicators giving insights on the institutional compatibility 
of a policy. The jurisdiction of local governments (e.g., if provinces have authority over 
taxing, spending, or legislating) may also be useful.  
Some of the second-generation performance indicators (Knack et al., 2003), such as waiting 
time for a free telephone line, policy unpredictability, predictable judiciary, enforcement of 
property rights and share of population fearful of crime are generally interesting for the 
objectives of institutional ex-ante policy assessment in SEAMLESS, but require further 
examination.  
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1.2 Social Capital Cluster 
Although social capital is not a new concept, most of the social capital literature stems from 
Robert Putnam’s (1993) seminal work on the relationship between government performance 
and sociological attributes in Italy. The literature on social capital grew rapidly during the late 
nineties, covering various topics, such as economic development, political efficiency, and 
quality of life. The Social Capital Initiative launched by the World Bank in 1996 allowed 
many empirical investigations in developing countries on the role of social cohesion and the 
structure of social networks in development. In comparison, there have been very few studies 
in industrialised countries.  
Social capital can be considered as a rather vague concept. One of the most rigorous and 
operational definition is made by Nan Lin; social capital encompasses the “[r]esources 
embedded in a social structure which are accessed/mobilised in purposive actions” (Lin, 
2001: 35). Social capital is, thus, a set of sociological features that provide several advantages 
to individuals. 
Theoretical literature on social capital distinguishes two broad classes of mechanisms by 
which sociological characteristics might influence efficiency and effectiveness (of policies). 
First, they may facilitate collective action and the reliability of relationships between 
individuals. This aspect is associated with the density of social networks and the existence of 
shared values of trust and cooperation. The second kind of mechanism is that social links may 
give preferential access to new resources, such as information about technologies or job 
opportunities. This is because information is far from being efficiently allocated by markets, 
especially when it concerns innovative activities. This second aspect implies extremely 
different features than the first one. From this perspective, the structure of the network is 
important rather than its density. Thus, networks should be able to bridge very different social 
groups and communities, for example, in order to distribute and share information in a 
society. The former aspect of social capital is commonly known as “bonding social capital”, 
whereas the latter is called “bridging social capital” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). 
Most empirical literature on social capital deals with the role of bonding social capital on 
development. This is because trust and cohesion are often critical ingredients that are missing 
from credit markets (for instance) in developed countries. Most studies report a positive 
effect of social capital on growth or other performance indicators. However, as argued by 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004), the evidence is not yet very compelling, due to many 
methodological problems in econometric analysis. 
The main problem with empirical literature assessing social capital is the lack of relevant 
indicators. Due to data availability problems, measures of social values (e.g., trust and 
propensity to co-operate), and network characteristics (e.g., density and geographical span) 
are often crude or very indirect. In Table A1-2, the main measures that have been used when 
measuring social capital are summarised. Most of them stem from databases, although many 
specific data collections also have been conducted in developing countries. 
1.2.1 Social Capital Indicators in Detail 
Table A1-2 provides a list of social capital indicators used in empirical studies. As social 
capital literature has grown rapidly and is very rich now, only the most relevant papers have 
been selected as a basis for this review. The indicators can be grouped into three broad 
categories: 
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1) Cognitive indicators: They aim at assessing the degree of social cohesion that facilitates 
collective action, low opportunism, and mutual aid, thus, reducing transaction costs. 
2) Density indicators: They reflect the intensity of social interaction among 
regions/communities. High density of social networks implies cost-efficient social control 
(which reduces opportunistic behaviour) and fosters the emergence of collective actions.  
3) Outer links indicators: They measure the access to outer resources through social links 
(e.g., information about new technologies, markets, and trading partners). 
The first and the second categories measure the bonding component of social capital; whereas 
the third measures the bridging component.  
• Among cognitive indicators, the most widely used measures are ethnolinguistic diversity 
and trust indicators. The former is mostly relevant for African and South-American 
countries where ethnic diversity is high which often explains the lack of cohesiveness of 
these countries. The latter is generally measured by using survey results, such as answers 
to the question “Do you agree that most people can be trusted?”. Some indirect measures 
have also been proposed to proxy the level of reciprocity and openness to others, such as 
blood donations (Guiso and Zingales, 2004), charity gifts, and the rate of phone users in 
the directory (Callois and Schmitt, 2006). Conversely, the Gini Index on Income seems to 
be a poor indicator of social cohesion, at least for industrialised countries. Specific 
surveys conducted in order to assess social capital include measures that are more 
detailed40, but these are hard to replicate in developed countries.  
Cognitive social capital does not only refer to relationships between individuals, but also 
between individuals and formal actors. In particular, trust towards authorities and 
bureaucratic actors and civic behaviour can be an essential aspect of a society’s 
cohesiveness. Again, surveys are often necessary to get precise estimates. Indirect 
measures are also possible. Variables used by Helliwell and Putnam (1995) on their 
seminal work in Italy include various measures of civic values such as newspaper 
readership, political behaviour, and satisfaction with government. Guiso and Zingales 
(2004) use electoral turnout. Last, regarding cooperation between local politicians, 
Callois and Schmitt (2006) use the fiscal integration coefficient, which measures the 
share of fiscal resources that are pooled between municipalities. 
• The most popular density indicator is association density, which was one of the key 
indicators used by Helliwell and Putnam (1995) to measure sociability, i.e., the ability of 
actors for social interaction. Assessing the density of social networks directly implies 
significant fieldwork. Many sociological studies have taken the sociometric approach. 
Sociometry consists of visualising the actual network between a set of individuals, by 
asking each of them with whom they have relationships, for what purposes and with what 
intensity. Ronald Burt’s (2000) work at the individual level showed the arbitration 
between dense (rich in bonding social capital) and open (rich in bridging social capital) 
networks. Brian Uzzi’s (1996; 1999) work on small industrial firms showed that the 
relationship between density/bonding and efficiency followed a reversed U-shaped curve: 
there was a threshold over which bonding social capital was detrimental to efficiency. 
As to the geographical scale, for higher levels than the local level it is generally infeasible 
to construct any direct indicators to be used in surveys. Instead, indirect indicators are 
used, such as the share of recent migrants (migrants are supposed to interact less with 
                                                     
40 See the World Bank questionnaire at: 
http://poverty2.forumone.com/files/11998_IntegratedQuestionnairefortheMeasurementofSC(03-04-
2002).doc  
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others), the average size of households, or the density of sociability places (e.g., bars and 
sport facilities).  
• In empirical literature, the outer links indicators bridging social capital have not yet been 
investigated very deeply. Some ideas are to be found in international economics 
literature, in particular in studies of the relationships between trade and international 
social networks. Indicators include the share of migrants of a given ethnical group, or the 
existence of cultural links (e.g., common language and former colony). They remain 
generally quite crude due to a lack of relevant statistical data. One problem with bridging 
social capital indicators is that they generally focus on social links but not on the 
resources they can give access to. Yet, it is insufficient to know people to have social 
capital – you have to know the right people. In order to integrate this resource aspect into 
the definition of bridging indicators, Callois and Schmitt (2006) propose composite 
indicators weighting the density of links to the outside world by an indicator of the level 
of resources (namely the logarithm of employment). These indicators can be computed 
both for social links due to migration and for economic networks. 
1.2.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Social Capital Cluster for 
Institutional Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 
Social capital indicators are relevant for the analysis of institutional compatibility as social 
values may directly influence the way policies are perceived and implemented. In particular, 
it is certainly valuable to look at the following sociological features: 
• Trust towards formal actors and cooperation between politicians 
• Propensity to co-operate (notably in agriculture) as cooperation may reduce transaction 
costs and help solving market failures 
• Bridging social capital indicators that can give an idea of a region’s openness and access 
to opportunities to development 
One great difficulty concerning social capital indicators - that also applies to the other 
clusters - will be to establish measures that allow comparisons between EU Member States. 
Different data sources will be available in different countries. That is why European surveys 
could be a valuable source of information. However, they will typically provide information 
at country (or NUTS I) level, which may not be sufficient, given the diversity of agricultural 
systems and sociological features at infra-country levels.  
Moreover, some indicators that are related to formal institutions may be biased by the 
differences in national institutional systems. This is for instance the case for political 
cooperation as national political systems are not directly comparable. Consequently, 
comparisons between countries based on different indicator values should be done with great 
caution.  
For the embeddedness level of social analysis (norms, customs, traditions, and religions), 
several publications based on extracts of the Eurobarometer statistics of the Public Opinion 
Analysis sector of the European Commission could provide data that can be incorporated into 
institutional indicators. The Standard Eurobarometer surveys have polled EU citizens’ 
attitude towards the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), their perception of the objectives it 
should pursue, and its main benefits. The quality of food products has also been dealt with in 
these surveys, as well as the perception of the EU enlargement or the environment (Special 
Eurobarometer, 2004, 2005). The principal results of how Europeans think about the 
environment are derived from polls in 2002 within the framework of the Eurobarometer 58.0 
and Flash Eurobarometer 123 Survey.  
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1.3 Sustainability Cluster 
The sustainability debate can easily be separated from the other clusters of literature. It is 
rooted in the United Nations international conferences on sustainable development. The 
debate started with introducing sustainable development as the main principle of the 
Declaration of Rio and Agenda 21 established in 1992 at the United Nations Conference for 
Environment and Development (Earth Summit). The report “Our Common Future” of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, known as the Brundtland report, had 
already defined sustainability in 1987 as a “development which meets the need of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 
1987). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made sustainable development an objective of the EU, 
resulting in the present European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development (EC, 2002). 
This means that sustainable development is now an important part of the European Union’s 
agenda. 
The evolution of institutional indicators within the sustainability debate can be traced back to 
the evaluation of the implementation of Agenda 21 by the Commission on Sustainable 
Development of the United Nations. They defined sustainability as having four dimensions 
(Spangenberg et al., 2002): Besides the economic, environmental, and social dimensions, 
institutions are defined as being the fourth dimension of sustainability. Institutions deliver the 
necessary structures capable to deliver the other three objectives of social, environmental, and 
economic sustainability (EC, 2001a). 
1.3.1 Sustainability – the Fourth Dimension’s Indicators in Detail 
The UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) is currently developing one 
common indicator set for measuring sustainable development at national level. This is based 
on chapter 40 of the Agenda 21 that calls on countries to develop and identify indicators of 
sustainable development that can provide a solid basis for decision-making at all levels. The 
main aim of the UNCSD Work Programme was to make indicators of sustainable 
development accessible to decision makers (UN, 2001). The UNCSD is leading this process, 
supported by the EU Member States and the European Commission. Eurostat has produced a 
set of sustainable development indicators adapted to the situation in the EU, based on the 
UNCSD proposals for a sustainable development indicator core set (EC, 2001a). Some 
specific complements have been added to the UNCSD core list of 59 indicators in order to 
include important EU issues that would otherwise be neglected. Thus, 66% of the selected 
indicators are comparable to those in the UNCSD core list. Some were added, others 
modified, changed, or omitted, resulting in 63 EU-suitable indicators. Out of this number, 
only four indicators refer to the institutional dimension.  
The core institutional indicators for sustainable development deal with two broad themes: 1) 
institutional framework and 2) institutional capacity. These themes are divided into 
subthemes, each dealing with one specific aspect of the institutional issues. Institutional 
framework indicators are linked to national strategic sustainable development implementation 
and international cooperation to achieve sustainable development goals. However, the 
indicators on National Sustainable Development Strategy and on Implementation of Ratified 
Global Agreements that were defined as Institutional Framework indicators by the UN (2001) 
- which were supposed to indicate the progress in relation to the preparation of national 
sustainable development strategies - could not be quantified and was omitted by Eurostat 
from the UN list. The institutional capacity indicators comprise the population’s level of 
information access, the communication infrastructure, the degree of science and technology 
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support, and natural disaster preparedness and response (EC, 2001a). The UNCSD and 
Eurostat initiative mainly aim at developing quantitative indicators. 
In the frame of a Communication by the Directorate General-Agriculture (EC, 2001b), the 
European Commission stresses the importance to broaden the approach from indicators for 
the integration of environmental concerns into the CAP towards the economic and social 
dimension of sustainable agriculture and rural development. In the presented framework, a set 
of indicators is proposed for the economic and social dimensions for sustainable agriculture 
and rural development. The social dimension also subsumes institutional aspects, yet, only 
institutional efficiency is mentioned as an indicator. Although it is mentioned that indicators 
on institutional efficiency have to be included (EC, 2001b: 13) the concrete formulation of 
this indicator remains rather vague. 
Spangenberg, Pfahl, and Deller are part of a group of scientists dealing with institutional 
indicators analysing and enhancing the UNCSD approach. They have published a series of 
articles on that topic. They take up the UNCSD’s set of sustainability indicators and focus 
explicitly on the fourth dimension of sustainability, the institutional one. Although the fourth 
dimension is conceived as a major achievement for sustainability policies, the institutional 
indicators proposed by UNCSD have major inherent weaknesses. One reason for this is that 
the UNCSD core list of sustainability indicators is a result of a multi-stakeholder process 
based on a politically negotiated document like Agenda 21.  
Spangenberg et al. (2002) work on an improved list of institutional indicators. They analyse 
the institutional content of Agenda 21 with the objective to link up cardinal indicators that 
give simple facts and data with explicit institutional references to become more meaningful. 
For instance, the measured terms of publications, patents, and the like would assess the 
effectiveness of the Research and Development Community much better than the number of 
scientists. Thus, Spangenberg and colleagues aim at defining cardinal performance indicators. 
Cardinal performance indicators would indicate the level of implementation of policy 
objectives as a quantitative measure for the effectiveness of the respective institution. In this 
process, it turned out that indicators - that were thought to be specific for one of the other 
three dimensions - are also meaningful for assess the institutional context. For example, 
human capital is an important social indicator that is also significant for institutional analysis. 
Here, the level of human capital in a country or region will indicate whether very knowledge 
intensive policy measures will be implemented effectively, or whether these measures have to 
be complemented by some form of knowledge transfer or education. 
Spangenberg (2002: 3) raises another interesting point from the perspective of the 
SEAMLESS objectives. The UNCSD selection of indicators has been focussed on well-
founded, consensus-based indicators for which data are already available and which can be 
realised within the constraints currently given in national administrations. This results in 
focussing on problems already experienced in the past (ex-post). For SEAMLESS, however, 
a procedure is needed that is also sensitive to capture new potential threats in the future. 
Another comprehensive approach within the sustainability debate is the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) developed by the Yale University and the Columbia University. It 
aims at assessing the ability of nations to protect the environment over the next several 
decades. Thus, the index is calculated at a national scale to allow for international 
comparison. In 2005, 146 countries have been included. It integrates 76 data sets covering 
natural resource endowments, past and present pollution levels, environmental management 
efforts, and the capacity of a society to improve its environmental performance. The variables 
are integrated into 21 indicators of environmental sustainability. These indicators permit for 
national comparisons across a range of issues that fall into five broad categories, one of them 
is “societal and institutional capacity to respond to environmental challenges”. This 
institutional component starts from the assumption that “a country is more likely to be 
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environmentally sustainable to the extent that it has in place institutions and underlying social 
patterns of skills, attitudes, and networks that foster effective responses to environmental 
challenges” (Esty et al., 2005: 11).  
Considering institutions as the fourth dimension of sustainability, the ESI report (Esty et al., 
2005) concludes that the role of governance is central. Thus, when comparing the correlation 
between the ESI and the 76 underlying variables, the strongest bivariate correlation is with 
civil and political liberties, suggesting that countries where robust political debate takes 
place, facilitated by fair elections, free speech, a dedicate press, active NGOs, and vibrant 
legislatures are more likely to focus on environmental challenges. The sixth strongest 
correlations are with similar variables from the institutional indicators, i.e. governmental 
effectiveness and rule-of-law. The coincidence of strong governance with high ESI scores is 
evident.  
Further, Ehler (2003) provides an applied approach to an integrated coastal management 
project. He develops indicators to assess the performance of the governance processes 
involved in integrated coastal management. This is an interesting contribution emphasising 
on performance indicators as assessing outcome-based results rather than process-oriented 
input-based accounting.  
1.3.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Fourth Dimension Cluster for 
Institutional Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 
The literature within this cluster is closely related to the approach of institutions for 
sustainability that conceives institutions as facilitating or hampering the other three 
sustainability objectives. This cluster indicates how challenging this new sphere of research 
is. On the one hand, the proposed indicators are very close to the relationships that need to be 
constructed. On the other hand, compared to the Good Governance, the Social Capital, and 
the Transaction Cost cluster the indicators introduced here are less developed. Most of them 
are propositions or conceptualization, but there are no data. For some indicators there are data 
available, but not area-wide or compiled within a data set.  
In contrast to this cluster, the focus of institutional analysis in SEAMLESS is different. 
Instead of analysing existing institutions with respect to their contribution to sustainable 
development, institutional analysis in SEAMLESS will assess the various impacts of the 
institutions in place on the effectiveness of different policy options to be implemented. This 
adds a new aspect into the existing debate within this cluster. 
1.4 Transaction Costs Cluster 
Ronald Coase (1937) was the first to introduce the term transaction costs as an important 
component of his theoretical framework for predicting under what conditions certain 
economic tasks would be best co-ordinated by firms or by markets, thus, introducing firms as 
a hierarchical allocation unit and markets as alternative modes of co-ordinating economic 
activities. According to Coase (1937), transaction costs are the costs incurred in organising an 
economic exchange/transaction, i.e., they are either “costs of using the price mechanism” or 
“costs of organizing transactions inside the firm”. For example, when buying or selling a 
stock most people must pay a commission to their broker. This commission is one part of the 
transaction costs incurred when conducting the stock deal. Considering buying cheese from a 
store, the costs incurred will not only include the price of the cheese itself, but also the energy 
and effort it requires to travel from the house to the store and back, the time waiting in line, 
and the effort of the paying itself. The costs incurred beyond the (market) price of this cheese 
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are transaction costs. There might be many other ways to organise the purchase of cheese, 
e.g., through a home delivery service offering cheese on the internet. Clearly, buying the 
cheese directly from the producing farmer would entail much higher transaction costs on part 
of the buyer. Thus, when evaluating the costs of a transaction, - here, purchase of cheese - it 
is important not to neglect transaction costs since those costs might prove to be significant 
and on some occasions even prohibitive.  
Williamson (1975; 1985) advanced Coase’ arguments and developed a research agenda for 
New Institutional Economics (NIE). Most importantly, the basic unit of analysis is the 
transaction41. “...a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a 
technological separable interface” (Williamson, 1985: 1). He operationalises the concept of 
transaction costs and identifies four determinants that influence transaction costs in a more or 
less predictable way:  
1) Behavioural attributes of actors (under the assumption that economic agents are bounded 
rational42 and may behave opportunistically43) 
2) Attributes of the transaction, including: 
• Asset specificity (the nature of assets and their transferability determine the level of 
transaction costs: e.g., human-capital specificity (training) and physical-capital 
specificity (investment in equipment)) 
• Uncertainty (the unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding a transaction) 
• Frequency of transactions 
3) The type of governance structure chosen, such as (spot) markets, hierarchies, and hybrids 
(e.g., subcontracting coordination networks of firms, franchising, collective trademarks, 
partnership, co-operatives, and alliances (Ménard, 2004)); 
4) The institutional environment (e.g., property rights and contract law)  
At this point, Transaction Costs Economics invokes the discriminating alignment hypothesis, 
according to which “transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance 
structures, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction 
cost economising result. Testing this hypothesis requires that the key attributes that define 
both transactions and governance structures be named and the ramifications worked out.” 
(Williamson, 2004: 30). He refers to three attributes of principal importance for describing 
governance structures: 1) incentive intensity, 2) administrative controls, and 3) contract law 
regime.  
This framework, which was initially developed for studying the economic organisation of the 
private sector (more precisely, it stems from the field of industrial organisation and the theory 
of the firm), has been more and more extended to include the public sector44 as well as agri-
                                                     
41 That is distinct from other units of analysis widely used in environmental and resource economics, 
such as externalities, public goods, resource utilisation, and common pool resources. 
42 Bounded rationality can be defined as intendedly rational, but only limited so. 
43 Opportunism refers to the assumption that an economic agent may seek his/her self-interest with 
guile and that such behavior cannot be predicted clearly. 
44 For example, analysing the organisation of sovereign transactions, Williamson (1999) compares 
privatisation (contracting out), public agency, and regulation (public agency plus private firm). 
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environmental problems.45 However, applying the concept of transaction costs to 
environmental problems e.g., caused by agricultural activities, makes it necessary to consider 
not only the transfer of private goods between actors (as classic NIE would focus on) but also 
various forms of public goods, such as club goods and common-pool resources. Clearly, the 
aforementioned attributes of transactions can also be found with public (environmental) 
goods. For example, asset specificity in this field would include site specificity (AOC46 
cheese regions in France) but also human-capital specificity (a specific knowledge is 
necessary to make this cheese) and capital specificity (investments in special cheese-making 
equipment is required, e.g., specific cellar for maturing the cheese). Further, uncertainty plays 
a major role for transactions related to the demand and supply of agri-environmental goods 
and services. Above all, this is often “because farmers and regulators do not know very 
precisely either whether certain environmental problems will arise, and when they will occur, 
or what the nature of these problems will be, and to what extend they will have serious 
impacts and who will be affected” (Hagedorn et al., 2002: 8). Furthermore, the frequency of 
transactions would also be relevant. For instance, milk production is continuous throughout a 
year. However, the number of transactions would be different between farmers and dairy 
industry and between dairy industry and retail stores throughout a year. In contrast, heat 
cropping would be an example for seasonal utilisation patterns. 
Notably, there is also a number of new attributes that have to be considered. Hagedorn et al. 
(2002) suggest to include a) the excludability of actors from access to environmental goods, 
b) rivalry among the users of environmental goods, c) the often low separability of the 
provision of distinct environmental goods into the analysis. For example, producing milk on a 
larger scale can also have negative impacts on the environment, thus, causing (unwanted) 
transactions between dairy farmers and other actors, such as higher nitrate emissions into the 
groundwater or emissions of malodour, d) the complexity of the causal relationships of 
ecological systems, e) the heterogeneity and variability of transactions, and f) the legitimacy 
of transactions.  
In this context, Hagedorn et al. (2002) separate between two types of transactions relevant for 
the impact of agriculture on environment (nature and ecosystem):  
1) An environmental problem caused by production and consumption activities is a result of 
a transaction between farmer(s) and the community concerned (e.g., polluting 
groundwater by applying pesticides on farmland).  
2) There are (or ought to be) related activities (transactions) between the actors suffering 
from the pollution and the farmer(s) to solve or to diminish this specific environmental 
problem. Here, effective mechanisms (governance structures) are needed to organise 
these transactions in an appropriate way, i.e., minimising transaction costs. For instance, 
some compensation payments from the farmer to the water users or simply a ban on 
pesticide usage on farm land. 
The aforementioned distinct and complex attributes of transactions in the field of agri-
environment - but also ample empirical evidence - has brought about the insight that markets, 
hierarchies, and hybrid forms might often not be the most effective and cost-efficient modes 
of governance when it comes to agri-environmental problems. Thus, other governance 
structures have been suggested instead, such as horizontal non-market coordination (e.g., 
cooperation and collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994)), formal and informal 
                                                     
45 Bougherara et al. (2005) consider the environmental-related transaction as an elementary 
coordination problem between two parties that involves a transfer of property rights. 
46 AOC = Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée (Protected Denomination of Origin, (PDO)) 
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networks as knowledge and information systems, and methods and infrastructure for 
measuring, monitoring, and evaluating environmental damages and benefits. They also 
include conflict resolution mechanisms and incentives and opportunities to promote 
innovation and learning (Hagedorn et al., 2002). In practice, various forms and combinations 
of governance structures used to co-ordinate agri-environmental transactions can be observed. 
There are governance structures based on voluntary agreements that involve state agencies 
and local communities (referred to as collaborative management or co-management). Those 
co-management arrangements may also include private sector organisations such as tourism 
enterprises. Birner et al. (1999) propose to model co-management arrangements as relational 
contracts. There are also attempts to apply adapted market-oriented forms of governance. For 
example, Stoneham et al. (2003) propose auctioning as a solution for nature conservation. 
They consider that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the 
problem of asymmetric information. Thus, auctions of conservation contracts were proposed 
to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders 
and government. In contrast, Hagedorn et al. (2002) suggest co-operative strategies might 
play a major role in coping with agri-environmental problems.  
1.4.1 Transaction Costs Indicators in Detail 
The literature review on transaction costs indicators has unearthed a rather small sample of 
studies that actually develop indicators and measure transaction costs related to 
environmental and/or agricultural policies and activities. The reviewed indicators were 
developed and measured in close relation to very specific cases, which does limit the direct 
use within SEAMLESS. Yet, these case studies provide valuable methodical information on 
how to develop appropriate indicators and on how to measure transaction costs that can be 
regarded as a valuable contribution to assess the efficiency of policy implementation but also 
policy design. In congruence with the SEAMLESS objectives, it was aimed to identify 
determinants for transaction costs in particular in the agri-environmental context.  
Apart from the conceptual study by Aubert et al. (2004), all studies reviewed deal with 
transaction costs related to policy implementation. However, indicators for determining the 
attributes of transactions and the observed governance structures are missing.  
For economic organisation and contractual arrangement, Williamson (1996) distinguishes 
between transaction costs defined as the ex-ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and safe-
guarding an agreement and more especially, the ex-post costs of mal-adaptation and 
adjustment that arise when contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, 
omissions, and unanticipated disturbances. Further, the costs of conducting transactions in 
one organisational or contractual form relative to the others are important. For Clemons et al. 
(1993), transaction costs are represented by two components. The first component is 
coordination costs, i.e. the costs of exchanging information and incorporating that 
information into the decision process. The second one is transaction risks, which refers to the 
risk that other parties in the transaction will shirk agreed responsibilities. 
Quite a few studies measuring transaction costs also focus the distribution of these costs 
among actors or actor groups. Many of them distinguish between private transaction costs 
that, e.g., farmers or other private actors have to carry (Kumm and Drake, 1998; Falconer, 
2000), and public transaction costs that public authorities and administrations have to bear 
(Kersten, 2004; Falconer and Whitby 1999a, b).  
Within SEAMLESS, it will also be necessary to distinguish between transaction costs related 
to the policy design and transaction costs related to implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement. Yet, in the reviewed studies, indicators for the costs related to the policy design 
process are missing.  
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1.4.2 Reflections on the Applicability of the Transaction Cost Cluster for 
Institutional Analysis in SEAMLESS-IF 
The following reflections start from the insights gained by reviewing the literature on 
institutional indicators, and, in particular, on the theoretical considerations described in 
Section 1.4.1. It is assumed that both, the designing and implementation of policies are 
connected with transaction costs. For instance, co-ordinating transactions between 
administrative layers (i.e., within hierarchies) is important when designing and implementing 
public policies. Such transactions entail specific transaction costs, incurred as a result of 
collecting information, making decisions, formulating institutional rules, monitoring 
compliance with these rules, and enforcing these rules (Paavola and Adger, 2005). If the same 
objective (environmental, economic, or social) can be provided by different policy options, 
the most cost-efficient organisation is the one connected with the lowest transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the way in which administrative processes are designed and foreseen within the 
policy option is expected to affect their institutional quality, such as transparency and 
reliability of processes. Here, a higher institutional quality may request higher transaction 
costs but may lead to an improved effectiveness of the policy option. 
Thus, policy options cannot be evaluated only according to their costs but also according to 
the required institutional quality of the institutional arrangements, such as the administrative 
processes in order to be effective. Within the ITAES Project (Integrated Tools to Design and 
Implement Agro-Environmental Schemes) funded by the EU 6th Framework Program, 
indicators of institutional quality have been introduced; yet, at a conceptual stage: 
transparency, reliability, continuity, legitimacy, responsibility, complexity, and sensitivity to 
mistakes (Beckmann et al., forthcoming). 
2 Gaps and Interlinkages of Institutional Indicators for 
Sustainability in SEAMLESS 
As described in Section 1, there is only a limited number of - often also less developed - 
indicators for institutional analysis compared to other dimensions. Apart from the relative 
juvenescence of institutional research, this is also due to the fact that the functions and 
characteristics of institutions, such as rules forming structures, building expectations or 
setting constraints are much more complex to tackle. In general, statements on gaps in 
institutional indicators depend on:  
a) the available indicators to measure institutions 
b) the institutional approach necessary for reaching the SEAMLESS objectives 
a) The most developed indicators were found in the good governance debates of the World 
Bank. Those indicators comply with scientific quality criteria and can be computed with 
existing data sets. Data sets with slightly different purposes are accessible. They are used 
to compose indices describing the impact of institutions on growth and economic 
performance in a narrow sense, and on public welfare and development aims in a broader 
sense. These indicators allow for international comparison and, thus, they are only 
available on national scale. Yet, according to Beck et al. (2000: 2), there is still a lack of 
detailed data on the political and institutional characteristics of countries and their 
changes over time.  
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The social capital indicators provide valuable information about the social 
embeddeddness level of a society and its communication capacities. Such indicators have 
been computed, but they are mainly based on local case study data and draw on 
subjective information. However, some objective proxies have been developed for single 
regions or countries, such as number of members in associations. Most social capital data 
are not included in data sets; they are only available from singular sources. 
The debate on institutions as the fourth dimension of sustainability provides the least 
developed indicators in this review. Most of them are at a conceptual level, i.e. they are 
formulated, but there is no method how to compute them. Moreover, even if there is an 
indication on how to compute the proposed indicators, the required data are often not 
available, scattered or in an inappropriate form. Nevertheless, the UNCSD and ESI 
institutional indicators are very promising as the underlying concept that institutions 
favour or hinder sustainable development is in line with the SEAMLESS approach 
(PD1.2.1). The institutional indicator sets assess the performance of implementing 
sustainability policy goals of the Agenda 21, or the institutional effectiveness to respond 
to environmental challenges, respectively.  
Like in most of the literature on sustainability indicators, the approach chosen in Work 
Package 2 of SEAMLESS separates society in four discrete dimensions or subsystems. 
However, there is a permanent interaction between the economic, social, environmental, 
and institutional dimensions. These interactions constitute the linkages of the four 
dimensions and should be characterised by interlinkage indicators (Spangenberg, 2002: 
4). Interlinkage indicators do not refer to one single dimension of sustainable 
development, but are e.g., socio-environmental or institutional-economic. Focusing 
exclusively on single dimensions of sustainability would imply the risk to loose the 
coherence of the approach and begin to trade-off between different goals instead of 
looking for integrated approaches (Spangenberg and Bonniot, 1998: 12). 
Social
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Indicators
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Indicators
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Indicators
Enviro-socio
interlinkage
Indicators
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Figure 2: Interlinkage Indicators between Four Dimensions of Sustainability 
Source: adapted form Spangenberg and Bonniot (1998: 13) 
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The closest interlinkage of institutional indicators will be with social indicators. Clearly, 
it can be regarded an advantage if indicators used to define social sustainability can also 
be used to define institutions for sustainability. Thus, some institutional indicators may 
overlap with economic and in particular social indicators. It can be assumed that there 
will be less overlap with environmental ones. However, it is not crucial whether an 
indicator is classified as economic, social, or institutional. Indicators may also be 
correlated positively or negatively with one another. By putting them into an appropriate 
framework and combining them to form complex indicators, the indicators will gain 
evidence. Thus, the outcome of the domain’s specific models, such as world trade models 
or bio-physical models, will be different indicators as those feed into the models. Many 
social indicators (see PISIS – D2.1.2) are indicators which refer to institutional as well as 
social questions, depending on the focus. For example, a) participation of population in 
various sorts of cultural events, divided according to its nature and age, b) participation in 
nature conservation associations, or c) indicators related to information accessibility, such 
as number of radios per household, number of televisions per household, and internet 
access per households. Here, indicators on social health issues such as participation in 
insurance schemes could simultaneously give indications on people’s risk assessment 
important to judge their opinion towards certain policy issues.  
The transaction costs indicators can be conceived as calculations of transaction costs on 
a case-to-case basis. Accordingly, there is no data set summarising the results of the 
varying studies of different disciplines. Some aggregated and methodological studies 
exist, trying to find determinants and attributes of transactions either indicating high or 
low transaction costs or pointing to discrete institutional arrangements. The latter 
approach does implicitly minimise transaction costs. Only until recently, scientists have 
not applied the approach to transactions related to natural resources. 
In general, in all four clusters, the coverage of different geographical scales is very 
limited. There is a high share of data relying on (local) case study material (social capital) 
and relative well-tended data sets of international statistics providing data on good 
governance at a national scale.  
b) The existence of some indicators that are already operational, i.e. which have an 
accessible data set, and are indicative, robust, and sensitive does not mean that they are 
appropriate for the objectives of institutional analysis in SEAMLESS. 
In SEAMLESS it is aimed at measuring the impact of policies on sustainability and to 
assess the institutional context with respect to its impact on the effectiveness of policy 
implementation. Thus, the measurement of institutions within SEAMLESS has to be 
closely connected to the policy option to be implemented. This adds a particular 
difficulty, which is not yet addressed in the institutional indicators literature. The 
methodologies for ex-ante policy assessment from an institutional perspective are rare, 
and none of them can be directly used in a formalised way. This implies that there is a 
need to elaborate on the existing indicators but also, partly, to develop new indicators as 
none of the four clusters directly aims at institutional compatibility of policy options. 
Furthermore, most of the subjective performance indicators of the UNCSD or the World 
Bank are designed for ex-post analysis, i.e. they measure the effects after policy 
implementation.  
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 116 of 170 
3 Developing a Classification System for Institutional 
Indicators 
In order to follow a systematic approach for analysing the literature, a classification system 
(matrix) of the various institutional indicators was constructed. This matrix represents an 
effort to facilitate the classification and, thus, the comprehension of indicators (variables and 
proxies) concerning their origin, characteristics, and purpose (Theesfeld and Beckmann, 
forthcoming). The classification system serves as the basis for the following Tables A1-1 to 
A1-4. All columns in the matrix represent characteristics that can be used to map the 
similarities and differences between the four clusters described above when their capability of 
measuring different aspects of institutional performance is concerned. The colums in the 
tables are 1) cluster of origin/research program, 2) methodology, 3) typology, 4) level of 
social analysis, 4) purpose of indicators, 5) example indicators, 6) data availability, 7) 
geographical coverage, and 8) references. In the following, the different categories are 
explained in detail. 
Methodology 
The column methodology highlights the steps and tools used to construct the indicators and to 
compile indices from relevant datasets. For the purpose of this Deliverable, the information 
provided in this column mainly applies to subjective versus objective data. Here, subjective 
indicators are based on expert or informed opinions, yet, systematically gathered; objective 
data represent data that are gathered from statistics and similar sources. It is important to note 
that indicators that are marked as “subjective” can also be quantitative in nature. In particular, 
in the good governance debate, the widely assumed superiority of quantitative over 
qualitative measures is a central issue. Hence, several approaches have been followed to 
quantify subjective information stemming, e.g., from qualitative assessments of experts. In 
turn, quantitative data from statistics are often not totally objective because of, for example, 
underlying subjective processes of data selection. Being aware of the blurred borderlines 
between quantitative, qualitative, subjective, and objective data, the latter two categories 
(subjective, objective) are considered to be more explanatory for the purposes of this 
Deliverable. 
Typology 
Each of the four clusters presented above developed its own typology for structuring 
indicators. One has to be aware of these different kind of typologies used to make indicators 
comparable.  
One prominent issue of debate shall be stressed here: the applicability of the Pressure-State-
Response (PSR) and the Driving-force-State-Response (DSR) typologies favoured by natural 
scientists, criticised by sociological scientists, and regarded as not suitable by institutional 
economists. Within the sustainability cluster, the typology starts with the PSR concept 
promoted by the OECD (1998) that exclusively focusses on the environment. The UNCSD 
has been adding the economic and the social dimension to the typologies, thus, the category 
“pressures” was changed to a more general one, “driving forces leading to the system”. Yet, 
Spangenberg (2002: 3) concludes that, for the institutional dimension, the DSR typology is 
misguiding. It is rather suited to deal with situations where measures are designed as a tailor-
made reaction to specific problems. Institutions, however, are only partly designed 
intendedly; they evolve partly as a result of changing mindsets, experiences, and public 
discourses. The diffuse impacts of institutions as well as the rebound effects of political 
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decisions on institutions make it difficult to define direct links from driving-forces to 
responses. Due to these conceptual difficulties, neither the PSR nor the DSR typology is used 
to classify institutional indicators in this Deliverable.  
Instead, many other typologies are presented in the literature, such as: a) themes and 
subthemes, b) specific analytical criteria, c) process (outcome and resources) and 
performance (contextual and sectoral), and d) stocks, efficiency, and equity. In the following, 
typology elements used in Tables A1-1 to A1-4 are introduced. 
Especially in the good governance cluster, two broad types of indicators can be found: 
performance and process indicators. Performance measures provide assessments of the 
quality of governance. For example, governments are rated with respect to corruption levels 
or predictability of policymaking. Indicators linked to a reference goal or sustainability target 
are termed performance indicators (Spangenberg and Bonniot, 1998). Process measures 
describe the institutional inputs that produce governance outcomes. Unlike performance 
measures, process measures have no normative content; for instance, “the average salary of 
civil servants relative to the private sector or to per capita income”. Performance indicators 
can be both quantitative and qualitative (see also Section “Methodology” above). For 
instance, the widely known Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
represents a performance indicator constructed by aggregating multiple indicators from 
various sources. 
Another typology is grouping indicators according to the measuring scale: nominal, ordinal, 
and cardinal. A typical cardinal indicator is “potential scientists and engineers per million 
inhabitants” or “access to information by number of newspaper circulating”. Some nominal 
indicators are presented in statistical studies as binary or dummy variables. For instance, a 
variable that equals “one” in a concrete region has a particular institutional feature, and 
“zero” another feature, or the existence of National Councils for Sustainable Development 
indicated with “yes” or “no”.  
Many indicators are counts of a phenomenon (e.g., number of transactions, number of 
associations, etc.). They are then usually normalised as ratios for statistical purposes, e.g., 
“average number of transactions per firm”, “average number of associations per inhabitant”, 
“ratio of agreements legislated for”, “agreements ratified from a list of six”, or “telephone 
lines per 1.000 inhabitants”. Last, some indicators are composite, i.e. they are the result of a 
computation of different data. For example, when a phenomenon is measured indirectly by 
several indicators principal component analysis can yield aggregate indices of that 
phenomenon. 
Level of Social Analysis 
The Level of Social Analysis refers to Williamson (2000: 597) and differentiates four logical 
levels: L1) the social embeddedness level (this is where norms, customs, mores, traditions, 
and religions are located; changes happen very slowly); L2) the institutional environment 
(includes the formal rules, such as constitutions, laws, and property rights; conceived to 
change within decades or centuries); L3) the governance structures (e.g., legal system for 
defining contract laws and enforcing contracts; changes conceived to happen within a year to 
a decade); L4) the level of resource allocation and employment (prices and other incentives 
affecting decision making; changes may happen daily or even more often). This classification 
is widely used by institutional economists. Elements also inform the categories of qualitative 
composite output indicators that are elaborated on in the last step of the Procedure for 
Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA). 
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 118 of 170 
Data Availability  
In the column data availability, first, the criterion geographical coverage of the indicators 
found in the literature will be addressed. According to SEAMLESS-IF, categories used will 
range from farm-level, local, regional, national, to international scales. While most indicators 
are only available at national level, regional and local information on institutions – in 
particular, on informal institutions – would be exceedingly helpful for assessing the 
institutional compatibility of policy options. As is true for environmental systems, local 
institutional systems within a country can be very heterogeneous. 
Further, other aspects of data availability are refered to in this column. Some proposed 
indicators are still at a conceptual level. Other indicators are in principle measurable, but data 
does not exist, yet. There are also indicators that have been measured, but that are not 
operational for the purpose of SEAMLESS-IF because they refer to local case study data 
only. Finally, there are indicators which are operational, i.e. data sets are accessible, either 
free of charge or fee-based. This information is important to assess the (practical or technical) 
applicability of the indicators for institutional analysis and their (potential) use for Prototype 
3.  
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4 Tables 
Table A1-1: Good Governance Institutional Indicators 
Research Program Methodology Typology Level of 
Social 
Analysis
Purpose Examples of Indicators Data Availability Reference 
Freedom House 
Index 
Subjective Performance,  
Ordinal scale 
L3 Assess political freedom and 
civil liberties 
Explain relations to income 
growth 
Countries are assigned a 
status of “free”, “partly free”, 
or “not free”, by averaging 
ratings. 
Cross-country data 
Annual since 1978, 192 
countries 
http:freedomhouse.org/r
atings/index.htm 
World Bank, 2001 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Subjective 
assessment of 
experts; 
composite 
scores 0-100 
Qualitative 
Performance,  
Ordinal scale 
L3 Explain relation to income 
growth 
Index that reflects the 
security of private property 
and the enforceability of 
contracts. 
Index 
Variables reflect corruption 
in government, law and order 
tradition, repudiation of 
contracts by governments, 
bureaucratic quality, and 
democratic accountability. 
Broad coverage across 
countries (140) and over 
time  
Fee required to access 
data by Political Risk 
Services Group of 
Syracuse, NY.  
http://www.prsgroup.co
m/icrg/icrg.html 
World Bank, 2001; 
Knack and Keefer, 
2003;  
Besancon, 2003 
Business 
Environmental Risk 
Intelligence (BERI) 
Subjective 
assessment of 
experts 
Performance, 
Ordinal scale 
L3 Assess political risks for 
overseas investments 
Index  
The index includes aspects, 
such as contract 
enforceability, 
nationalisation risk, 
Private source 
Limited country 
coverage (50) 
Fee required to assess 
World Bank, 2001; 
Besancon, 2003; 
Knack and Keefer, 
1995, 2003 
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bureaucratic delays, and 
infrastructure quality 
data 
http://www.beri.com 
World Development 
Report 1997 
(WDR1997) 
Subjective 
assessment of 
actual investors
Performance L3 Assess perceptions of 
governance among investors 
Explain investment rates 
related to the quality of 
governance 
Policy unpredictability, 
quality of government 
services, corruption, judicial 
unpredictability. 
67 countries 
data available 
World Bank, 1997 
Corruption 
Perception Index  
Subjective 
Survey of 
business 
people, 
investors, 
journalists, and 
risk analysts. 
Composite 
index using 
different data 
sources.  
 
Performance, 
Ordinal scale 
L3 Assess the perception of 
corruption. 
Give indications for donors 
where investment is needed 
to fight corruption 
Index 
Example question: Bribing 
and corruption prevail or do 
not prevail in the economy? 
Annually updated, broad 
country coverage (163) 
Rating accessible 
www.transparency.org 
Transparency 
International, 2006 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Research Indicators 
Data set (KKZ) 
Subjective 
Construct six 
aggregate 
indexes 
Performance L3 Explain relation of these 
indexes to higher per capita 
incomes 
Aspects of governance 
assessed: 
Rule of law, graft, voice and 
accountability, government 
effectiveness, political 
instability and violence, and 
regulatory burden.  
Covers 199 countries 
Web-Interactive 
Governance indicators. 
Four time series: 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002: 
http://www.worldbank.o
rg/wbi/governance/pub/g
ovmatters.html,  
http://www.worldbank.o
Kaufmann et al., 
1999a,b, 2003 
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rg/wbi/governance/pub/g
ovmatters3.html, 
http://www.worldbank.o
rg/wbi/governance/govd
ata2002/ 
Contract-Intensive 
Money (CIM) 
Objective Ratio L3, L4 Explain reliance on contract 
enforcement and its relation 
to growth rates and 
investment’s share of GDP. 
CIM  Clague et al., 1999 
Civil Service 
Employment and Pay 
Objective Process 
Ratio 
L4 Give ratios of government 
employment and wages as a 
share in the whole economy 
Average government wages 
as a ration of manufacturing 
wages. Total government 
wage bill as a percentage of 
GDP 
Not updated since 1993 
http://www.worldbank.o
rg/html/dec/publications/
workpapers/WPS1700se
ries/wps1771/wps1771.p
df 
Schiavo-Campo et 
al., 1997a, b 
Weberian 
Comparative State 
Data Project 
Subjective 
Ranking of 
experts 
Qualitative, 
Ordinal Scale 
L3 Relation to economic growth  Various dimensions of 
bureaucratic structure and 
meritocracy 
35 developing countries 
data for 1993-1996: 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jr
auch/webstate/ 
Evans and Rauch, 
1999 
Polity98 Project on 
Regime 
Characteristics/ 
Polity IV 
Subjective, 
Survey data 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative, 
Process, 
Ordinal scale 
 Describe political structures 
and regime change over 
almost 200 years. 
Variables on how chief 
executives are selected, or 
sources and extent of 
constraints on the chief 
executive as power. 
Measures on political 
participation, on 
centralization and scope of 
government authority 
161 countries 
http://www.cidcm.umd.e
du/inscr/polity/index.ht
m 
Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2001 
Political Constraint Objective Quantitative, L4 Relation to growth rates Number of independent 140 countries Henisz, 2000 
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Index Process branches of government with 
veto power. Distribution of 
preferences across and within 
those branches. 
http://www-
management.wharton.up
enn.edu/henisz/ 
Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) 
Objective Qualitative 
and 
quantitative,  
Process, 
binary, 
cardinal 
L1 Answers questions of 
political economy: Which 
political institutions are most 
conducive to development 
and reform? Investigate 
institutional and political 
conditions under which 
governments promote or 
retard reforms and assumed 
economic development.  
Indices for Competitiveness 
in election 
Indicators for federalism 
(regulatory power of sub-
national governments) 
Cross-country database 
with 113 variables on 
177 countries 
Free access 
http://www.worldbank.o
rg/wbi/governance/pdf/
wps2283 
Beck et al., 2000 
Second-generation 
governance 
indicators 
Objective Process and 
Performance  
 Indicators should be more 
policy relevant, politically 
acceptable, and quantitative.  
Areas taken into account: 
Good governance, human 
rights and democratization 
and participatory 
development 
Examples: 
Timeliness of audited 
financial statements 
Percentage of population 
fearful of crime 
Enforcement of property 
rights 
40 candidate indicators 
in a mean number of 80 
countries 
OECD DAC website 
Knack et al., 2003 
Evaluating the 
quality of public 
governance 
Subjective  Process and 
Performance 
L1, L3 Conceptualising a new 
orientation in evaluating the 
quality of public governance. 
Measuring improvements in 
quality of life and in 
governance process instead 
of a quality of a service. 
Level of community safety 
perceived by citizens  
Level of understanding of 
citizens, in relation to the 
issues about which they wish 
to know 
Quality of the environment 
which people experience 
Conceptual work; Data 
sets which go into this 
direction are the Human 
Development Index of 
the United Nations, The 
Compass Project of the 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
in German, or the Audit 
Commission in Britain 
Bovaird and 
Löffler, 2003 
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Table A1-2: Social Capital Institutional Indicators 
Research Program Methodology Typology Level of 
Social 
Analysis 
Purpose Examples of Indicators Data 
Availability 
Reference 
Social capital Objective Composite L1 Explain growth Ethnolinguistic diversity At country level Easterly and Levine, 1997
Social capital Subjective & 
objective 
Composite L1 Explain program 
adoption 
Trust and reciprocity indices No (survey data) Pargal and Huq, 1999 
Social capital Objective Composite L1 Explain fertiliser 
adoption 
Social homogeneity No (survey data) Isham, 2002 
Social capital Objective Composite  L1, L2 Explain household 
expenditure 
Number of groups weighted by 
quality 
No (survey data) Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999 
Social capital Objective & 
subjective 
Composite L1 Explain growth Civic behaviour indicators: 
Associations, newspaper 
readership, political behaviour, 
satisfaction with government; 
At regional level 
in Italy 
Helliwel and Putnam, 
1995 
Social capital Objective Ratios L1 Explain household 
investment 
Electoral turnout 
Blood donation 
At municipality 
level in Italy 
Guiso and Zingales, 
2004 
Social capital Objective Ratios L1 Explain growth Association density At county level 
in the US 
Rupashinga and Goetz, 
2002; 
(and many others) 
Social capital Objective & 
subjective 
Cardinal L1 Explain individual 
success 
Number of moves 
Parental involvement 
At district level 
in the US 
Hagan and MacMillan, 
1996 
Social capital Objective Cardinal L1 Explain food trader 
success 
Number and types of links No (survey data) Fafchamps and Minten, 
2002 
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Social capital Objective Ratios L1 Explain mean income 
and its standard 
deviation 
Number of monoparental 
families 
Criminality rate 
At district level 
in the US 
Robison and Siles, 1999 
Social capital Subjective Ratio L1 Explain growth Trust (general) At country level Knack and Keefer, 1997 
Social capital Subjective & 
objective 
Ordinal, 
Cardinal 
L1, L2, L3 Explain program 
adoption 
Leaders’ charisma, groups, co-
operative behaviour 
No (survey data) Krishna, 2001 
Social capital Subjective  
Rating 
(source: EVS) 
Ordinal L1 Explain growth Taste for sociability 
Materialism 
At NUTS I level 
in the EU 
(European 
Values Study) 
Beugelsdijk and 
Smulders, 2003 
Social capital Objective Composite L1, L3 Explain growth Various bonding and bridging 
indicators 
At municipality 
level in France 
Callois and Schmitt, 
2006 
International 
economics 
Objective Ratio L1 Explain trade Share of immigrants At country level Gould, 1994; 
Rauch and Trindade, 
2002 
International 
economics 
Objective Ratio L1 Explain equity 
investment 
Phone calls between countries At country level Portes and Rey, 2001 
International 
economics 
Objective Binary L1 Explain trade Common history, language, etc. At country level Rauch, 1999 
International 
economics 
Objective Binary L1, L2 Explain trade Presence of business group Canada only Head and Ries, 1998 
Economic sociology Objective  Composite,  
Sociometric 
L1 Linking individual 
success and network 
structure 
Structural measures of 
individual network 
No (survey data) Burt, 2000 
Economic sociology Objective  Composite, 
Sociometric 
L1 Firm’s success Frequency of interaction with 
suppliers: concentration index 
No (survey data) Uzzi, 1996;1999 
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Table A1-3: Sustainability Institutional Indicators 
Research Program Methodology Typology Level of 
Social 
Analysis 
Purpose Examples of 
Indicators 
Data Availability Reference 
United Nation 
Commission for 
Sustainable 
Development, 
Objective 
binary 
(existence: 
yes/no) 
Subjective 
(effectiveness) 
Themes and 
Subthemes 
L2, L3 International core set of 
indicators for sustainable 
development 
Subtheme: Institutional 
Framework 
1) National Sustainable 
Development Strategy. 
2) Implementation of 
Ratified Global 
Agreements 
In addition to the four 
indicators of 
institutional capacity 
described below 
1) only existence can 
be monitored, no 
methodology for this 
indicators 
2) data available but 
no meaningful 
indicator 
UN, 2001 
Eurostat and United 
Nations Commission 
for Sustainable 
Development,  
Objective Themes and 
Subtheme 
Cardinal 
Ratio 
 
L3 Adaptation to the European 
requirements of the 
international core set of 
indicators for sustainable 
development 
Subtheme Institutional 
capacity 
1) Internet access 
2)Communication 
infrastructure 
3) Expenditure on 
research and 
development 
4) Risks to human and 
natural capital 
Eurostat, national 
scale 
1), 4) Caution is 
advised in using some 
data. Relevance or 
quality is 
questionable, 
2), 3) Good quality 
and comparable data 
EC, 2001a 
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Enhancing 
institutional indicators 
of the United Nation 
Commission for 
Sustainable 
Development 
Objective According to 
analytical 
levels 
Aims at 
cardinal and 
performance 
L1-L3 Developing more 
meaningful institutional 
indicators out of the core 
set of indicators for 
sustainable development 
Number of elected 
representatives in 
parliaments, councils 
etc. per 100,000 
inhabitants for level of 
decentralization, 
Funding for NGOs as 
share of the total 
subsidies paid by 
government, 
Average of real tax 
paid by the top 20% of 
private income as 
compared to the 
national average for 
distributional dynamics
Most of the 
indicators proposed 
are proposed new 
once, but data is 
partly available. 
However not 
gathered in a 
database 
www.wupperinst.org 
Spangenberg, 2002; 
Spangenberg et al., 
2000, 2002 
Framework for 
economic and social 
dimension of 
sustainable 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
 Typology of 
“Stocks”, 
“Efficiency”, 
and “Equity” 
indicators 
L3 for 
institutional 
aspects 
Developing a framework 
which besides the agri-
environmental indicators 
take the economic and 
social dimension into 
account 
Institutional efficiency 
Assessed by aspects of 
the regulatory 
framework, informal 
relationships and 
steering mechanisms 
Only listed, not 
conceptual and no 
data available 
EC, 2001b 
Environmental 
Sustainability Index 
Report 
Objective/Subj
ective 
Annex C of the 
report outlines 
the 
methodology 
for each 
variable 
Building block 
for indicators 
out of 5 
components, 
each out of a 
group of 
indicators and 
out of a group 
of variables. 
L2, L3 To compare nations in their 
ability to protect the 
environment over the next 
several decades with a more 
quantitative approach to 
environmental decision-
making. 
The indicator 
“environmental 
governance” is build 
out of a group of 
variables such as, 
corruption measures, 
government 
effectiveness, and 
percentage of total land 
National scale 
Institutional variables 
are taken from 
existing indexes, such 
as Freedom House, or 
new calculated from 
existing data sets, 
such as World Bank, 
and UNCSD, or 
Esty et al., 2005 
www.yale.edu/esi 
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area under protected 
status, rules of law, 
civil and political 
liberties, and 
democracy measures. 
based on a conducted 
survey.  
Governance 
performance in 
integrated coastal 
management 
Objective / 
Subjective 
Input, Process, 
Output, 
Outcome 
Performance 
L3 Measure the outcome and 
impacts of a project to 
measure the actual success 
in both environmental and 
socioeconomic terms.  
Political support 
obtained and 
maintained; Scientific 
advisory groups 
established; Public 
access to information is 
assured 
Conceptual Ehler, 2003 
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Table A1-4: Transaction Costs Institutional Indicators 
Research Program Methodology Typology Level of 
Social 
Analysis 
Purpose Examples of 
Indicators 
Data Availability Reference 
Transaction costs and 
environmental policies  
Objective 
Survey, 
government 
reports, financial 
account, proposed 
budget 
 L1, L2, 
L3 
To explain 
transaction costs in 
environment 
policies 
Type of transaction 
costs: Research and 
information, enactment 
or litigation, 
contracting, 
monitoring/detection, 
prosecution/ 
enforcement 
Conceptual case McCann et al., 2005 
Dairy production in 
East Africa  
Objective 
Survey on 
smallholder 
farmers  
Cardinal L3 Explain dairy 
production after 
liberalisation 
Distance 
Travel price 
Time (search, bargain, 
monitor, etc.) 
Survey, case study Staal et al., 1997 
Policy Administrative 
Costs to implement 
environnemental 
sensitive area in 
England 
Objective 
Survey, 
negotiation 
between actors 
Ratio L3 To maintain, 
improve, and 
extend habit or 
landscape features 
on agricultural 
land. 
Share of policy 
expenditure: for 
information, 
contracting, 
monitoring, etc. 
Survey, case study Falconer et al., 2001 
Industrial firm reduce 
pollution due to Kyoto 
protocole  
Objective Ratio L3 Analysis of cost 
and institutional 
rigidities for 
projects 
implementation 
within the Kyoto 
Proportional, fixed, 
degressive of each 
transaction cost 
(search, negotiation, 
approval, validation, 
registration, 
Data from the 
Swedish activities 
implemented jointly 
Michaelowa and 
Jotzo, 2005 
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Protocol flexibility 
mechanism 
monitoring, 
verification, 
certification, and 
enforcement costs) in 
relation to project size 
Transaction costs case: 
electronic commerce 
Objective  
Collecting data 
from Singapore 
Cardinal L3 Use transaction 
cost assessment to 
understand 
consumers’ 
willingness to pay 
Time for search, 
monitoring, etc. 
Survey, case study Teo and Yu, 2005 
Agriculture in USA Objective Ratio 
Cardinal 
L3 Description of 
links among 
organisational 
economic, policy 
analysis and 
agriculture 
Share of value of 
product under contract 
Contract 
characteristics: contract 
fees, contract 
quantities, length, 
confidentiality clause, 
specified investment / 
spot market alternative 
Data from a survey MacDonald et al., 
2004 
Outsource information 
technology 
Objective 
 
Ratio L3 Analysis of 
outsourcing 
determinants 
Asset specificity, 
Share of materials 
outsouced: hardware, 
printer, etc. 
Conceptual, Survey, 
case study. 
Aubert et al., 2004 
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Appendix 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types: 
PICA Step 2 
In Appendix 2, the literature reviewed for identifying crucial institutional aspects is 
documented in a detailed manner. Section 1 presents 16 concrete policies that are analysed 
for their CIAs. They are grouped according to the policy type matrix. An overview of policy 
types covered in this Section can be found in Table A2-1. For each policy, a description of 
the policy option is given first followed by the categorisation into a policy type. Thereafter, 
related CIAs are discussed. Section 2 elaborates the literature on those CIAs not directly 
linked to concrete policies.  
1 Crucial Institutional Aspects of Policy Types 
Table A2-1: Policy Types Covered in Section 1 
Area of Intervention Property 
Rights 
Change 
 
Hierarchy/ 
Bureaucracy 
Market Self-organised 
Network 
 
Regulatory 
1.1;  
1.12;  
1.13; 
1.15 
1.6; 
1.7; 
1.11; 
1.14; 
1.15 
 1.4; 
1.6; 
1.14 
Economic 
1.12 1.3; 
1.11; 
1.16 
1.2; 
1.5; 
1.8 
1.3; 
1.4; 
1.16 
Type of 
Intervention 
Advisory/Voluntary   1.9; 1.10 
1.10 
 
Natural Resources Addressed 
Complex resource systems with many externalities involved (e.g., wetlands) 1.5 
Water resource systems with long-term and diffuse impacts stemming from 
farming activities 
1.9 
Land/Soil 1.16 
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1.1 Subsidies for the Production of Environmental Services 
Description of the policy option 
Agri-environmental measures and rural development schemes connected with financial 
incentives aim at inducing farmers to produce what may be considered as environmental 
services (maintaining grasslands, traditional landscape, and biodiversity, adopting farming 
practices that limit pollution and erosion). They are based on the idea of making the farmer 
individually responsible towards the environment (Hodge, 2001). In this section, we 
concentrate on the aspect of implementation of these measures within the public 
administration.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy type: Regulatory on hierarchies 
These measures deeply transformed the activity of local administrations in charge of 
agriculture, as well as their relationships with professional organisations. The high workload 
of administrations induced by the policy, and the high resistance of farmer unions (who claim 
that they are not supposed to be “gardeners of the countryside”), explained the slowness of 
progress of these measures (Bousset et al., 2002). Moreover, in practice, the implementation 
of these measures is often characterised by both confused definition of objectives and 
complicated implementation. The objectives also tend to evolve with time during the 
implementation of the policy (Macombe et al., 2004). Note that in some cases, professional 
organisations managed to divert the concrete measures and premiums of the policy and 
transform it into another type of automatic subsidy. For instance, the criteria for getting the 
subsidy were set at a low level, corresponding in fact to the present situation of land use 
(Vollet et al., 2001). Most farmers did not have to change anything to their behaviour to get 
the subsidy. 
Here, the main crucial institutional constraint is related to political and administrative 
inertia as a source of transaction costs. Concretely, inertia means that civil servants generally 
need to devote many resources (time, meetings, memos, etc.) in order to become acquainted 
with the policy and to build new procedures to implement it properly. Inertia might cause 
reluctance to implement policies that come along with substantial changes in procedures. 
When the redistribution effects of the workload and budgeting within the administrative 
bodies are high and connected with negative effects for a certain unit, than the inertia of that 
unit is expected to be higher. Depending on the existing administrative structures, substantial 
changes can be costly and lead to the crucial institutional constraint of administrative public 
transaction costs for policy administration. To a lesser extent, there is also the issue of 
bargaining power between the State and farmers’ organisations. The latter relates to 
influencing the content of the measures and the premiums.  
1.2 Rural Development Schemes Encouraging Self-organised 
Networks 
Description of the policy option 
Here we refer to a special type of rural development schemes, the so-called “territorial 
actions”. These are special measures of the rural development scheme aiming at stimulating 
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collective action, in particular, for the development of specific/traditional products, or for 
stimulating relationships between agriculture and other sectors. 
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy type: economic on self-organised network 
In practice, the results of these measures were poor, notably because farmer organisations 
were reluctant to see non-farmers involved in these measures (Ministère de l’Agriculture, 
2004). Due to the power of these farmers’ organizations (in particular in France), incentives 
were insufficient or not directed to the right people in order to stimulate cost-efficient actions. 
In countries where the bargaining power in rural communities is more evenly distributed 
(Germany for instance as opposed to Spain or France), the policy seemed to give quicker and 
more cost-efficient results (Lynggaard, 2001; Wilson et al., 1999). 
The main crucial institutional constraint is the bargaining power of the farming sector’s 
representatives. When it is strong, the policy objectives may bring about not intended 
effects.  
1.3 Agri-environmental Schemes in the New Member States 
Description of the policy option 
Following the agreements on the Agenda 2000, the direct payments to the farmers are linked 
to the “Good Farming Practice”. For agri-environmental measures exceeding this standard, 
agri-environmental schemes (AES) have been established according to the Rural 
Development Regulation No. 1257/1999 (Eggers, 2005). These are modes of compensatory 
allowances for farmers who will be compensated for the income forgone and the cost incurred 
when carrying out those agri-environmental measures. The AES are incentive-based policies. 
Farmers are to participate voluntarily in the respective schemes and they have to commit to 
the scheme for five years. The Member States are responsible for the design of the AES. 
Thus, the measures vary widely in terms of number, design, targeted environmental problem, 
and content. Partly, they aim to change the production structure of farmers, thus, effecting 
their market position. Regulatory constraints of implementing the policies are discussed in 
Section 1.1. Here, we look at the aspect of the impacts on the farm level, the private changes 
of production and transaction costs.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional constraint 
Policy Type: Economic on market and economic on property rights  
As mentioned above, the scope of AES varies widely and accordingly, the scope of possible 
institutional constraints is even broader. Therefore, we need to concentrate on specific AES to 
be able to derive conclusions about institutional constraints. The crucial institutional 
constraints elaborated in the following appear in the whole EU, yet, they are often more likely 
and more pronounced in the New Member States. 
Crucial institutional aspects which will decide on the uptake of and compliance with AES are 
that farmers are aware and convinced of potential benefits and they must feel confident in a 
stable policy approach. The main institutional constraints for uptake - no matter how 
carefully the scheme and single measures are designed - are if a) in-sufficient information 
on policy is available; in contrast to clearly presented and easily understood and 
announced/advised by organisations and well-regarded by the farming community, b) the 
scheme or single measures are too complicated to apply, or c) farmers are not convinced of 
the potential benefits. They doubt that the costs they incur will really be compensated. The 
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latter aspect hints to the crucial institutional constraint that farmers in the New Member 
States have no experiences with such schemes and measures. The more complex and risky 
a management prescription is the higher the financial incentive needed to attract farmers. 
Furthermore, it is always more easy to include an additional financial incentive than to reduce 
or eliminate it once an expectation to be compensated has been generated (Zélie, 2002).  
In particular, Zélie (2002) points to the following institutional constraints:  
Those principally responsible for the much-vaunted richness of the rural environment in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are often the least advantaged in society. 
Subsistence farmers can be regarded as being too poor to care for the environment. Often, 
farmers have to reach a certain farm size in order to be eligible for the AES. Thus, the lack of 
eligibility of sub-groups within the target group (here, ‘subsistence farmers’ within the 
target group ‘farmers’) seems to be another crucial institutional constraint. If policies aim to 
protect the environment effectively those (sub-) groups must be eligible to and benefit from 
these policies.  
Measures that should be realistically incorporated into the farming system and should be 
attractive to potential applicants must be adequate and sufficiently simple. More precisely, 
they must be a) content-wise simple, which means applicable to a targeted farm type and b) 
procedure-wise simple, which means sufficient resources (bookkeeping, time, knowledge) to 
apply must be available. Thus, not matching farmers’ competencies and capabilities is a 
crucial institutional constraint.  
Furthermore, schemes and measures have to fit to the existing mental models of farmers to 
facilitate a change in production functions. For instance, farmers do not like to step back to 
“old” - often more extensive - production practices. Thus, it seems to be easier to preserve 
existing habitats and areas of high environmental values as encouraging farmers to return to 
less intensive farming practices, perceived as less modern.  
1.4 The Endowment Effect of Property Rights 
Description of the policy option 
Pistor (2002: 75) points out that every formal legal system relies heavily on voluntary 
compliance as state controlled resources are insufficient to ensure legal compliance only by 
means of coercion. Whenever a policy changes the property rights of a resource, the 
allocation of the cost and benefit streams that stem from (using) the resource are changed as 
well. Sunstein (1993) discusses an additional effect: people have preferences of a good, a 
right, or anything else depending on whether the government, some other authorities or the 
law, has allocated it to them in the first instance. For Sunstein (1993: 224) the key point is 
“the decision to grant an entitlement to A rather than B can affect the valuation of that 
entitlement by both A and B. More specifically, the initial grant of the entitlement to A 
frequently makes A value that entitlement more than he would if the right had been allocated 
to B”.  
Although both contributions do not deal with a specific policy option, they can be related to 
all policies changing the initial endowment of property rights, as acceptance and voluntary 
compliance with policy measures are closely linked to the property rights distribution.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional constraint 
Policy type: economic on property rights and regulatory on property rights 
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What Sunstein (1993) describes is the endowment effect. This is a crucial institutional 
constraint related to voluntary compliance with policies affecting negatively the previous 
property allocation of an actor. Introducing a policy option that will cut back on the 
previously allocated property rights of an actor will meet stronger resistance as assigning 
limited property rights in the first place. Strictly speaking, this refers to reallocations of 
concrete property rights between the state and a farmer. Crucial for the degree of resistance is 
here, how this exchange process is organised; in particular, if the decrease in benefits due to 
the cutting back on the property rights is to be fully compensated, partly, or not at all. For 
example, if specific agri-environmental production activities that have been paid for by the 
state (via AES) are suddenly considered becoming non-compensated productions standards 
(Good Farming Practices) by farmers, ceteris paribus, resistance is likely to be high. In 
contrast to the Old Member States, the endowment effect in the New Member States might be 
even stronger, in particular, related to property rights on land. Frequently, land has been 
restituted during the transition phase. Therefore, changes to these recently re-gained rights are 
regarded as very sensitive, compared to farmers in the Old Member States who are used to 
several restrictions to their property rights on land.  
1.5 Subsidising Collective Action of Landowners to Restore 
Wetlands 
Description of the policy option 
The problem of inciting land users to behave environmentally friendly is even more difficult 
when there are externalities between them. Because many pollutants (pesticides, nitrogen, 
etc.) diffuse in space, and because land properties are parcelled out across the country, it is 
difficult to identify who caused (to what extent) the externality. It is in particular the case for 
wetland restoration programmes, when there are numerous landowners whose participation is 
necessary for the measure to have a noticeable effect. In that case, collective action is 
required. In particular, this policy refers to complex natural resource systems where the 
sources of externalities are not easy to identify and the effects are not easy to internalise. 
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional constraint 
Policy type: Economic on self-organised network and complex natural resource systems with 
many externalities involved  
Related policies generally include subsidies for initiating collective action (e.g., covering 
costs for meetings, advertising, studies, and other coordination costs). In some cases, these 
policies are supplemented by financial means to compensate for changes in production. 
Despite financial incentives for collective action to address the externality problems, other, 
regulatory, measures should be complementary. Therefore, in general, a mixture between 
authoritarian decisions and economic incentives seems to be the best solution (Hodge and 
McNally, 2000). 
The main crucial institutional aspect is trust between landowners, which is an essential 
component of social capital that facilitates the co-ordination of the objectives of these 
policies, thus, reducing coordination costs. This is because, in general, there is no local 
formal organization that could manage co-operation cost-efficiently. Free-riding behaviour is 
likely if trust is lacking in the local communities. Likewise, the costs for monitoring the 
compliance with the (collectively agreed) activities will be lower if trust among the actors is 
high. 
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1.6 Compulsory Restrictions in New Member States 
Description of the policy option 
Compulsory restrictions constitute - besides incentive-based policies - another set of 
instruments within a coherent and comprehensive agri-environmental policy. Decisions 
regarding the appropriate levels at which to set compulsory requirements, how and when to 
apply sanctions, and even the question what constitutes complementary compensated services 
are based on decisions regarding property rights and are often based on the application of the 
Polluter Pays Principle. In the following, we consider policies that start from the assumption 
that the basic distribution of property rights is already fixed and effective. Yet, the 
implementation in the New Member States might be difficult as rights and obligations are not 
clearly set and enforced, and property rights are often ambiguous and/or not effective (Zélie, 
2002).  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional constraint 
Policy Type: Regulatory on market and regulatory on property rights  
Many property rights are not yet clearly defined in the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Thus, prevailing ambiguous property rights are particularly a constraint with 
regulatory policies on markets, which are based on clearly assigned property rights. For 
instance, if the ownership on land is not clear, restrictions on production patterns, such as the 
prohibition to mow during certain periods, will not be effective. 
1.7 Implementation of Tradable Permits 
Description of the policy option 
The implementation of tradable permits within the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanism 
consists in creating and regulating new markets for environmental goods. It is designed as a 
way to internalise the negative externalities produced by industrial firms. The creation of the 
market itself would refer to the policy type regulatory on market, as new governance 
structures are established. Yet, we will focus here on the regulatory intervention on the 
production function of the firms, and thus, on the effects of the intervention on their market 
position. 
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional constraint 
Policy type: regulatory on market 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is likely to entail considerable costs of baseline 
development, project registration, verification, and certification. Transaction costs are mainly 
supported by the public authorities, although the firms bear some of them too (Michaelowa 
and Jotzo, 2005). The latter refers to the issue of who is paying the costs for establishing the 
new market. The public intervention defines the rules of the trading market but also needs to 
manage organizations dealing with information, administration, and monitoring. 
High information asymmetries between state and polluters as a crucial institutional 
constraint lead to inefficient policy implementation, as the transaction costs might be 
prohibitively high. The state cannot monitor the pollution cost-efficiently, nor does it know 
precisely the cost of cleaning measures (or, alternatively, measures for avoiding pollution). 
This information problem implies a lot of transaction costs and opportunism issues.  
SEAMLESS 
No. 010036 
Deliverable number: D2.4.2 
17 February 2007 
 
 
 Page 143 of 170 
1.8 Fostering Endogenous Development Strategies through 
“Territorial Policies” 
Description of the policy option 
The so-called “territorial policies” encourage local actors to self-organise in order to build a 
common development strategy, and to find new synergies (e.g., scale and scope economies in 
the development of tourism products). Territorial policies may have a quite narrow scope 
(e.g., landscape management), but they can also cover all three dimensions (economic, social, 
environmental) of sustainable development (e.g., the “Pays” policy in France). Probably the 
best-known territorial policy is the LEADER-Programme (Ray, 2000). Groups that meet in 
the frame of such kind of policies are typically cross-sectoral and link private and public 
actors.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy type: economic on self-organised network 
Territorial policies seem to be in tune with social demand, due to their “participative 
democracy” feature. However, their implementation is hindered by several significant 
institutional aspects: 
For instance, already only at the level of ministries, they transcend classical sectors. There is 
a need to co-ordinate several ministries (agriculture, environment, industry, equipment etc.), 
whereas all of them have different cultures and working habits. Civil servants from different 
ministries may make contradictory requirements to local actors (Candau et al., 2003). (See 
also “Problems of interplay” in Section 1.13). 
We have administrative public transaction costs, but also private transaction costs, in 
particular, huge public administrative costs, for meetings and the compilation of many 
documents that are supposed to lead to the awaited territorial strategy. 
Territorial policies rely on “bottom-up” development mechanisms, but this requires an 
appropriate level of social capital (know-how to socially interact, trust in state organisations, 
and inter-level trust between involved levels), which may be missing in some places (Arlot et 
al., 2002, 2004; Atmanagara et al., 2002). 
With this kind of policies, the governance structures are changed towards more participation. 
When the initial distribution of actors’ resources and interests is very heterogeneous self-
organisation and participation is unlikely to emerge (Arzt, forthcoming) and will lead to non-
effective policy outputs. Thus, the crucial institutional constraint - heterogeneity of actors’ 
interests - hinders participation.  
Besides, policies may be seen as implying a loss of power for some local actors, in particular 
elected representatives (Callois and Bonnel, 2002). This is due to the fact that often economic 
intervention in form of subsidised investments is included. For instance, when the pays policy 
was initiated regional development funds were supposed to be reserved for the areas under a 
pays contract. However, in practice, this rule was soon abandoned under the pressure of local 
elected representatives (Callois and Bonnel, 2002). The resistance of elected local 
representatives stems from the fact that they loose decision power and the power to distribute 
otherwise local funds with increasing participation of other, non-elected, rural actor groups. 
The fear of loosing influence leads to their resistance. With increasing scope of change from 
the existing distribution of decision power, including the power to decide over the 
distribution of funds, the resistance increases. In other words, the level of redistribution of 
decision-making power is a crucial institutional constraint. Whenever pluralistic decision-
making structures are imposed on previously singular decision making structures opposition 
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will be high, thus, resistance to a pluralisation of decision-making can become a 
constraint. 
1.9 Voluntary Co-operative Agreements between Farmers and 
(Private) Water Suppliers in Europe 
Description of the policy option 
To overcome the difficulties in implementing command-and-control policies to reduce water 
pollution from agriculture and the weaknesses of usual water-related AES voluntary co-
operative agreements (CA) between water suppliers and farmers in a catchment area 
have been developed in Germany and other European countries. In general, voluntary CAs 
bring about more site-specific rules and/or tailor-made compensatory payments including 
farm-specific advisory services, investment aids (e.g., enlargement of storage capacities), and 
monitoring of soils and waters. They are considered as a complementary instrument to 
regulations and AES. Voluntary CAs differ greatly in terms of geographical scope, number of 
involved farmers, objectives (e.g., preventative and discretionary), legal conditions, 
involvement of state authorities, funding sources for compensation payments, and the role of 
additional activities, such as advisory services. Typically, involved actors include local water 
authorities, representatives of involved farmers, water suppliers, chambers of agriculture, 
agricultural advisors, and nature conservation authorities. CAs are financed to varying 
degrees from the water suppliers, EU-co-financed AES, and the respective Regional State 
mostly using revenues from water abstraction charges.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy Type: voluntary/advisory on self-organised network and water resource systems with 
long-term and diffuse impacts stemming from farming activities 
Voluntary CAs are seen as complementary to traditional policy instruments, such as statutory 
rules and pure, mostly non-catchment-specific compensation schemes. Effective 
implementation of command-and-control policies (e.g., Drinking Water Directive (EC) 
83/1998 and Nitrate Directive (EEC) 676/1991) directed, among other things, at the 
prevention of water pollution from agriculture is often hampered because enforcement of 
these regulations is difficult and costly. This is often due to the large number of farmers, the 
different farming activities carried out by the individual farmers, and the typically long-term 
and diffuse impact of farming activities on the water quality. Furthermore, while 
compensation payments from water-related AES can induce farmers to, e.g., apply extensive 
farming practices, they often are not targeted – in terms of premium levels and rules – to local 
conditions prevalent in a particular catchment area and usually do not include payments for 
advisory services and investment aids that might be more cost-efficient in preventing water 
pollution.  
Here, voluntary CAs have been shown to be more economically cost-efficient and 
environmentally effective means compared to alternative instruments, such as command-and-
control, taxes, and AES (alone). In general, CAs have a high potential – as a complementary 
instrument – to increase the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of 
regulatory and economic policy instruments. Implemented measures can better account for 
the spatial and temporal variations of production costs and environmental benefits. Further, 
monitoring of farmers’ compliance with the rules will tend to be easier since regional water 
suppliers are directly involved in this monitoring process being (spatially) closer to the 
subjects monitored than state agencies. Compared to statutory rules, farmers also have fewer 
incentives for violating the obligations in the case of CAs (Brouwer et al., 2003). 
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Brouwer (2003) presents several factors that might influence the implementation of CAs 
positively or negatively, and, thus, account for their varying occurrence across the EU. He 
finds first, very large water catchment areas to be a severe obstacle. Second, the 
establishment of groundwater protection zones – sometimes accompanied with the 
introduction of compensation schemes for farmers – provides incentives to create CAs. In 
other words, regulatory requirements, such as compulsory rules coming along with 
groundwater protection zones, facilitate the emergence of CAs. Other promoting factors 
include the existence of both, site-specific rules, and monitoring programmes, as well as the 
availability of compensation schemes (e.g., AES) for the income foregone, innovative 
farmers, good communication between farmers and water suppliers, the provision of advisory 
services, and a (culturally determined) preference of water consumers for high-quality 
drinking water. In turn, the establishment of CAs might be hampered if there are no major 
diffuse pollution and/or water scarcity problems caused by agriculture (or, if the existing 
instruments prove to be sufficiently effective), if farmers face high opportunity costs and, 
thus, demand very high compensation payments, and if there are inadequate resources to 
initiate CAs (e.g., because the “public” is unwilling to provide financial funds to farmers for 
“not-polluting the environment”) (Brouwer, 2003; Heinz, 2003). Apart from financial means 
for compensating farmers and/or for providing advisory services, there are also those 
substantial costs to be considered that participating actors will incur, e.g., for organizing and 
running meetings held in the context of the CA. Further, if farmers are involved in the 
process of designing the farming practices from the very beginning they will be more ready to 
join the CA; even if compensation payments are not provided.  
In conclusion, crucial institutional aspects are very large natural resource systems (here, a 
water resource system), contradictory policy instruments, low incentives to resolve the 
problem, high opportunity costs of farmers, and high private transaction costs.  
1.10 Pollution Licences  
Description of the policy option 
This section deals with the special policy of issuing pollution licenses as a direct negotiation 
over property rights between private parties. Déprés et al. (2005) deal with the problem of 
water pollution by farmers in the area of Vittel water production, and give a comparison with 
other cases in Europe. It is a typical example of the use of pollution licenses.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy Type: voluntary/advisory on self-organised network and on property rights 
This study shows that the Coasian bargaining process (Coase, 1960) may work when the 
number of actors is not too high, and when the environmental problem is easy to identify 
in space and time. The main crucial institutional constraint is the dispersion and 
fragmentation of property rights47. A high dispersion/fragmentation is detrimental to 
efficiency of the policy since transaction costs are higher.  
                                                     
47 Here, the term “fragmentation” refers to “land fragmentation”, i.e., owners per hectare. However, 
“dispersion” refers to the distribution of specific components of property rights on a concrete piece of 
land (access, alienation, withdrawal, etc.). 
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1.11 Contracting between National and Regional Levels in Economic 
Development Actions 
Description of the policy option 
The “CPER” (Contrat de Plan Etat-Region – State-region planning contract) is a contract 
between the national and local (mainly regional, i.e. NUTS II) levels that aims at co-
ordinating the action of these different levels to stimulate economic development. 
Historically, it is the outcome of the decentralisation process in the early 1980s. Before 1982, 
France was a highly centralised state within which local levels had a very low autonomy. The 
decentralisation laws instituted autonomous local governments with their own budget and a 
full range of competences, in particular for economic development.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy type: regulatory on markets and economic on markets 
The analysis of the actions undertaken in the CPER reveals two kinds of problems. First, 
national and regional actions may be redundant or contradictory in which case the interest of 
having two separate programs for the same thing is questionable, as it basically doubles 
administrative transaction costs. Second, the definition of eligible projects may be influenced 
by powerful local actors (unions, elected representatives who also have interests in a 
particular economic sector), and create distortion in the allocation of subsidies (Guérin and 
Vollet, 2000). 
The main crucial institutional constraint is the existence of either contradictory or 
redundant policy instruments, which cause unnecessary transaction costs. 
1.12 Decentralisation of Rural Development Interventions 
Description of the policy option 
Here, we look at all rural development interventions that delegate new competencies to local 
governments. Recently, we observe a tendency for federal and central governments to give up 
some competences to more local levels, especially for economic interventions (Callois and 
Moquay, 2006). This transfer of responsibilities is generally supposed to better adapt policies 
to local needs.  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy type: regulatory on hierarchy 
There is often an ambiguity in the definition of responsibilities between the federal/central 
level, and local levels (Joyal and El Batal, 2005). Basically, the central level tries to keep a 
control on the local decisions, while decreasing its expenditure for regional development. 
Sometimes, this takes the form of redundant interventions by central and local 
administrative bodies. Another crucial institutional constraint is the not matching financial 
means and capacities between the responsible administrative levels. For instance, local civil 
servants are considered less neutral than central ones, because they are more directly under 
political pressure. This may cause distortions in the allocation of funds. 
Another crucial institutional constraint is the bargaining power between the state and local 
governments. Whereas local governments usually have better information than the state on 
their needs, it is of little use to them because the state has a far greater power. 
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Policy type: economic on hierarchy 
The central level generally transfers money to local government in order to cope with the new 
responsibilities, but the amount granted is seldom sufficient to cover the needs. The 
decentralisation process may be the source of new inequalities between regions, and thus of a 
loss of social cohesion, as the poorer regions seldom have the necessary resources for 
implementing a cost-efficient policy (Callois and Moquay, 2006). The un-differentiated 
distribution of financial means is here the crucial institutional constraint. Ignoring the 
heterogeneity of target regions and too easily set criteria for the distribution of funds may 
lead to the fact that rich regions are better off and poorer regions are worse off.  
1.13 Introduction of River Basin Management within the Water 
Framework Directive 
Description of the policy option 
The introduction of river basin management is one of the most important features of the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) that is currently being implemented in the EU. Systems 
of water management have to be organised along natural geographical and hydrological 
borders instead of following administrative or political borders. River basin management 
involves all tasks related to water protection (surface water and ground water), e.g., 
inventories, monitoring, reporting, drawing up and putting into practice of management plans 
or programmes of measures. Apart from the cross-spatial co-ordination of water management 
river basin management within the WFD also includes the need to coordinate across different 
sectors, such as water management, agriculture, and transport, as well as elaborated forms of 
participation (Moss, 2003a). 
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy Type: regulatory on hierarchies/bureaucracy 
An analysis of the institutional change likely to be induced by implementation of the policy 
option mentioned above raises issues 1) of compatibility and adaptability of well-established 
national and sub-national institutions of water management, 2) of problems of interplay that 
might be relevant if resource management requires the interaction between different levels of 
the political and administrative hierarchy (national, federal, regional, etc.) and/or if 
(horizontal) interaction across different sectoral (administrative) units (e.g., spatial planning, 
agriculture, or nature conservation) and related organisations, and 3) the problem of fit - that 
occur if the boundaries of a biophysical system do not fit the boundaries of the institutional 
arrangements governing the management of this resource system. As regards, river basin 
management this refers to organising water management along biophysical rather than 
political-administrative boundaries (Moss, 2003b). Here, institutional change towards the 
implementation of (fully functional) river basin management systems will be hampered if 
adverse but historically deep-rooted institutional structures are in place. For example, 
federal administrative and politically systems, such as in Germany, are more likely to make 
the implementation of river basin management difficult. Furthermore, it is argued that 
possible implementation problems may arise 1) if interests of particular actors in the river 
basin are very diverse, e.g., with regard to ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency 
of measures, 2) if financial resources (public and private) are limited, 3) if there are adverse 
political necessities, such as, specific (adverse) priorities in the regional economy and high 
distributional asymmetries. Implementation problems might be caused by the WFDs explicit 
demand for flexible goals and elaborated forms of participation (Moss, 2003b).  
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The main crucial institutional aspects derived are first, the problems of interplay, including 
the existence of contradictory (or redundant) policies, and second, the problems of 
(institutional) fit Further institutional aspects include the heterogeneity of actors’ interests 
and limited financial resources for administrative restructuring. 
1.14 Privatisation of Public Services 
Description of the policy option 
In particular, we look at policies delegating public services to private operators and we will 
concentrate our analysis on the effects on the property rights. Since the early 1980s, there has 
been a general trend of entrusting the private sector to activities that used to be considered as 
natural monopolies (e.g., electricity (Glachant, 1998; Perez, 2004), railway (Yvrande-Billon, 
2003), phone, water distribution and treatment (Ménard and Saussier, 2003)). The lowering 
of fixed costs (e.g., phone sector) or the fragmentation of the industry (e.g., separating 
infrastructure from trains in the railway sector), was supposed to allow for genuine 
competition and thus for a greater efficiency of the private sector (Yvrande-Billon, 2004). 
Instead of limiting our view to the creation of new governance structures, here markets, as 
new state assets are introduced on the market, which would highlight a regulatory on 
hierarchy policy type, we will focus on the regulatory type of intervention which intervenes 
on the market, as the process does not only consist of creating new markets. 
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy type: regulatory on markets and regulatory on property rights 
When intervening on the markets, governments do have to keep these sectors under close 
scrutiny, and full privatisation is seldom the case. The transfer of property rights is never 
complete, because of the high risk of opportunism (benefiting from private information) and 
collusive behaviour from private structures. There are diverse possible governance structures, 
which imply various levels of autonomy for private operators, and thus different levels of 
transaction costs. The literature above suggests that the most efficient contractual 
arrangement highly depends on the institutional situation (e.g., which level of government is 
responsible for that sector), but also on the size and variability of the market. This is 
especially clear for water distribution, which may generate high economies of scale, but for 
which demand may be quite variable in time. 
The main crucial institutional constraint is again the information asymmetry between the 
state and the private firms and the high risk of opportunism on part of the latter. 
1.15 Implementing Agricultural Labels 
Description of the policy option 
Due to an increasing number of food scares and the fact that consumers continue to be more 
health conscious, quality signals at food markets have become increasingly important. Apart 
from quality signals closely related to specific “production processes” (e.g., organically 
produced food), in particular, the quality signal “regional origin of food” has gained more 
prominence in food purchasing decisions (Balling, 2000; Becker, 2002). The EU recognises 
and supports those agricultural labels that differ from trademarks in that the production must 
be linked to a particular area. Within the WTO negotiations, agricultural labels are presented 
as a means of reducing information asymmetries about the quality of food products, 
especially when quality is supposed to be linked to a particular area (Barjolle and Chappuis, 
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2000). It should be noted that objectives of policies promoting agricultural labels for regional 
origin of food might also include the potential benefits to the rural economy, in particular to 
less-favoured or remote areas, by improving the income of farmers and by retaining the rural 
population in these areas (Regulation EC No. 2081/1992). However, in the following only the 
policy objective “reducing information asymmetries” is focused on. On the other hand, labels 
are accused of facilitating collusion and distorting competition. For example, food producers 
have an incentive to benefit from using agricultural labels (realising price premiums and/or 
higher consumer demands) while at the same time avoiding the costs for meeting the related 
superior quality standard. Therefore, in the EU, the regional-origin labelling has to be 
associated with a quality-control system that ensures the superior quality.  
The debate around labels is rooted in cultural habits. Some authors find that people in 
Southern Europe countries (including France) tend to value local specificities (French notion 
of “terroir”), whereas people in Northern countries (in particular, England and the 
Netherlands) only think in terms of industrial brands (Ménard and Klein, 2004). Yet, also in 
Germany, consumers have at least some willingness to pay for the characteristic “regional 
origin” (Schröder et al., 2005).  
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy option: regulatory on hierarchies and regulatory on markets 
Implementation of agricultural labels raises several institutional issues. First, policymakers 
need to devise a system of quality control that reduces the likelihood of collusion and that 
avoids situations where the organization in charge of the quality monitoring has a direct 
interest in the food sector. In France, for example, this took the form of the separation 
between certification organizations and producers associations. In other countries, state 
agencies were created or made responsible for ensuring independent quality control. Here, 
implementation costs might be substantial. Second, the quality policy needs to define ways of 
distinguishing the protection of traditional processes from pure collusive and anti-competition 
behaviour, in the context of high cultural differences between countries. In other words, the 
policymaker has to make sure that protecting and promoting products of regional origin by 
introducing agricultural labels actually serves the purpose of reducing information 
asymmetries about the quality of food products. Further, the regional origin needs to be 
linked to a superior quality demanded by consumers. Thus, misuse of agricultural labels has 
to be avoided as well as inadequate levels of protection and promotion. Here, weak consumer 
preferences with regard to regional and quality aspects of food products might indicate that 
there is no actual demand for information on food origin and quality, thus, providing no 
“societal legitimisation” of policies promoting agricultural labels. On the other hand, strong 
consumer preferences together with the ability to voice their interests (determined by social 
capital) are likely to increase the level of protection or the number of labelled products. 
There are four main crucial institutional aspects. First, the likelihood of collusion is positively 
correlated to the monopoly power of the food-processing industry which is partly derived 
from the industry structure (Raynaud and Sauvée, 2000), but increases also with the level of 
trust between private operators (Perrier-Cornet and Sylvander, 2000). Second, 
administrative public transaction costs for establishing independent certification 
organisations. Third, weak consumer preferences for healty and quality products indicate 
low actual demands for agricultural labels. Forth, strong consumer preferences together 
with high levels of social capital and, to a lesser extent, the degree of corruption (here, 
agreement between producers and administration) might lead to “over-labelling” or misuse of 
agricultural labels.  
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1.16 Agricultural Subsidies Subject to Compliance with 
Environmental Standards 
Description of the policy option 
The Policy Food Security Act from 1985 in the USA encompassed farm program payments 
that were linked to the conservation of soil practices to induce the desired producer 
behaviour. When producers apply an approved conservation plan on highly erodible land 
potential they receive government payments. The analysed policy option can be compared 
with the European cross-compliance policy provisions that tie eligibility for agricultural 
subsidies to producer compliance with certain environmental standards (Giannakas and 
Kaplan, 2005). 
Policy type and corresponding crucial institutional aspects 
Policy Type: economic on market and economic on property rights; natural resource 
addressed is land/soil 
Crucial institutional aspects influencing this policy’s effectiveness are that monitoring and 
enforcement of compliance and adoption is costly and the conventional assumption of 
producer homogeneity. There are economic incentives for producers not to comply with the 
conservation provisions but to claim government payments (for which they are not entitled). 
Compliance depends on, among other things, the farm specific costs incurred by adopting the 
environmental standards in relation to the level of agricultural subsidies linked to it. Thus, 
given uniform environmental standards to be met by all producers, heterogeneity of 
actors’ interests and opportunistic behaviour are the main institutional aspects. 
2 Crucial Institutional Aspects not Directly Related to 
Policy Options 
(Trade-related) Agricultural Protectionist Policies 
2.1 Deregulation of Agricultural Trade in Russia 
Main message of the article  
Kopsidis (1997) starts from the observation that from 1990 to 1994 the economic and 
political process of disintegration within the Russian Federation halved the domestic trade of 
grain between the various regions and caused significant reductions in production. From 
European economic history and the experience of several developing countries it is argued, 
that there is a strong correlation between the formation of domestic markets and sustainable 
growth in agricultural output. It is shown that economic reforms (Ordnungspolitik) and a 
deregulation of the agricultural trade can only generate positive effects on agricultural 
production in Russia if the infrastructure is greatly improved. Yet, such reforms and an 
overall modernization of the infrastructure can only be implemented if the central power can 
establish a consistent market conform economic and agricultural policy all over Russia. The 
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unwillingness to implement reforms in all parts of the Russian agricultural sector is identified 
as main obstacle to the formation of a cost-efficient domestic market. 
Crucial institutional aspects 
Political and administrative inertia (here, the unwillingness to implement reforms) might 
hamper the implementation of policies aiming at the deregulation of trade and a cost-efficient 
domestic market for agricultural products.  
2.2 New (Potentially Legitimate and Welfare-enhancing) 
Arguments for Trade-related Protectionism 
Main message of article 
Kerr (2004) provides important insights on institutional aspects related to economic policies 
addressing the market. He starts from the argument that following the economic model that 
underlies the WTO the only group that can be expected to ask for protection is producers in 
importing countries. Other arguments for protectionisms, such as balance of trade, infant 
industry, national security, revenue-raising tariff, infant economy, import substitution 
industrialisation were shown not to be generally welfare enhancing. However, seeking of 
protection is no longer confined to producer interests in importing countries but rather 
includes new groups that have different motives and incentives. Prominent ones are:  
1) Consumer issue–based  
For the most part, consumer concerns are comprised of individuals (or subsets of the 
consumer population) who have strong preferences related to a particular issue including 
animal welfare, labour standards, the use of growth hormones in animal production, and the 
use of biotechnology in food production. In the case of biotechnology, for example, trade 
liberalisation might indeed not be unambiguously welfare enhancing if information 
asymmetry between consumer and producer is accounted for. Thus, politicians might impose 
trade barriers legitimately to protect consumer-based interests. However, since those trade 
barriers often also provide economic benefit to domestic producers of products that would 
compete with imports it is difficult to determine the true underlying source of protectionist 
pressure. 
2) Environmental issue–based  
Environmentalists (often on behalf of consumers) request to deny market access to products 
not produced in an environmentally friendly fashion or want higher standards of scientific 
evidence to be used for determining when imports are to be considered safe for the 
environment. Furthermore, the risk trade itself presents for the environment is the concern: In 
some cases the perception is that economic growth is bad for the environment and, as trade 
liberalisation leads to economic growth, it should be opposed. In other cases, environmental 
groups worry that lowering environmental regulations will impart a competitive advantage 
for tradable goods and will cause deleterious effects on the global environment. Here again, 
traditional producer protectionist interests and their allies such as labour unions that are 
concerned with the loss of competitiveness and the offshore movement of investment and 
jobs are able to make common cause with environmental groups and lend their resources to 
fostering a cause that has considerable legitimacy.  
3) Failed economy–based  
“Failed economies” are often dysfunctional to a degree (e.g., uncompetitive or severely 
distorted markets) that they can be expected to receive only marginal benefit from an open 
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trade regime. What is more, regulating trade often becomes one of the most lucrative means 
for domestic politicians to extract corruption rents that can, in part, be used to keep them in 
power. This may either be through opportunities for bribery or the exercise of an import 
monopoly. Thus, implementation of trade liberalisation policies might be constraint by 
national/regional governments. 
Crucial institutional aspects 
There are three main categories of issues that might hamper effective implementation of 
policies eliminating trade-related protectionism: 1) consumer-based (strong consumer 
preferences for health and quality products), 2) environment-based (strong 
environmental groups, environmental legislation, or environmental awareness of 
consumers), and 3) failed-economy based (e.g., corruption). In particular in the first two 
cases, policies for trade liberalisation cannot be considered as generally welfare enhancing. 
Further, since those arguments are often perceived as legitimate by the general public trade 
liberalisation might face strong opposition, thus, hampering effective implementation. Yet, 
detecting the true underlying source of protectionist pressures in order to determine the 
legitimacy of protectionist policies is difficult. 
2.3 Trade Policy Liberalisation in Poor Countries with Smallholder 
Agriculture 
Main message of article 
Kydd et al. (2002) argue that trade policy liberalisation requires institutional change. The 
authors raise the question whether these changes produce „superior institutions“ judged in 
terms of a reduction of transaction costs, improved coordination, stronger strategic 
commitment to investing in needed specific assets, and allocative efficiency. Applying a 
theoretical framework informed by the various strands within institutional economics, the 
authors content that smallholder agriculture in poor countries needs coordinated market 
economy type institutions if it is to develop, at least at the earlier stages. Ideally, these would 
be based on deliberative institutions, working horizontally inside a sector, but also working 
vertically along the supply chain. However, a way must be found in which the state and other 
powerful actors can initiate deliberative processes and take a lead in encouraging appropriate 
asset specific investments, while at the same time planning to fade into the background as 
initial success is achieved. Furthermore, it is noted critically that current institutional analysis 
can not sufficiently provide insights, in particular quantifiable, into the consequences of those 
liberalisation policies which drive changes in such features as „non-standard institutional 
arrangements“; non-market coordination; and the roles of government.  
Crucial institutional aspects 
If trade liberalisation policies are to be implemented effectively in poor countries with 
smallholder agriculture they need to be accompanied - at least in the early stages - by a 
process of deliberately crafting institutions (by either the state or other powerful actors; i.e., 
some form of non-market coordination) that are able to reduce transactions costs and to 
improve market coordination, that encourage investment in specific assets, and that improve 
allocative efficiency. Thus, in the case of poor countries with smallholder agriculture, 
trade liberalisation policies that are not complemented by some form of non-market 
coordination might face high transaction cost and might not be welfare enhancing. This is 
often due to inefficient credit markets for smallholders. 
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2.4 Direct Versus Indirect Agricultural Support Schemes: Farmers’ 
Perceived Dependence on Support 
Main message of the article 
Based on a survey of 4,500 farmers asked in the UK, Germany, and Portugal, respectively, 
Daugbjerg et al. (2003) emphasise that design and nature of agricultural support schemes 
have an influence on farmers’ perception of their level of dependence on agricultural support. 
In contrast to direct aid payments for farmers, indirect support mechanisms veil the level of 
subsidisation. For example, price support through artificially high consumer prices might give 
an illusion of free and competitive markets amongst farmers. Thus, Daugbjerg et al. show that 
the visibility of agricultural subsidies affects how farmers perceive their dependence on 
agricultural support, albeit at a modest level. Farmers cannot be said to be rational actors 
possessing full information on the regulatory context in which they conduct their farming 
activity. Farmers operating predominantly under commodity market regimes applying 
indirect support tend to believe that they are less dependent on agricultural support than those 
receiving direct support  
Crucial institutional aspects 
Farmers seem not to possess full information on the regulatory context of agricultural support 
schemes. Since direct aid schemes for farmers convey a stronger subjective impression of 
dependence, it can be argued that policies that aim to reduce those direct aid schemes will 
face stronger opposition from farmers (‘lobbies) than indirect support schemes. 
2.5 Political Costs of (Reducing) Agricultural Protection 
Main message of the article 
Swinnen et al. (2000) focus on the impact of the changing role of agriculture and food 
production in the economy with economic development and changes in the relative income 
situation of farmers as the primary causes of change in agricultural protection, as well as 
institutional changes affecting decision-making. Changes in the structure of the economy 
affect the distribution and the size of political costs and benefits of agricultural protection 
and, thus, the government’s political incentives in decision making. The results are based on a 
quantitative empirical analysis of the determinants of agricultural protection, based on 
hundred years of commodity level annual data from Belgium. 
Crucial institutional aspects 
• Decreasing farmers’ incomes relative to incomes of the rest of the economy reduce the 
political costs and increase the benefits for politicians in supporting farm incomes [and, 
arguably, vice versa]. Thus, EU policies aiming at reducing agricultural support while the 
relative income position of farmers is decreasing is likely to be resisted (or the expected 
losses to be compensated) by national/regional governments in order to avoid high 
political costs. 
• Agricultural protection has been higher for those commodities that represented a smaller 
share in consumer expenditures, as policy-induced price increases for those commodities 
had less impact on consumer welfare, and met with less opposition. Thus, it is likely that 
a policy reducing subsidies for those commodities representing a small share in consumer 
expenditures will face only limited opposition (political costs) since the corresponding 
decrease in consumer welfare (due to higher prices, ceteris paribus) will be small. 
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• The integration of Belgian agricultural policies in the CAP in 1968 had a positive impact 
on protection, ceteris paribus. It is argued that the specific characteristics of the EU 
decision-making institutions cause higher agricultural protection. For example, 
consumers tend to be less informed about decision-making at the EU level than at the 
national/regional level and less organised at the EU level than producer groups and, 
therefore, have less influence on the decision-making. From this it can be expected that 
those policies reducing subsidies which are decentrally defined (at national/regional 
level) will be more in line with consumer interests, resulting in – comparatively – limited 
opposition from (national/regional) consumer lobbies and lower levels of (remaining) 
protection.  
• The considerable increase in capital intensity of Belgian agriculture, and the associated 
reduction in employment, which occurred around the time of EU integration, would 
increase agricultural protection. If agricultural protection is reduced in capital-intensive 
agricultural production branches opposition against policy implementation will be higher 
than in labour intensive branches. 
• With increasing incomes, declining real food prices, and innovations in food processing 
and marketing, consumers are caring less about the price effect of agricultural policy, and 
increasingly more about other aspects (quality, health, and later on environment, animal 
welfare, etc.), unlike the producer groups who remain heavily affected by the price 
effects of the policies. Thus, consumers in economies with high income rates, low real 
food prices, and innovative food processing and marketing systems will respond to price 
shocks (higher commodity prices following a decrease in subsidies) less drastically 
(decreasing demand; political lobbying) than consumers in low income countries, etc. 
To sum up, implementation of policies reducing agricultural protection might be constrained 
(due to high political costs) in a specific country/region a) if the relative income position of 
farmers is decreasing, b) if the commodities concerned represent a high share in consumer 
expenditures, c) if policies are defined at EU level, d) if capital intensive agricultural 
production branches are concerned, and e) in the presence of low income rates and high real 
food prices. 
Environmental Policies 
2.6 Transaction Costs in Environmental Policies 
Main message of the article 
McCann and Colby (2005) provide a theoretical framework for analysing the different kinds 
of transaction costs occurring for setting up and management of environmental policies. 
Based on the standard Williamson approach they develop a typology of costs (e.g., 
information, research, negotiation, monitoring, etc.). They also discuss the distribution and 
the magnitude of these costs that vary greatly between the different levels of administration 
(national, regional). They stress the need to consider transaction costs for evaluating 
environmental policies systematically, in particular monitoring costs that can be substantial. 
However, direct measurement of transaction costs is difficult. 
Crucial institutional aspects 
This article identifies several crucial institutional aspects: 
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• High monitoring costs due to both, measurement problems in environmental practices 
and uncertainties about causal relationships between these practices and the state of the 
environment. Here, information asymmetry between state and producer(s) as well as 
opportunism on part of the latter can constitute an institutional constraint.  
• Co-ordination/negotiation costs between (groups of) actors with divergent interests and 
different – culturally determined – attitudes with respect to the environment can be high. 
Thus, heterogeneous environment-related social values (e.g., environmental 
awareness) of the relevant (groups of) actors can pose an institutional constraint. 
• In particular, environmental policies need to be implemented during a sufficient amount 
of time to be effective. Thus, frequent changes because of a lack of (environmental) 
political continuity (for instance, due to the electoral process) can reduce the 
effectiveness of environmental policies.  
2.7 Constraints to Cost-efficient and Equitable Environmental 
Policy Design 
Main message of the article 
Theoretical considerations by Lichtenberg (2002) explore to three determinants for cost-
efficient and equitable environmental policy design: farmers’ incentives, heterogeneity, and 
uncertainty. In particular, it is focussed on a) the extent to which farmers have incentives for 
protecting environmental quality voluntarily and how those incentives are influenced by 
technical change, b) the implications of heterogeneity in physical, chemical and biological 
characteristics of the environment, the variations in crop choice and the cultivation methods 
for the choice of cost-efficient environmental policy types: So-called best management 
practices, imposing restrictions on the use of specific inputs, taxing inputs associated with 
environmental problems, or subsidizing environmental quality measures, and c) the 
implications of uncertainty of the agricultural production and its environmental effects for 
environmental policy design.  
Crucial institutional aspects 
According to heterogeneity of the characteristics of the environment the social optimum 
cannot be implemented for instance by a uniform tax on inputs that impair environmental 
quality or by a uniform subsidy on inputs that enhance environmental quality. For instance, if 
nitrogen leaching is lower on higher quality land then the optimal nitrogen tax should be 
lower on fields of higher quality. Thus, undifferentiated policy measures (premiums, 
restrictions, etc) can reduce a policies’ effectiveness.  
However, there is often an institutional constraint preventing the implementation of 
differential taxes needed, as law often prohibits those differentiations. Hence, legal 
restrictions to differentiation likely constitute the most significant barriers to adapt, for 
instance, policy measures against soil erosion to topography, soil characteristics, location, 
crop choice or farm production practices. 
Another institutional constraint is the information asymmetry between agricultural firms 
and the state due to the characteristics of natural resources. To handle environmental 
problems associated with the use of variable inputs, such as fertilisers and pesticides, it is 
crucial that these inputs are storable and easily repacked. Here, effective taxes, for instance, 
would involve extensive reporting. Other environmental measures are unenforceable without 
extensive, intrusive government inspection, which often lead to high transaction costs. For 
example, if a tax involves differentiated premiums related to input quantities, the government 
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must be able to monitor cumulative purchases to ensure that farmers do not simply avoid high 
tax rates through multiple purchases of smaller quantities. In addition, if the government 
offers a payment in return for a specific conservation effort, it must be able to observe that 
effort or infer it from observable outcomes.  
Due to the aforementioned difficulties to monitor environmental measures, the problem of 
opportunism (moral hazard) on part of the producers is exacerbated. For example, input 
taxes and subsidies are ineffective in cases where pollution control effort can neither be 
observed directly nor inferred from production. 
Furthermore, effectiveness of environmental policies aimed at agriculture is often hampered 
by existing agricultural policies and policies focussing at other resources. Thus, 
contradictory policy instruments constitute an institutional constraint.  
General Institutional Aspects 
2.8 Redundant and Contradictory Public Policies 
Main message of the article 
Demazière (2002) emphasises the competition between interventions/policies of public 
authorities at different administrative levels (EU, national state, regions, départements) for 
local development actions in France. The example of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region indicates 
the difficulty to take environmental aspects into account in the definition of public local 
actions targeted at the same companies/producers (e.g., subsidies to reduce pollutions or to 
treat polluted soils) in the presence of other public (non-) environmental policies. 
Crucial institutional aspects 
The crucial institutional constraint here is the multiplicity of public interventions aiming at 
the same companies but with (slightly) different objectives that sometimes can be 
contradictory (e.g., incentives to raise productivity versus incentives to reduce the emission 
of environmentally unfriendly substances) or redundant. Since different administrative 
levels (horizontally and vertically) are involved, the unclear distribution of responsibilities 
between administrative levels (problem of interplay) is relevant, too. 
2.9 Acceptance of Policies by Citizens 
Main message of the articles 
Citizens’ response to a policy is centrally important in whether this policy will achieve its 
objectives, and thus be effective (Pistor, 2000). Whether policies result in compliance, 
resistance, or withdrawal depends not so much on what the policy actually does, but on how 
people socially construct the meaning of the policy and what they believe are appropriate and 
correct actions for citizens to take.  
Crucial institutional aspects 
The acceptance of policies belongs to the embeddedness level of crucial institutional aspects. 
Depending on the policy options and “policy design elements” governments can appear fair 
or unfair, logical and straightforward or illogical with hidden agendas, helpful or antagonistic, 
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as an important aspect of life or irrelevant (Schneider and Ingram, 1997: 79). In accordance, 
with respect to an implemented policy people may feel informed, empowered, helpless, 
ignorant, or important. Therefore, the implementation of policies might be constrained if 
there is a lack of trust in state authorities, if insufficient information on policy objectives 
between state and people prevail, and if political objectives are not congruent with the mental 
models and values of the people,  
2.10 Social Capital Dimensions: Interpersonal Trust and Trust 
Towards Government Authorities 
Main message of the article 
Alesina and Ferrara (2002) and Callois and Aubert (2005) discuss the distinction between two 
important determinants of social capital: interpersonal trust (trust between individuals) and 
trust towards government authorities. Although the articles do not focus on policies, both 
ingredients of social capital as well as there interrelation are seen as determinants for 
effective policy implementation.  
Crucial institutional aspects 
The articles raise two important institutional aspects. First, depending on the level of trust of 
actors towards government authorities interpersonal trust may facilitate as well as hinder 
the implementation of policies. When trust towards government authorities is high and trust 
between individuals is also high then the latter will reduce transaction costs and facilitate the 
implementation of a policy. However, when trust towards government authorities is low and 
trust between individuals is high, than the latter will foster collusion (e.g., non-compliance, 
low uptake of schemes, etc.) against government action. Second, low levels of interpersonal 
trust will hamper the implementation of policies (or cause high transaction costs) 
relying on spontaneous/endogenous collective action, such as territorial policies. In that 
case, a more authoritarian scheme may be more cost-efficient, in order to enhance 
collaboration. Cook et al. (2005: 1) argue that trust works primarily at the interpersonal level 
to produce microlevel social order and to lower the costs of monitoring and sanctioning that 
might be required if individuals were not trustworthy.  
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Appendix 3: Suggestions for Operationalisation of PICA and 
its Integration in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
This Section contains a detailed visual depiction of the sequence and the form of interactions 
between the User(s), the PICA expert team, other SEAMLESS Working Groups and - if 
applicable - external experts and stakeholders. The depiction also provides suggestions on the 
representation of the different PICA components in the Graphical User Interface (GUI). This 
first sketch will be further discussed and improved together with all relevant SEAMLESS 
work packages.  
Tables, graphs, maps, and texts that are placed on a light grey background are supposed to be 
permanent elements of the GUI and SEAMLESS-IF integrated in Prototype 3 and later 
versions. However, their form and content will be updated continually. All other tables, 
graphs, maps, and texts will be constructed, i.e., filled with information and data, according to 
the needs and outcomes of the respective PICA “run”. 
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User PICA-Experts
 Hierarchy/ 
Bureaucracy 
Market Self-organised 
network 
Regulatory    
Economic    
Advisory/ 
Voluntary 
   
 
 
Representation in the GUI
May inform him/herself 
Describes policy option 
1) Categorise policy type 
(buttons light up)
2) Provide short 
explanatory text
 Hierarchy/ 
Bureaucracy 
Market Self-organised 
network 
Regulatory    
Economic    
Advisory/ 
Voluntary 
   
 
 
Property rights
change
Natural 
Resources 
Addressed 
    
 
 
May click on buttons 
that light up 
Click on button shows short general explanation of policy 
type (here, economic on market) and example policies
Short introduction to Institutions and 
the concept of institutional analysis 
(PICA) in SEAMLESS-IF
Provide (Prototype 3) 
and update content 
Description of policy option, e.g., Nitrate Directive
Detailed description of policy option
Detailing policy option
(with PICA-Experts) 
Discussing policy option
(with User) 
Regulatory 
on Market
Other relevant 
policy categories 
    
 
Environmental
Policy
Water
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Crucial Institutional Aspects (CIA)
User PICA-Experts
Decides to initiate 
PICA step 2
Clicking one of the lighted-up buttons in the 
above table produces 
1) a short explanatory text
1) Discussing relevance and 
sufficiency of CIA selected in PICA 
step 1 for concrete policy option
2) If necessary, conducting expert 
interviews, carrying out com-
plementary literature review, etc.
3) Provide adapted list of CIA, 
including short explanatory texts, a 
detailed report, and documentation 
of discussion (protocol)
Representation in the GUI
Short explanation of link between policy option and category
2) the general list of Crucial Institutional Aspects (CIA) 
linked to the category from the general library of CIAs
Provide 
(Prototype 3) and 
update content 
A – Ambigious Property Rights
B – High Level of Opportunism
C – …
D – …
E – …
May click on buttons
Clicking one of the buttons in the above table produces a 
short story on the general link between this CIA and the policy 
type (Note: A CIA’s logic may apply to several policy types)
Short story on general link between CIA and policy type
Adapted (restricted) list of CIA linked to the categories 
relevant for the policy option
Crucial Institutional Aspects (CIA) 
 
 
 
 
B – High Level of Opportunism
C – …
Z – Strong bargaining power of farmers‘ organisations
May click on buttons
2) a list of all Crucial Institutional Aspects related to the 
category (policy type)
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Description of 
Indicator 
Data 
source 
Operation
al? 
Specific assumptions on 
links between indicator, 
CIA, and policy option 
Д =    
β =    
 
User PICA-ExpertsRepresentation in the GUI
Clicking one of the buttons in the above table produces 
1) a short story on the specific link between the CIA and the 
policy option
Short story on specific link between CIA and policy option
2) a matrix with institutional indicators able to describe the 
degree of the respective CIA
B – High level of opportunism 
 
Description 
of Indicator 
Data 
source 
Operatio
nal? 
General 
assumptions on 
links between 
indicator and CIA 
Д =    
β =    
…    
 
Indicator/ data base is accessible and operational in S-IF
Indicator/ data base is accessible, but not integrated in S-IF
Indicator needs data generation
д
β
γ
δ
…
…
Provide 
(Prototype 3) and 
update content 
Decides to initiate 
PICA step 3
Adapted (restricted) matrix with institutional indicators most 
appropriate to describe the degree of CIA with respect to policy option
1) Discussing relevance and 
sufficiency of available indicators 
for describing CIA with respect to 
concrete policy option
2) If necessary, new or better 
indicators can be added
3) Discussing data-related issues 
with relevant SEAMLESS-staff
4) Provide adapted matrix, including 
specific assumptions
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User PICA-Experts
Interacting with WP4 and WP5:
• Integrating (external) data base in 
S-IF (if possible)
• Accessing data base outside S-IF, 
feeding in indicator values; 
providing tables/maps
• Accessing other indicators 
calculated by S-IF or model 
outputs, e.g., FSSIM, etc.; 
providing tables/maps
Decides on favoured 
indicator(s)
a)
Representation in the GUI
Activating fully operational institutional indicator (green) starts 
“indicator calculator” and produces
1) a table containing the indicator values for respective 
countries, regions, etc.
Indicator Values Description 
of Indicator Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
… 
β = X Y Z … 
 
2) If applicable, a map showing the indicator values for 
respective countries, regions, etc.
Provide (Prototype 3) 
and update content, 
together with WP2, 
WP3, WP4, and 
WP5, e.g.,
- integrate data 
bases in S-IF
- relate data bases to 
output styles (table, 
map)
b)
Indicator Values Description 
of Indicator 
Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
… 
γ = X Y Z … 
 
Initiates 
operationalising
of institutional
indicator
May watch
May watch
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User PICA-Experts
c)
Representation in the GUI
1. Carrying out data 
generation, e.g., 
qualitative assessment 
with/without external 
experts/stakeholders
2. Providing summary of 
qualitative assessment 
and/or table and/or map; 
interacting with WP5
Initiates data 
generation
Indicator Values Description 
of Indicator 
Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
… 
Д = X Y Z … 
 
Summary of qualitative assessment, perhaps country-/
or region wise
May watch
Compiling all indicator 
values and qualitative 
assessments for each CIA 
of the adapted list 
identified in PICA step2
B – High level of opportunism 
 
д
β
Indicator Values Description 
of Indicator 
Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
… 
Д = X Y Z … 
β = L K B … 
 
C – … 
 
Z – Strong bargaining power of farmers’ organisations 
 Indicator Values Description 
of Indicator Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
… 
Φ = W Q E … 
σ = D H A … 
 
ф
σ
ξ Summary of qualitative assessment
May watch
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User PICA-ExpertsRepresentation in the GUI
1. Evaluating indicator 
values and qualitative 
assessments for each CIA 
of the adapted list 
identified in PICA step 2
2. Providing qualitative 
assessments on the 
overall extent/relevance of 
each CIA of the adapted 
list (country-/region wise); 
table and/or map 
May watch
Overall extent/relevance of CIA 
(Very low / low / medium / high / very high)
Crucial 
Institutional 
Aspect 
Evaluated 
Indicators 
Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
… 
High level of 
opportunism 
Д ; β  high medium very high … 
Strong bargaining 
power of farmers’ 
organisations 
Φ ; σ  
low low very low … 
… ξ  … … … … 
 
1. Defining clusters of 
institutional compatibility 
(revising existing list)
2. Aggregating/ grouping 
CIA in clusters of 
institutional compatibility 
previously defined
3. Discussing conclusions 
on the overall 
institutional compatibility 
in the respective clusters 
(with external experts)
Overall extent/relevance of CIA 
(Very low / low / medium / high / very high) Compatibility 
Cluster CIA Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
Governance 
Structures 
Compatibility 
High level of 
opportunism high medium very high 
Governance 
Structures 
Compatibility 
… … … … 
Communication 
Capacity 
Strong 
bargaining 
power of 
farmers’ 
organisations 
low low very low 
Property Rights 
Compatibility … … … … 
Property Rights 
Compatibility … … … … 
Institutional Diversity … … … … 
Institutional Diversity … … … … 
N.N.     
 
May watch
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1. Providing qualitative 
conclusions on the overall
institutional compatibility 
of  the policy option for 
each compatibility cluster 
(country-/region wise)
2. Providing ranking in table 
and/or map, and short 
and detailed versions of 
an explanatory text on the 
overall institutional 
compatibility of the policy 
option for each 
compatibility cluster
User PICA-ExpertsRepresentation in the GUI
Overall Institutional Compatibility of Policy 
Option 
(Very low / low / medium / high / very high) Compatibility 
Cluster Country/ 
Region 
A 
Country/ 
Region 
B 
Country/ 
Region 
C 
Expla-
natory 
Text 
Governance 
Structures 
Compatibility 
high medium high-medium Text 
Communication 
Capacity low medium-low very low Text 
Property Rights 
Compatibility … … … Text 
Institutional Diversity … … … Text 
N.N.    Text 
 
May watch 
and/or read
May click on buttons
Short or Detailed
Explanatory Text
Clicking one of the buttons in the table above produces
a) a map showing the overall 
institutional compatibility of the 
policy option (ranking) for each 
compatibility cluster in the 
respective countries/regions
b) An short/detailed explanatory 
text on the overall institutional 
compatibility of the policy option 
for each compatibility cluster in 
the respective countries/regions
Discusses results of 
institutional 
compatibility analysis 
and implications for 
policy implementation 
and (perhaps) policy 
modification
Explaining results of 
institutional 
compatibility analysis 
and implications for 
policy implementation 
and (perhaps) policy 
modification
 
